§ 710. It has also been made a question, whether a compact between two states is within the scope of the prohibition. And this also has been decided in the affirmative. The terms, compact and contract, are synonymous; and, when propositions are offered by one state, and agreed to, and accepted by another, they necessarily constitute a contract between them. There is no difference, in reason or in law, to distinguish between contracts made by a state with individuals, and contracts made between states. Each ought to be equally inviolable. § 711. Before quitting this subject it may be proper to remark, that as the prohibition, respecting ex post facto laws, applies only to criminal cases; and the other is confined to impairing the obligation of contracts; there are many laws of a retrospective character, which may yet be constitutionally passed by the state legislatures, however unjust, oppressive, or impolitic they may be. Retrospective laws are, indeed, generally unjust; and, as has been forcibly said, neither accord with sound legislation, nor with the fundamental principles of the social compact. Still they are, with the exceptions above stated, left open to the states, according to their own constitutions of government; and become obligatory, if not prohibited by the latter. § 712. Whether, indeed, independently of the constitution of the United States, the nature of republican and free governments does not necessarily impose some restraints upon the legislative power, has been much discussed. It seems to be the general opinion, fortified by a strong current of judicial opinion, that since the American revolution no state government can be presumed to possess the trancendental sovereignty to take away vested rights of property; to take the property of A. and transfer it to B. by a mere legislative act. A government can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights of property are left solely dependent upon a legislative body, without any restraint. The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require, that the rights of personal liberty, and private property should be held sacred. At least, no court of justice, in this country, would be warranted in assuming, that any state legislature possessed a power to violate and disregard them; or that such a power, so repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil liberty, lurked under any general grant of legislative authority, or ought to be implied from any general expression of the will of the people, in the usual forms of the constitutional delegation of power. The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights, so vital to their security and well-being, without very strong, and positive declarations to that effect. § 713. The remaining prohibition in this clause is, that no state shall "grant any title of nobility." The reason of this prohibition is the same, as that, upon which the like prohibition to the government of the nation is founded. Indeed, it would be almost absurd to provide sedulously against such a power in the latter, if the states were still left free to exercise it. It has been emphatically said, that this is the corner-stone of a republican government; for there can be little danger, while a nobility is excluded, that the government will ever cease to be that of the people. CHAPTER XXXV. PROHIBITIONS ON THE STATES. 714. THE next clause of the constitution is, "No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay "any duty on tonnage; keep troops, or ships of war "in time of peace; enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power; or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such "imminent danger, as will not admit of delay." 66 66 § 715. The first part of this clause, respecting laying a duty on tonnage, has been already considered. The remaining clauses have their origin in the same general policy and reasoning, which forbid any state from entering into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; and from granting letters of marque and reprisal. In regard to treaties, alliances, and confederations, they are wholly prohibited. But a state may, with the consent of congress, enter into an agreement, or compact with another state, or with a foreign power. What precise distinction is here intended to be taken between treaties, and agreements, and compacts is nowhere explained; and has never as yet been the subject of any exact judicial, or other examination. § 716. The other prohibitions in the clause respect the power of making war, which is appropriately confided to the national government. The setting on foot of an army, or navy by a state, in times of peace, might be a cause of jealousy between neighbouring states, and provoke the hostilities of foreign bordering nations. In other cases, as the protection of the whole Union is confided to the national arm, and the national power, it is not fit, that any state should possess military means to overawe the Union, or to endanger the general safety. Still, a state may be so situated, that it may become indispensable to possess military forces, to resist an expected invasion, or insurrection. The danger may be too imminent for delay; and under such circumstances, a state will have a right to raise troops for its own safety, even without the consent of congress. After war is once begun, there is no doubt, that a state may, and indeed it ought to possess the power, to raise forces for its own defence; and its co-operation with the national forces may often be of great importance, to secure success and vigour in the operations of war. The prohibition is, therefore, wisely guarded by exceptions sufficient for the safety of the states, and not justly open to the objection of being dangerous to the Union. § 717. It has been already seen, and it will hereafter more fully appear, that there are implied, as well as express, prohibitions in the constitution upon the power of the states. Among the former, one clearly is, that no state can control, or abridge, or interfere with the exercise of any authority under the national government. And it may be added, that state laws, as, for instance, state statutes of limitations, and state insolvent laws, have no operation upon the rights or contracts of the United States. § 718. And here end our commentaries upon the first article of the constitution, embracing the organization and powers of the legislative department of the government, and the prohibitions upon the state and national governments. If we here pause, but for a moment, we cannot but be struck with the reflection, how admirably this division and distribution of legislative powers between the state and national governments is adapted to preserve the liberty, and promote the happiness of the people of the United States. To the general government are assigned all those powers, which relate to the common interests of all the states, as comprising one confederated nation. While to each state is reserved all those powers, which may affect, or promote its own domestic interests, its peace, its prosperity, its policy, and its local institutions. At the same time, such limitations and restraints are imposed upon each government, as experience has demonstrated to be wise in order to control the public functionaries, or indispensable to secure the harmonious operations of the Union. |