would guide his Administration in the form of an inaugural address." 42 The message was released on April 9, 1841, four days after he arrived in Washington. He first focused on the unique circumstances that brought him to the presidential office and then moved to the principles that would govern his administration of patronage, foreign policy, military affairs, and the economy. The major portion of his remarks was devoted to the need for civil service and economic reform. With regard to federal patronage, Tyler said he would "at a proper time invoke the action of Congress on the subject," and would acquiesce in those measures "calculated to arrest" the evils of the present system. In recognizing that the "public interest" demanded a stabilized economy, Tyler pledged that he would promptly give his sanction to any constitutional measure Congress approved which might restore the sound monetary system he believed "essentially necessary to give confidence in all transactions of life, to secure to industry its just and adequate rewards, and to reestablish the public prosperity." 43 The Whigs were cheered by these latter remarks, confident that at last their long fight for a national bank was now over. 44

accession to the presidency, however, left Clay's future uncertain. If Tyler "remained in the good graces of the party he would be the logical candidate for the succession." Only by "assuming the leadership of the party and by discrediting Tyler in the eyes of the Whigs" could Clay retain his mantle as heir apparent. Chitwood, John Tyler, p. 211. On May 25, 1841, the New York Herald in an editorial relating to a political dinner planned for Sen. Nathaniel P. Tallmadge of New York the following evening maintained that the festivities were "essentially a continuation of a movement to control the succession-to inure to the benefit of Mr. Clay." See also Chitwood, John Tyler, p. 209; Tyler, Letters and Times, 2: 23; and United States Democratic Review 9 (July 1841): 60-74.

42 Richardson, Papers of the Presidents, 4:1890. Prior to the publication of Tyler's inaugural address at least three persons expressed the hope that he would announce his intended course as president. Alfred Kelly to Ewing, Apr. 9, 1841, and Albert Lawrence to Ewing, Apr. 8, 1841, Ewing Papers; S. Mason to Cushing, Cushing Papers. In two instances the dates are after the address had been released; this is because it was a number of days before the president's remarks reached those living away from Washington. See also Abell, Life of John Tyler, p. 186; and Cincinnati Daily Gazette, Apr. 10, 1841.

43 Richardson, Papers of the Presidents, 4:1892. Morgan contends that the inaugural address was used by Tyler to confirm his position publically. Morgan, Whig Embattled, pp. 10, 18, 185; Morgan, "The Presidency Under John Tyler" (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Virginia, 1951), p. 32.

44 Cushing to Dr. Spafford, Apr. 15, 1841, Cushing Papers; John Davis to Daniel Webster, Daniel Webster Papers, LC;

Henry Clay, father of the "American System" and a perennial aspirant to the presidency.

Almost totally ignored was Tyler's concluding statement with respect to the currency wherein the president explained that he would approve only measures that conformed to the ideals of the "fathers of the great republican school," and by inference would veto any that did not.

As Webster aptly observed in July 1841, some weeks prior to the formal split between Tyler and the Whigs on the bank issue: When Harrison and Tyler were nominated, their opinions on public questions were generally known. And especially was Tyler's attitude toward the bank question well known-known as well as any public man's position on any subject whatever. From 1819 to the day of the nomination, those sentiments had been expressed and repeated in all forms, both in

Lambert, Presidential Politics, p. 11; Morgan, "Presidency Under John Tyler," p. 34.

Tyler was, as he told Rep. Henry A. Wise of Virginia a few days after Harrison's death, "too old in his opinions to change them" 66 more radically than this. Wisely, Tyler kept his feelings largely to himself. Secretary of the Treasury Thomas Ewing, one of Clay's closest friends in the cabinet, wrote to the Kentuckian on May 8, "No man can be better disposed [toward Clay] than the president.... He speaks of you with the utmost kindness and you may rely upon his friendship, it is strong and unabated." 67

On the morning of May 13, 1841, eight weeks after Tyler had assumed the presidency, the special session of the Twenty-seventh Congress convened. During the ensuing two days, both houses of the Congress by "overflowing majorities," resolved, in the words of the New York Daily Express, that "John Tyler, late vice president [had] become, by the death of General Harrison, 'President of the United States,' and not vice president, exercising the office of president."

