calls was to be minimized. The voluntary method, the mainstay of earlier mobilizations, had become a war casualty.

The selection process that Johnson and his colleagues devised was able to satisfy the large draft calls of 1918. In the first eleven months after the draft's inception in May 1917, less than one million men were inducted. Yet in the next three months one million seventy-five thousand men were inducted, three hundred seventy-three thousand in May 1918, alone; and by the war's end in November, the draft had furnished nearly 67 percent of the four million men mobilized. If the war had dragged on into 1919, these large calls would have exhausted the reservoir of "fully qualified availables," necessitating the call-up of deferred classes and the risk of economic disruption. As it was, the necessity for this was postponed until 1919 only by registering all men who had turned twenty-one years of age since the first registration and the extension in

the summer of 1918 of draft age limits from eighteen to forty-five. 37

Another factor in the attempt to minimize labor shortages was a concerted drive early in 1918 to remove "idlers" from the streets. These were eligibles with high order numbers who preferred to loaf rather than work while awaiting their draft calls or persons exempted on grounds of dependency who were engaged in nonessential work. The presence of the idlers was galling to the families of men already in the service, and they obviously "served no economic war purpose whatsoever." The drive to remove them from the streets was spearheaded by Crowder, who in March 1918, commanded Johnson, now deputy provost marshal general, to prepare a memorandum dealing with both idleness and the need for more workers in essential industries. 38

37 E. H. Crowder, The Spirit of Selective Service (New York, 1920), p. 159.

38 Memo, Crowder to Johnson, Mar. 8, 1918, box 1, office

In the resulting memorandum, entitled "Selective Draft and Adjustment of Industrial Man Power," Johnson began with a stinging attack on those "who stood in saloons and pool rooms watching their contemporaries marching away to war" and postulated that "every man must serve, either under the battle flag or in the army of those usefully employed behind them." That the saloon and poolroom might be the poor man's social club was "palpable bunk" to Johnson. He dealt with the problem of idleness in two ways. First, he proposed that "the deferred classification or the deferment due to the order number . . . be withdrawn from any man upon a showing that he is not usefully engaged." Second, Johnson returned to his proposal of April 1917, for legislation requiring registration of all men between the ages of nineteen and forty-five. He now proposed that men between the ages of eighteen and fifty be registered and that for those outside the designated military ages "their age alone will be their exemption, except that, those idle or not usefully engaged must either enter useful employments or become subject to draft.'

"39

The Wilson administration was averse to Johnson's proposals because of the opposition of labor leaders. They refused to admit that there was a labor shortage and feared that Johnson's proposals would become the first steps toward industrial conscription. After two months of temporizing, however, Wilson agreed to a modified version of Johnson's proposals, and on May 23, 1918, Baker permitted Crowder to issue a "work or fight" order. It warned deferred men who were either idle or engaged in nonessential work that they risked reclassification and induction if they did not find work in essential industries. The "work or fight" order did not produce many men for the army. But as Johnson later boasted, it did put 137,255 "bartender[s], private chauffeurs, men hair dressers, and the like that are pansies" into essential war work, and it had a beneficial psychological effect. 40 The one drawback to "work or fight" was its inability to sup

file, RG 163, NA.

39 Resolution of the War Council, Mar. 20, 1918, box 67, general file, ibid.; Grenville Clark to Johnson, Mar. 23, 1918, ibid.; Johnson, The Blue Eagle, p. 84.

40 Johnson, "Selective Service," p. 8; Second Report of the Provost Marshal General, 1918, p. 80.

ply labor to particular industries in proportion to need.41

By March 1918, Crowder was ready to release Johnson. The new regulations would apparently supply enough men for the large calls of 1918; at the same time it was becoming clear that Johnson had outlasted his usefulness. His volatile personality had led to many moments of acute stress for his colleagues. When differences in policy arose, Johnson, as was the case with the constitutional question of using state institutions and officials to administer the draft, had often resorted to intemperate tirades to reinforce his arguments. And when he felt that he was being denied just credit, his reaction, whether in the form of a sullen withdrawal or a verbal tempest, had been highly visible and had impeded his work until fully vented. Moreover, he had openly feuded with Maj. John H. Wigmore, a noted Northwestern University law professor on temporary duty with the army and Crowder's "father confessor." 42 Perhaps Johnson had a personality clash with Wigmore, or perhaps he resented Wigmore's closer relationship with Crowder. Whatever the origin, Johnson's hostility toward Wigmore manifested itself in several bitter fights over the credit each should receive for his work with the draft.4

43

Notwithstanding his friendship for Johnson, Crowder had recognized early that Johnson needed close watching; and after Johnson's audacious actions in having the registration forms printed and distributed without waiting for congressional authorization, he had maintained a tight rein on his brash deputy. But at the same time Crowder's friendship for Johnson led him to tolerate his outbursts. He believed that they could be explained, in great degree, by the fatiguing conditions under which Johnson worked and a natural tendency to "blow off steam." Johnson's aggressive personality and outbursts continued to disrupt the harmony of Crowder's office. Prudence dictated that he mute his emotional tirades and differences with Wigmore. That, however, was impossible for the high-strung Johnson.

