Morality and Self-InterestOxford University Press, 14/12/2007 - 336 من الصفحات Ever since "Know Thyself" was inscribed at Delphi, Western philosophers have struggled to understand the relations between morality and self-interest. This edited volume of essays pushes forward one of the oldest and most important debates in philosophy. Is morality a check on self-interest or is it in one's self interest to be moral? Can morality and self-interest be understood independently of each other? Christopher Morris, The Trouble With Justice Mathias Risse, Nietzsche on Selfishness, Justice, and the Duties of the Higher Men Richard Joyce, Morality, Schmorality David Schmidtz, Because It's Right Thomas Nagel, The Value of Inviolability Samuel Scheffler, Potential Congruence Stephen Finlay, Too Much Morality Terence Irwin Scotus and the Possibility of Moral Motivation Ralph Wedgwood, Butler on Virtue, Self Interest, and Human Nature Julia Annas, Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism W.D. Falk, Morality, Self, and Others Paul Bloomfield, Why It's Bad To Be Bad Joel Kupperman, Classical and Sour Forms of Virtue Michael Stocker, Shame and Guilt; Self Interest and Morality |
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