[Bank of the United States v. Daniel et al.] and to abide by, and follow such construction, when found to be settled. Looking to the two adjudications in Kentucky, on the construction of the statute of 1798, in the spirit of the rule we have laid down for our government; and without any reference to the misgivings we may entertain of the correctness of the construction, declared to be the true one in Hopkins and Clay, we have come to the conclusion, that Wood's case did not overrule the former. It is therefore declared, by this Court, that the bill of exchange, for ten thousand dollars, drawn by Robert Griffing, although payable at a bank in New Orleans, did not, by force of the statute of Kentucky, subject the drawer or others bound to take it up, to the payment of ten per cent. damages. Not having been entitled by the statute, the appellants insist they were authorized to charge damages by commercial usage, and that the statute prescribed a fair measure. The assumption, that the holder could lawfully demand damages, depends on the fact, whether the bill was foreign or inland; if foreign, then the bank had the right to redraw from New Orleans to Lexington, for such amounts as would make good the face of the bill, including principal, re-exchange and charges, with legal interest: the law does not insist upon actual redrawing; but the holder may recover the price of a new bill at the place of protest. Had a jury been called on to assess the amount due, proof of the exchange against Lexington, would have been necessary, to the recovery of damages, on the ground of re-exchange; but the parties themselves having liquidated them, at the rate the statute of Kentucky allowed, in cases very similar, we must presume, at this distant day, aside from any proof to the contrary, that ten per cent. was fair compensation: it may have been less; of this, however, the parties were the proper judges. Kent's Com. Lecture 44. Whether a bill of exchange, drawn in one state of this Union, payable in another, is a foreign bill, involves political considerations of some delicacy, although, we apprehend, of no intrinsic difficulty, at this day. The respective states are sovereign within their own limits, and foreign to each other, regarding them as local governments. 2 Peters, 586. Kentucky and Louisiana, as political communities, being distinct and sovereign, and consequently foreign to each other in regard to the regulation of contracts, it follows, a bill drawn in one, payable in the other, is a foreign bill: and so this Court adjudged in the cause of Buckner v. Finley and Van Lear [Bank of the United States v. Daniel et al.] 2 Peters, 586. The bill, in that case, was drawn at Baltimore, by citizens of Maryland, on Stephen Dever, at New Orleans; whereas, the one in this case, was drawn and accepted in Kentucky, but payable at a bank in New Orleans. Yet, we think, the place of payment, being within a jurisdiction foreign to Kentucky, subjected the acceptor, James Daniel, to the performance of the contract, according to the laws of Louisiana, to every extent he would have been, had he became a party to the bill at New Orleans; and that the effect of the contract, on all the parties to it, does not vary from the one sued on in Buckner v. Finley and Van Lear, 2 Peters, 586. Story's Conflict of Laws, sect. from 281 to 286. Being a foregn bill, and not having been affected by the statute of Kentucky, of course, the holders, by commercial usage, were entitled to re-exchange when the protest for non-payment was made: and those bound to take it up having paid, or agreed to pay the damages, with a full knowledge of the facts, and a presumed knowledge of the law, voluntarily giving the bank a legal advantage, it would be going far for a court of chancery to take it away: the equities of the parties being equal, to say the least, it cannot be against conscience for the appellants to retain their judg ment. The main question on which relief was sought by the bill; that on which the decree below proceeded, and on which the appellees relied in this Court for its affirmance; is, can a court of chancery relieve against a mistake of law? In its examination, we will take it for granted, the parties who took up the bill for ten thousand dollars, included the damages of a thousand dollars in the eight thousand dollar note; and did so, believing the statute of Kentucky secured the penalty to the bank; and that, in the construction of the statute, the appellees were mistaken. Vexed as the question formerly was, and delicate as it now is, from the confusion in which numerous and conflicting decisions have involved it; no discussion of cases can be gone into without hazarding the introduction of exceptions that will be likely to sap the direct prineiple we intend to apply: indeed, the remedial power claimed by courts of chancery to relieve against mistakes of law, is a doctrine rather grounded upon exceptions, than upon established rules. To this course of adjudication we are unwilling to yield. That mere mistakes of law are not remediable, is well established, as was declared by this Court in Hunt v. Rousmanier, 1 Peters, 15; and we can only repeat what was there said, "that whatever exceptions there may be to the rule, they will be found few in [Bank of the United States v. Daniel et al.] number, and to have something, peculiar in their character," and to involve other elements of decision. 