functions of the house of lords in relation to the trial of the party accused. The principles of the common law, so far as the jurisdiction is to be exercised, are deemed of primary obligation and government. The object of prosecutions of this sort in both countries is to reach high and potent offenders, such as might be presumed to escape punishment in the ordinary tribunals, either from their own extraordinary influence, or from the imperfect organization and powers of those tribunals. These prosecutions are, therefore, conducted by the representatives of the nation, in their public capacity, in the face of the nation, and upon a responsibility, which is at once felt, and reverenced by the whole community. The notoriety of the proceedings; the solemn manner, in which they are conducted; the deep extent, to which they affect the reputation of the accused; the ignominy of a conviction, which is to be known through all time; and the glory of an acquittal, which ascertains and confirms innocence; - these are all calculated to produce a vivid and lasting interest in the public mind; and to give to such prosecutions, when necessary, a vast importance, both as a check to crime, and an incitement to virtue. § 348. This subject will be resumed hereafter, when the other provisions of the constitution, in regard to impeachments, come under review. It does not appear, that the vesting of the power of impeachment in the house of representatives was deemed a matter of serious doubt or question, either in the convention, or with the people. If the true spirit of the constitution is consulted, it would seem difficult to arrive at any other conclusion, than of its fitness. It is designed, as a method of national inquest into the conduct of public men. If such is the design, who can so properly be the inquisitors for the nation, as the representatives of the people themselves? They must be presumed to be watchful of the interests, alive to the sympathies, and ready to redress the grievances, of the people. If it is made their duty to bring official delinquents to justice, they can scarcely fail of performing it without public denunciation, and political desertion, on the part of their constituents. CHAPTER X. THE SENATE. § 349. THE third section of the first article relates to the organization and powers of the senate. § 350. In considering the organization of the senate, our inquiries naturally lead us to ascertain; first, the nature of the representation and vote of the states therein; secondly, the mode of appointment; thirdly, the number of the senators; fourthly, their term of service; and fifthly, their qualifications. § 351. The first clause of the third section is in the following words: "The senate of the United States "shall be composed of two senators from each state, "chosen by the legislature thereof for six years; and " each senator shall have one vote." § 352. In the first place, the nature of the representation and vote in the senate. Each state is entitled to two senators; and each senator is entitled to one vote. This, of course, involves in the very constitution of this branch of the legislature a perfect equality among all the states, without any reference to their respective size, population, wealth, or power. In this respect there is a marked contrast between the senate and the house of representatives. In the latter, there is a representation of the people according to the relative population of each state upon a given basis; in the former, each state in its political capacity is represented upon a footing of perfect equality, like a congress of sovereigns, or ambassadors, or like an assembly of peers. The only difference between it and the continental congress under the old confederation is, that in this the vote was by states; in the senate, each senator has a single vote. So that, though they represent states, they vote as individuals. The vote of the senate thus may, and often does, become a mixed vote, embracing a part of the senators from some of the states on one side, and another part on the other. § 353. It is obvious, that this arrangement could only arise from a compromise between independent states; and it must have been less the result of theory, than "of a spirit of amity, and of mutual deference and concessions, which the peculiarity of the situation of the United States rendered indispensable." It constituted one of the great struggles between the large and the small states, which was constantly renewed in the convention, and impeded it in every step of its progress in the formation of the constitution. The struggle applied to the organization of each branch of the legislature. The small states insisted upon an equality of vote and representation in each branch; and the large states upon a vote in proportion to their relative importance and population. Upon this vital question there was so near a balance of the states, that a union in any form of government, which provided either for a perfect equality or inequality of the states in both branches of the legislature, became utterly hopeless. If the basis of the senate was an equality of representation, the basis of the house must be in proportion to the relative population of the states. A compromise was, therefore, indispensable, or the convention must be dissolved. The small states at length yielded the point, as to an equality of representation in the house, and acceded to a representation proportionate to the federal numbers. But they insisted upon an equality in the senate. To this the large states were unwilling to assent; and for a time the states were, on this point, equally divided. Finally, the subject was referred to a committee, who reported a scheme, which became, with some amendments, the basis of the representation, as it now stands. §354. Whatever may now be thought of the reasoning of the contending parties, no person, who possesses a sincere love of country, and wishes for the permanent union of the states, can doubt, that the compromise actually made was well founded in policy, and may now be fully vindicated upon the highest principles of political wisdom, and the true nature of the government, which was intended to be established. § 355. No system could be more admirably contrived to ensure due deliberation and inquiry, and just results in all matters of legislation. No law or resolution can be passed without the concurrence, first of a majority of the people, and then of a majority of the states. The interest, and passions, and prejudices of a district are thus checked by the influence of a whole state; the like interests, and passions, and prejudices of a state, or of a majority of the states, are met and controlled by the voice of the people of the nation. It may be thought, that this complicated system of checks may operate, in some instances, injuriously, as well as beneficially. But if it should occasionally work unequally, or injuriously, its general operation will be salutary and useful. The disease most incident to free governments is the facility and excess of law-making; and while it never can be the permanent interest of either branch to interpose any undue restraint upon the exercise of all fit legislation, a good law had better occasionally fail, rather than bad laws be multiplied with a heedless and mischievous frequency. Even reforms, to be safe, must, in general, be slow; and there can be |