sense is to be adopted in every other connexion, in which it occurs. This would be to suppose, that the framers weighed only the force of single words, as philologists or critics, and not whole clauses and objects, as statesmen and practical reasoners. And yet nothing has been more common than to subject the constitution to this narrow and mischievous criticism. Men of ingenious and subtle minds, who seek for symmetry and harmony in language, having found in the constitution a word used in some sense, which falls in with their favourite theory of interpreting it, have made that the standard, by which to measure its use in every other part of the instrument. They have thus stretched it, as it were, on the bed of Procustes, lopping off its meaning, when it seemed too large for their purposes, and extending it, when it seemed too short. They have thus distorted it to the most unnatural shapes, and crippled, where they have sought only to adjust its proportions according to their own opinions. It was very justly observed by the Supreme Court, "that the same words have not necessarily the same meaning attached to them, when found in different parts of the same instrument. Their meaning is controlled by the context. This is undoubtedly true. In common language, the same word has various meanings; and the peculiar sense, in which it is used in any sentence, is to be determined by the context." A very easy example of this sort will be found in the use of the word "establish," which is found in various places in the constitution. Thus, in the preamble, one object of the constitution is avowed to be "to establish justice," which seems here to mean to settle firmly, to fix unalterably, or rather, perhaps, as justice, abstractedly considered, must be considered as for ever fixed and unalterable, to dispense or administer justice. Again, the constitution declares, that congress shall have power "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies," where it is manifestly used as equivalent to make, or form, and not to fix or settle unalterably and forever. Again, "congress shall have power to establish post-offices and post-roads," where the appropriate sense would seem to be to create, to found, and to regulate, not so much with a view to permanence of form, as to convenience of action. Again, it is declared, that "congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion," which seems to prohibit any laws, which shall recognise, found, confirm, or patronize any particular religion, or form of religion, whether permanent or temporary, whether already existing, or to arise in future. In this clause, establishment seems equivalent in meaning to settlement, recognition, or support. And again, in the preamble, it is said, "We, the people, &c. do ordain and establish this constitution," &c. where the most appropriate sense seems to be to create, to ratify, and to confirm. So, the word "state" will be found used in the constitution in all the various senses, to which it is commonly applied. It sometimes means, the separate sections of territory occupied by the political societies within each; sometimes the particular governments established by these societies; sometimes these societies as organized into these particular governments; and lastly, sometimes the people composing these political societies in their highest sovereign capacity. § 214. XIX. But the most important rule, in cases of this nature, is, that a constitution of government does not, and cannot, from its nature, depend in any great degree upon mere verbal criticism, or upon the import of single words. Such criticism may not be wholly without use; it may sometimes illustrate, or unfold the appropriate sense; but unless it stands well with the context and subject-matter, it must yield to the latter. While, then, we may well resort to the meaning of single words to assist our inquiries, we should never forget, that it is an instrument of government we are to construe; and, as has been already stated, that must be the truest exposition, which best harmonizes with its design, its objects, and its general structure. § 215. The remark of Mr. Burke may, with a very slight change of phrase, be addressed as an admonition to all those, who are called upon to frame, or to interpret a constitution. Government is a practical thing made for the happiness of mankind, and not to furnish out a spectacle of uniformity to gratify the schemes of visionary politicians. The business of those, who are called to administer it, is to rule, and not to wrangle. It would be a poor compensation, that we had triumphed in a dispute, whilst we had lost an empire; that we had frittered down a power, and at the same time had destroyed the republic. CHAPTER VI. THE PREAMBLE. § 216. HAVING disposed of these preliminary inquiries, we are now arrived at that part of our labours, which involves a commentary upon the actual provisions of the constitution of the United States. It is proposed generally to take up the successive clauses in the order in which they stand in the instrument itself, so that the exposition may naturally flow from the terms of the text. § 217. We begin then with the preamble of the constitution. It is in the following words: "We, the people of the United States, in order "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure "domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings "of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and "establish this constitution for the United States of "America." § 218. The importance of examining the preamble, for the purpose of expounding the language of a statute, has been long felt, and universally conceded in all juridical discussions. It is an admitted maxim in the ordinary course of the administration of justice, that the preamble of a statute is a key to open the mind of the makers, as to the mischiefs, which are to be remedied, and the objects, which are to be accomplished by the provisions of the statute. We find it laid down in some of our earliest authorities in the common law; and civilians are accustomed to a similar expression, cessante legis præmio, cessat et ipsa lex. 219. There does not seem any reason, why, in a fundamental law or constitution of government, an equal attention should not be given to the intention of the framers, as stated in the preamble. And accordingly we find, that it has been constantly referred to by statesmen and jurists to aid them in the exposition of its provisions. § 220. The language of the preamble of the constitution was probably in a good measure drawn from that of the third article of the confederation, which declares, that "The said states hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare." And we accordingly find, that the first resolution offered in the convention, which framed the constitution, was, that the articles of the confederation ought to be so corrected and enlarged, as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution, namely, common defence, security of liberty, and general welfare. § 221. And, here, we must guard ourselves against an error, which is too often allowed to creep into the discussions upon this subject. The preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge the powers confided to the general government, or any of its departments. It cannot confer any power per se; it can never amount, by implication, to an enlargement of any power expressly given. It can never be the legitimate source of any implied power, when otherwise withdrawn from the constitution. Its true office is to expound the nature, and extent, and application of the powers actually conferred by the constitution, and not substantively to create them. For example, the preamble declares one object to be, "to provide for the common defence." |