1 Story's Ch. 129. What is this case, and does it turn upon any peculiarity? Griffing sold a bill to the United States Bank, at Lexington, for ten thousand dollars, endorsed by three of the complainants, and accepted by the other, payable at New Orleans; the acceptor, J. D., was present in Kentucky, when the bill was made, and there accepted it; at maturity it was protested for nonpayment, and returned. The debtors applied to take it up; when the creditors claimed ten per cent. damages, by force of the statute of Kentucky. All the parties bound to pay the bill were perfectly aware of the facts; at least the principals, who transacted the business, had the statute before them, or were familiar with it, as we must presume; they and the bank earnestly believing, (as in all probability most others believed at the time,) that the ten per cent. damages were due by force of the statute, and influenced by this opinion of the law, the eight thousand dollar note was executed, including the one thousand dollars claimed for damages. Such is the case stated and supposed to exist by the complainants, stripped of all other considerations standing in the way of relief. Testing the case by the principle, " that a mistake or ignorance of the law, forms no ground of relief from contracts fairly entered into, with a full knowledge of the facts;" and under circumstances repelling all presumptions of fraud, imposition, or undue advantage having been taken of the party; none of which are chargeable upon the appellants in this case; the question then is, were the complainants entitled to relief? To which we respond decidedly in the negative. Lastly, the appellants rest their defence on the statute of limitations. If the thousand dollars claimed as damages were paid to the bank, at the time the bill of exchange was taken up, then the cause of action to recover the money, (had it been well founded) accrued at the time the mistaken payment was made, which could have been rectified in equity, or the money recovered back by a suit at law. The courts of law and equity have concurrent jurisdiction; and the complainants having elected to resort to equity, which they had the right to do; were as subject to be barred by the statute in the one court as in the other. In such cases the courts of equity act in obedience to the statutes of limitation, from which they are no more exempt than courts of law. [Bank of the United States v. Daniel et al.] This suit having been brought more than five years after the bill was taken up; to apply the bar, it becomes necessary to inquire whether the damages were then paid. The complainants allege that they paid in July, 1819, three thousand three hundred and thirty dollars and sixty-seven cents, on account of the whole amount due, consisting of principal, interest, charges, and damages; and for the balance of the amount of the bill, Griffing and James Daniel executed their negotiable note for eight thousand dollars, payable sixty days after date, to William Armstrong, to which Cunningham, Hanson, and Henry Daniel were parties as endorsers or co-drawers; which note was discounted by the bank for the benefit of Griffing and James Daniel; and upon the express agreement between them and the bank, and the other parties to the note, that the proceeds of said eight thousand dollar note, should be applied to the payment of the balance due on said bill of exchange. The parties to this suit agreed in writing, that the statement above set forth was true; and the bill was liquidated by the proceeds of the note, and the three thousand three hundred and thirty dollars and sixty-seven cents. If the pre-existing debt due the bank, and evidenced by the bill of exchange, was extinguished when the bill was taken up; then the remedy of the bank was gone, and the right to recover the one thousand dollars of excess arose. It is generally true, that the giving a note for a pre-existing debt, does not discharge the original cause of action, unless it is agreed that the note shall be taken in payment; 6 Cranch, 264. In reference to this principle, it is insisted for the appellees, that the eight thousand dollar note given to the bank, and the renewals of it afterwards, furnished mere evidence of the continuance of the original liability, from which they should be relieved; because the notes covered too much by a thousand dollars, with interest; so the court below thought, and decreed the abatement. This Court thinks the facts do not involve the principle referred to. We are not told by the appellees that the eight thousand dollar note was taken in payment of the balance of the bill of exchange; but that three thousand three hundred and thirty dollars and sixty-seven cents in cash was paid, and the note discounted, the money obtained upon it, and "by express agreement, applied to the payment of the balance due on said bill of exchange." The debtors raised the cash, and paid the bill; nor did the eight thousand dollar note enter into the transaction, further than that the proceeds were applied to the VOL. XII.-H [Bank of the United States v. Daniel et al.] extinguishment of the pre-existing debt. Payment was, therefore, made on the 8th of July, 1819; and the thousand dollars could have been sued for then, as well as in 1827, when the bill of injunction was filed. It follows, the act of limitations is a bar to the appellees, aside from any other grounds of defence. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kentucky, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged and decreed by this Court, that the decree of the said circuit court in this cause, be, and the same is hereby reversed, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said circuit court, with directions to that court to discharge the injunction at law, and to dismiss the bill in this cause, at the cost of the complainants. |