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The First To Fight: Marine Corps Expansion,

1914-18

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JACK SHULIMSON

The impact of World War I upon the United States explains only in part the sevenfold increase in the number of marines from ten thousand men in 1914 to over seventy thousand at the end of 1918. In large measure, the political ability of Major General Commandant George Barnett and key members of his staff determined the extent of that expansion. They achieved notable success in furthering the interests of the marines within the administration and in Congress. Their political astuteness was honed in the special relationship that existed between the Marine Corps and the navy.

The development of modern warfare had made the Marine Corps' position within the naval establishment insecure. By the late nineteenth century, technological and tactical changes eliminated the need for marines in their traditional roles of manning the fighting tops of sailing ships and maintaining order among crews. As a result, some naval officers led a movement for the navy to absorb the remaining marine shipboard missions of providing men for landing parties and manning guns. President Theodore Roosevelt actually signed an executive order in the last days of his administration that would have taken marines

1976 by Jack Shulimson

The first naval academy graduate to become commandant, Maj. Gen. George Barnett won the respect of both staff and line officers.

off naval vessels, but Congress, influenced by an unofficial lobbying campaign, amended the 1909 naval appropriations bill so that marines would make up 8 percent of all battleship crews. Despite this success, marine officers believed that a threat to the corps continued to exist.11

At the same time, there was dissension between marine staff and line officers and within corps headquarters itself. Col. Charles H. Lauchheimer, the adjutant and inspector of the Marine Corps, openly showed his distaste for Commandant George Elliot during the Taft administration and according to newspaper speculation worked to have Elliot dismissed for incompetence. William P. Biddle, who succeeded Elliot as commandant in 1911, was better known as a member of the Philadelphia Biddle family than for his military qualities.2

1 Col. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea (Annapolis, 1962), pp. 154-157.

2 For an account of the Lauchheimer-Elliot dispute, see Wayne A. Wiegan, "America's Dreyfus Affair?," unpublished MS, Apr. 2, 1973, Marine Corps History and Museums Division (MCH&H, HQMC). For newspaper speculation about differences within the Marine Corps, see newsclipping, Jan. 25, 1914, in John A. Lejeune Papers, Library of Congress. Heinl observes that Biddle was nicknamed "Sitting Bull" because of "his love for a comfortable chair." Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 14.

FIRST TO FIGHT 5

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George Barnett, who assumed the commandancy in February 1914, had several attributes that tended to smooth over existing differences within the corps as well as to improve its relationship with the navy. According to Josephus Daniels, Woodrow Wilson's secretary of the navy, Barnett was "capable and agreeable... ready to carry out any policy . . . got along well with officers, and men." 3 In fact, Barnett had the respect of both line and staff officers. He and Lauchheimer had been classmates at Annapolis and were close personal friends. Barnett was also the first naval academy graduate to become commandant of the Marine Corps, which did him no harm in his dealings with the navy.

From the beginning of Barnett's command, the corps was extensively involved in carrying out Wilson's foreign policy in Latin America, placing a heavy strain on its troop resources. In April 1914, a marine brigade landed in Mexico at Vera Cruz. Brigade-size marine forces also intervened in Haiti and Santo Domingo in the following years. To meet such emergencies, marines were pulled off ships and gathered from barracks and recruiting depots. As a result, the corps was overextended, thus forcing Barnett to concern himself with increasing the number of marines.

Nevertheless, Secretary Daniels throughout 1914 and early in 1915 opposed any increase in the navy or the marines. The outbreak of World War I did not change his mind. As late as January 5, 1915, Daniels joined forces with House Democratic members of both the military and naval affairs committees against a suggested increase in military appropriations.4

Suddenly, with the sinking of the British passenger ship Lusitania, in May 1915, American involvement in the European war appeared dangerously near. As far as the Marine Corps was concerned, Barnett reported it could enlist ten thousand recruits and train and equip them within an eight-month period if mobilization were authorized. He also suggested that if hostilities began, marine detachments guarding navy yards should be increased to protect against spies and saboteurs.5

3 Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 19101917 (Chapel Hill, 1944), p. 534.

4 See entry for Jan. 5, 1915, in E. David Cronon, ed., The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels (Lincoln, 1963), pp. 87-88.

5 "Marine Corps Preparation for War, Aug. 1914-Apr. 6, 1917," enclosure 2, letter from officer-in-charge, Planning

Maj. Gen. Biddle, commandant in 1911, was best known as a member of the Biddle family of Philadelphia.

The mission of the corps in the event of war, however, was vague. Col. John A. Lejeune, who commanded the brigade at Vera Cruz and who was now the assistant to the commandant, proposed that the corps be prepared for a twofold role. If the foe were a naval power, the corps would be assigned to the defense of United States advance bases and to other duties with the navy. On the other hand if the enemy nation were a land power, "our duties if organized into regiments and brigades for Advance Base Training would be that of the Advance Guard of the Army." Lejeune believed that the objective of the marines in this case would be that they be the "first to set foot on hostile soil in order to seize, fortify, and hold a port from which as a base, the Army would prosecute its campaign." 6

Section, to commandant, Mar. 15, 1920. See also Maj. A. S. McLemore to officers of the Recruiting Service, June 3, 1915. These documents are in the files of the Office of the Commandant, general correspondence, 2515-20, Records of the United States Marine Corps, Record Group 127, National Archives (cited hereafter as RG 127, NA).

6 Lejeune, "The Mobile Defenses of Advance Bases by the Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette (Mar. 1916), pp. 1-18. The advance-base concept called for seizing and defending

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