" 68

In the House of Representatives a discussion of Tyler's succession began after Congressman Wise had "offered the usual resolution" for the appointment of a committee to "join with such a committee as might be appointed by the Senate, to wait on the President of the United States, and inform him that . . . Congress is now ready to receive any communication he may be pleased to make." John McKeon of New York questioned the propriety of the motion and "moved to amend the resolution by striking out the word 'President,' and inserting the words 'Vice President now exercising the office of the President.'" He explained that his proposed amendment was prompted not out of political malice but because an examination of the debates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 clearly indicated that "Mr. Tyler was not actually President of the United States, but merely the Vice President executing the powers and duties of the former office." McKeon concluded by urging the House "not to mingle this matter

66 Wise to Leslie Coombs, Dec. 29, 1842, Tyler, Letters and Times, 3:106. See also Tyler to Rives, May 8, 15, 1841, Rives Papers; Jackson to Blair, Apr. 19, May 31, 1841, in Bassett, Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, 6:105, 115; and New York Herald, Apr. 7, 1841. A differing opinion is found in New Yorker 11 (Apr. 17, 1841), p. 73.

67 Ewing to Clay, May 8, 1841, Clay Papers. 68 New York Daily Express, June 4, 1841.

Congressman Wise, a member of Tyler's kitchen cabinet, in response to McKeon's remarks stated that he was glad the point had been raised. Although Tyler "with sentiments of deep sorrow, regretted that the office had devolved upon him," Wise knew that he would claim the presidency "by the Constitution, by election, and by the act of God." Furthermore, the succession clause of the Constitution confirmed Tyler's assumption of the office as well as the powers and duties of president. He hoped the House "would at once vote to recognize John Tyler as President of the United States." McKeon offered no rebuttal. Wise's resolution as originally introduced was adopted shortly thereafter.70

The following morning the debate began anew. Whig Sen. Jabez W. Huntington's motion that the "Senate concur in the joint resolution" passed by the House some hours earlier was opposed by Ohio Senators Allen and Tappan. Allen, citing article II, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution, explained that recognition of Tyler as president was likely to complicate instances of presidential inability. Tappan's observations were tempered to "confirm the view which had been taken by his colleague." It was his opinion:

that it would be found, from an examination of the Constitution as originally adopted and as subsequently amended, that there was but one mode provided in that instrument by which a President of the United States could be created. It was very true that the Vice President, under certain contingencies, was required to exercise the powers and perform the duties of the office of President, but it was nowhere declared that he thereby became the President of the United States. The President of the United States, as such, existed and could exist only by an election of the people.71

Sen. Robert J. Walker of Mississippi, the lone voice disputing the remarks of Allen and Tappan, vigorously defended Tyler's constitutional right to the presidency. "Is Tyler still

69 U. S. Congress, House, Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., 1841, 10:3.

70 Ibid., 10:4. McKeon's effort is termed an emphatic failure in New Yorker 11 (June 5, 1841), p. 185.

71 U. S. Congress, House, Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., 1841, 10:4.

the Vice President discharging additional duties?" Walker asked:

If so why is he not here performing the duties of Vice President? Could he come here and act as Vice President for a single moment? Surely not, because he has ceased to be the Vice President, for the reason that the Constitution has devolved on him the office of President, which office he holds for the entire term for which the President was chosen. This is the language and meaning of the Constitution.72

Before the proceedings ended, Allen once again addressed the disability issue. "It was easy," he explained, "to conceive that temporary disability of a President was a case likely more frequently to occur than his death. Disability might often happen, and if the Senator's [Walker's] doctrine should be established, the most fearful convulsions would follow." John C. Calhoun, however, stated that the question of disability was not before the Senate, and the discussion concluded shortly thereafter. Only eight of forty-six senators supported Allen's amendment.73 Throughout the entire discussion, Clay, the one senator who could possibly have turned the tide against Tyler, remained subdued at his desk. The president's two-month campaign to assure Clay of his willingness to cooperate with the Whigs had eased Tyler past this final hurdle in his tempestuous ascension to the office of first citizen of the land.

Less than four months later, on September 9, 1841, for the second time in some thirty days, Tyler vetoed legislation designed by Clay to reestablish a Bank of the United States. The entire cabinet, with the exception of Daniel Webster, resigned in protest two days later. Others openly denounced the vetoes as the action of an ungrateful traitor. Why had he done it? Clay, now painfully aware that his and Tyler's political philosophies were not compatible, spoke scornfully as he retraced what he considered to be the president's gradual defection from the party that had con

72 Ibid., 10:5. Sen. William C. Preston of South Carolina provided an interesting sequel to the debate when he introduced the following January a resolution instructing the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to determine if any further legislation was necessary to define the powers and duties of the vice president when the presidency is vacant. U.S. Congress, Senate, Journal, 27th Cong., 2d sess., Jan. 3, 1842, p. 64.