Even though he was aware that his temperament had sparked conflict, Johnson was

41 Dickinson, The Building of an Army, p. 165.

42 Lockmiller, Enoch H. Crowder, p. 181.

43 Johnson to Crowder, Nov. 29, 1921, box 8, Crowder Papers.

blind to the intensifying disenchantment with him that was surfacing in 1918. His friendship with Crowder was unimpaired, and in January 1918, he again focused his attention on France in expectation that Pershing would soon renew his call.44 This time he was buoyant, as Crowder promised to release him no later than midApril. Pershing, however, cabled in March that

44 Pershing to chief of staff, Oct. 2, 1917, cablegram 198-S, box 6, Gen. John J. Pershing Collection, National Archives Gift Collection, RG 200, NA; memo, Johnson to Crowder, Jan. 25, 1918, box 3, Crowder Papers.

Johnson's acceptance of a promotion to colonel in the national army made him ineligible for duty with his staff in France. The commander of the AEF was concerned that officers in France were being passed over for promotion by staff officers in Washington, and he refused to accept Johnson until his own staff officers were promoted.45 Pershing's decision 45 Pershing to secretary of war and chief of staff, Mar. 4, 1918, cablegram 680-S, and Pershing to judge advocate general, Mar. 24, 1918, cablegram 779-S, box 6, RG 200, NA; memo, Col. W. D. Ketcham, acting director of the War Plans Division, to chief of staff, Apr. 12, 1918, War College Divi

disappointed Johnson, but he had little time to brood. Upon reviewing the operations of the War Department, the incoming chief of staff, Gen. Peyton C. March, had "observed the work of Colonel Johnson in the Provost Marshal General's office as being very high grade" and judged that his talents would be valuable in reinvigorating the languishing army supply effort. On March 25, 1918, he relieved Johnson from duty with Crowder's office and assigned him to the general staff.46 It was not the combat field that Johnson had yearned for, even intrigued to get. Yet the transfer did bring about his rapid promotion to brigadier general and provided another arena in which he could play a major role in making things move.47

Johnson's experience with the draft showed that with close watching he was a capable number-two man. Crowder's ideas and direction form to the draft, but Johnson, more gave than anyone else, translated these into policy. Under Crowder's supervision he penned the original plan for executing the draft, the registration plan, the revised selection regulations, and the rationale for the "work or fight" order. Each marked a major step in the development of the draft, and collectively they helped insure a fair and effective system. In addition, as executive officer in charge of administration and later as deputy provost marshal general, John

sion, RG 165, NA.

46 Peyton C. March, The Nation at War (Garden City, 1932), pp. 239-240. For other estimates of Johnson's faculty for staff work, see Crowder to chief of staff, Nov. 15, 1917, box 1, office file, RG 163, NA; memo, John Biddle, acting chief of staff, to adjutant general, Feb. 5, 1918, box 504, War College Division, RG 165, NA; and memo, Col. P. P. Bishop to chief of staff, Apr. 5, 1918, box 68, chief of staff correspondence file, 1917-21, ibid.

47 John Kennedy Ohl, "General Hugh S. Johnson and the War Industries Board," Military Review, May 1975, pp. 35-48.

son oversaw much of the daily business of Crowder's office, leading the provost marshal general to write in his first annual report that "such commendation as the administration of the office merits . . . will be found due, in a great measure, to Lieut. Col. Johnson." 48 However, for all of his flair for organization and in spite of Crowder's close watching, Johnson's emotionalism and inability to work harmoniously with other staff members limited his usefulness; and one knowledgeable observer later surmised that if Johnson had remained as the number-two man administering the draft, his temperament would have seriously hindered the "tremendous and strenuous" day-to-day work required to fill the 1918 calls.49

Johnson displayed the same strengths and weaknesses when he became head of the NRA. He was at his best organizing and selling the NRA to the nation and overseeing the drafting and adopting of the fair-trade codes. But his zeal led him into excesses; and as number-one man in NRA and with no one to steady him, his weaknesses became even more pronounced. Just as he had feuded with Major Wigmore during the war, he was now feuding with Donald Richberg, his principal associate in the NRA, and countless businessmen, labor leaders, cabinet officers, and senators. His feuds embarrassed the Roosevelt administration, undermined the recovery program, and finally persuaded Roosevelt in October 1934, as Crowder before him, that Johnson's usefulness was at an end.50

48 Report of the Provost Marshal General, 1917, p. 10. 49 W. G. Murdock to Crowder, Aug. 23, 1920, box 8, Crowder Papers.

50 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, (Boston, 1959), pp. 103-157.