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might be of a nature not constituting strict technical proof; or the disclosure of the evidence might reveal important state secrets, which the public interest, and even safety, might imperiously demand to be kept in
§ 593. The power to govern the militia, when in the actual service of the United States, is denied by no one to be an exclusive one. Indeed, from its very nature, it must be so construed; for the notion of distinct and independent orders from authorities wholly unconnected, would be utterly inconsistent with that unity of command and action, on which the success of all military operations must essentially depend. But there is nothing in the constitution, which prohibits a state from calling forth its own militia, not detached into the service of the Union, to aid the United States in executing the laws, in suppressing insurrections, and in repelling invasions. Such a concurrent exercise of power in no degree interferes with, or obstructs the exercise of the powers of the Union. Congress may, by suitable laws, provide for the calling forth of the militia, and annex suitable penalties to disobedience of their orders, and direct the manner, in which the delinquents may be tried. But the authority to call forth, and the authority exclusively to govern, are quite distinct in their nature. The question, when the authority of congress over the militia becomes exclusive, must essentially depend upon the fact, when they are to be deemed in the actual service of the United States. There is a clear distinction between calling forth the militia, and their being in actual service. These are not contemporaneous acts, nor necessarily identical in their constitutional bearings. The president is commander-in-chief of the militia, when in actual service; and not, when they are mere
ly ordered into service.
They are subjected to martial law only, when in actual service, and not merely when called forth, before they have obeyed the
POWER OVER SEAT OF GOVERNMENT AND OTHER CEDED PLACES.
§ 594. THE next power of congress is, "to exercise "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such "district, not exceeding ten miles square, as may, by "cession of particular states and the acceptance of congress, become the SEAT OF THE GOVERNMENT of the "United States; and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of "the state, in which the same shall be, for the erection "of FORTS, MAGAZINES, ARSENALS, and other needful buildings."
§ 595. The indispensable necessity of complete and exclusive power, on the part of the congress, at the seat of government, carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every legislature of the Union, and one might say of the world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it, not only the public authorities might be insulted, and their proceedings be interrupted with impunity; but the public archives might be in danger of violation, and destruction, and a dependence of the members of the national government on the state authorities for protection in the discharge of their functions be created, which would bring upon the national councils the imputation of being subjected to undue awe and influence, and might, in times of high excitement, expose their lives to jeopardy. It never could be safe to leave in possession of any state the exclusive power to decide, whether the functionaries of the national gov
ernment should have the moral or physical power to perform their duties. It might subject the favoured state to the most unrelenting jealousy of the other states, and introduce earnest controversies from time to time respecting the removal of the seat of government.
§ 596. Nor can the cession be justly an object of jealousy to any state; or in the slightest degree impair its sovereignty. The ceded district is of a very narrow extent; and it rests in the option of the state, whether it shall be made or not. There can be little doubt, that the inhabitants composing it would receive with thankfulness such a blessing, since their own importance would be thereby increased, their interests be subserved, and their rights be under the immediate protection of the representatives of the whole Union. It is not improbable, that an occurrence, at the very close of the revolutionary war, had a great effect in introducing this provision into the constitution. At the period alluded
to, the congress, then sitting at Philadelphia, was surrounded, and insulted by a small, but insolent body of mutineers of the continental army. Congress applied to the executive authority of Pennsylvania for defence; but, under the ill-conceived constitution of the state at that time, the executive power was vested in a council consisting of thirteen members; and they possessed, or exhibited so little energy, and such apparent intimidation, that congress indignantly removed to New-Jersey, whose inhabitants welcomed them with promises of defending them. Congress remained for some time at Princeton without being again insulted, till, for the sake of greater convenience, they adjourned to Annapolis. The general dissatisfaction with the proceedings of Pennsylvania, and the degrading spectacle of a fugitive congress, were sufficiently striking to produce this
remedy. Indeed, if such a lesson could have been lost upon the people, it would have been as humiliating to their intelligence, as it would have been offensive to their honour.
§ 597. The other part of the power, giving exclusive legislation over places ceded for the erection of forts, magazines, &c., seems still more necessary for the public convenience and safety. The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, and the nature of the military duties, which may be required there, all demand, that they should be exempted from state authority. In truth, it would be wholly improper, that places, on which the security of the entire Union may depend, should be subjected to the control of any member of it. The power, indeed, is wholly unexceptionable; since it can only be exercised at the will of the state; and it is therefore placed beyond all reasonable scruple.
§ 598. A great variety of cessions have been made by the states under this power. And generally there has been a reservation of the right to serve all state process, civil and criminal, upon persons found therein. This reservation has not been thought at all inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution; for the state process, quoad hoc, becomes the process of of the United States, and the general power of exclusive legislation remains with congress. Thus, these places are not capable of being made a sanctuary for fugitives, to exempt them from acts done within, and cognizable by, the states, to which the territory belonged; and at the same time congress is enabled to accomplish the great objects of the power.
§ 599. The power of congress to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over these ceded places is conferred on