73 U. S. Congress, Senate, Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., 1841, 10:5.

Daniel Webster, staunch Whig and exponent of the national government.

sistently supported him. He told his Senate colleagues after the first veto that Tyler's inaugural message of April 10, 1841, was "a Whig address from beginning to end-every inch of it was Whig and patriotic." It was an address wherein Tyler had clearly stated that he would willingly carry forth the Whig plan for a national bank. "Entertaining this opinion of the Address," Clay returned to Washington at the opening of the Twenty-seventh Congress anticipating nothing but cordial cooperation between Congress and the executive branch, reflecting with pleasure that at the head of the government was an intimate "personal and political friend," whom he held in high esteem. 74

If those who nominated and elected Tyler had foreseen that he would veto legislation, approved by the first Whig congress, providing for a national bank, Clay was convinced the president would not even have been nominated. Clearly there were alternatives the president neglected to consider. He could have let the bank bill become law without his signature or been guided by the wisdom of his 74 Ibid., app., p. 364.

party and cabinet. Tyler might even have resigned his office as he had in 1836 when, as a United States senator, he could not conscientiously obey the instructions of the Virginia General Assembly to vote for the expunging of a resolution censuring President Jackson. The president instead chose to disregard "the sentiments of the whole nation." 75 Clay's anguish was understandable. Tyler's views seemingly were well known long before his succession, but Clay, like many of his political associates, understood them imperfectly. Consequently, Clay and his disciples could not anticipate the ultimate effect that their con

75 Ibid., p. 365.

firmation of the Virginian as president would have on Whig legislation.

Even if Clay and others had completely understood Tyler's intentions, they still would have had great difficulty besting him. Before Tyler reached Washington on the morning of April 6, an unusual political and social environment had begun to develop that would provide him advantages extremely difficult if not impossible to counteract. In the end, Tyler's firm desire to shape personally all the policies of his administration left him without a party to enact his legislative programs. Yet, this very independence, and his courage, assured him enduring significance as the author of the succession precedent.

American Appeasement of Germany, 1941-51

BRUCE KUKLICK

We should not describe American policy toward Germany during the forties as appeasement. Nor should American policy in the thirties be described in this way. Nonetheless, United States strategy during both the thirties and forties was similar, that is, consistent during those twenty years. Consequently, the title of this paper is meant to be a reductio ad absurdum of the use of the appeasement label in the thirties. For if appeasement obfuscates our understanding of the forties, and if the thirties and forties were alike, then it must obfuscate our view of the thirties.

What do I have against the notion of appeasement? The diplomatic historian's job is to elucidate the behavior of past diplomats using the most economic set of concepts. These concepts will always, I think, have evaluative overtones, but their primary characteristic ought to be their analytic, explanatory power. Appeasement fails us in this respect. Using the term to describe American policy forces us to accept a whole web of notions that I would disparage, ways of thinking that are heavy with a moralizing air. What I have in mind are things like that vision of Neville Chamberlain arriving from Munich holding a piece of paper and crying "peace in our time," heroic talk of gal1976 by Bruce Kuklick

lant democracies and base dictatorships, the easy use of labels such as "totalitarian" and "aggression."

It is not that appeasement and the network of connotations in which it is implicated have no explanatory power; rather, their explanatory power is wedded to a well-defined moral and political position. Using the word is almost tantamount to adopting the world view and passions of the liberal internationalists who triumphed in the forties. The idea may be powerful, but its power is as much moral and political as analytical-witness attempts of politicians of all sorts in the forties, fifties, and sixties to pin the label of "appeaser" on their opponents. The problem is, accordingly, not that appeasement and allied concepts do not provide us with an implicit theory about recent diplomatic history but that the kind of theory they embody is suspect.

The word "nigger" has descriptive contentit tells us something about the color of a person's skin- but it also encapsulates a set of attitudes that most of us would disavow. Using it reflects a series of prejudices and dispositions to action belonging to a particular social group and political persuasion. I am no champion of the contours of American diplomacy in the forties but I would not characterize it as "capi