[United States v. Coombs.] the admiralty jurisdiction; and if any person steals goods belonging to her, the punishment attaches. In this case, it was admitted that the ship was in the condition described in the act; but the goods were above high water mark when stolen. The rest of the section shows that the object of congress was to include cases above high water mark. "Showing false lights" would, in most cases, be on the shore and in places above the tide. No serious doubt of the power of congress to punish such offences can exist. The power given by the constitution to regulate commerce, necessarily includes the power to protect the goods which are the subject of commerce; and it is of no consequence whether the commerce is foreign or domestic. The view which congress entertained of this power, is shown by its legislation in the first crimes act; in which, aiding or advising in piracy, is made punishable. These are acts which, in many cases, would be done on shore. All that is necessary is, that the matter which is the subject of the prosecution, shall be connected with, or have grown out of commerce. Mr. Justice STORY delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a case, certified upon a division of opinion of the judges of the circuit court, for the southern district of New York. The case, as stated in the record, is as follows: Lawrence Coombs was indicted under the 9th section of the act, entitled "An act more effectually to provide for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States, and for other purposes," approved the 3d of March, 1825; for having, on the 21st of November, 1836, feloniously stolen, at Rockaway Beach, in the southern district of New York, one trunk of the value of five dollars, one package of yarn of the value of five dollars, one package of silk of the value of five dollars, one roll of ribbons of the value of five dollars, one package of muslin of the value of five dollars, and six pairs of hose of the value of five dollars, which said goods, wares and merchandise, belonged to the ship Bristol, the said ship then being in distress, and cast away on a shoal of the sea, on the coast of the state of New York, within the southern district of New York. On this indictment the prisoner was arraigned, and plead not guilty; and put himself upon his country for trial. It was admitted, that the goods mentioned in the indictment, and which belonged to the said ship Bristol, were taken above high water [United States v. Coombs.] mark, upon the beach, in the county of Queens; whereupon, the question arose whether the offence committed was within the jurisdiction of the court; and on this point the judges were opposed in opinion. Which said point, upon which the disagreement has happened, is stated above, under the direction of the judges of said court, at the request of the counsel for the United States, and Lawrence Coombs, parties in the cause, and ordered to be certified unto the Supreme Court at the next session, pursuant to the act in such case made and provided. The ninth section of the act of 1825, ch. 276, on which the indictment in the present case is founded, is in the following words: "That if any person shall plunder, steal, or destroy any money, goods, merchandise, or other effects from, or belonging to, any ship or vessel, or boat, or raft which shall be in distress, or which shall be wrecked, lost, stranded, or cast away upon the sea, or upon any reef, shoal, bank, or rocks of the sea, or in any place within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction of the United States; or if any person or persons shall wilfully obstruct the escape of any person endeavouring to save his or her life from such ship or vessel, boat or raft, or the wreck thereof; or if any person shall hold out or show any false light or lights, or extinguish any true light, with intention to bring any ship or vessel, boat or raft, being or sailing upon the sea, into danger or distress, or shipwreck; every person so offending, his or their counsellors, aiders or abettors, shall be deemed guilty of felony; and shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by a fine, not exceeding five thousand dollars, and imprisonment and confinement at hard labour, not exceeding ten years, according to the aggravation of the offence." 3 Story's Laws of the U. S. 2001. The indictment, as has been already stated, charges the offence to have been committed on Rockaway Beach; and as is admitted, above high water mark. Before we proceed to the direct consideration of the true import and interpretation of this section, it seems highly important, if not indispensable, to say a few words as to the constitutional authority of congress to pass the same. For if, upon a just interpretation of the terms thereof, congress have exceeded their constitutional authority, it will become our duty to say so; and to certify our opinion on the points submitted to us, in favour of the defendant. On the other hand, if the section admits of two interpretations, each of which is within the constitutional authority of congress, that ought to be adopted, [United States v. Coombs]. which best conforms to the terms and the objects manifested in the enactment, and the mischiefs which it was intended to remedy. And again, if the section admits of two interpretations, one of which brings it within, and the other presses it beyond the constitutional authority of congress, it will become our duty to adopt the former construction; because a presumption never ought to be indulged, that congress meant to exercise or usurp any unconstitutional authority, unless that conclusion is forced upon the Court by language altogether unambiguous. And, accordingly, the point has been presented to us under this aspect, in the argument of the attorney general, on behalf of the government. There are two clauses of the constitution which may properly come under review, in examining the constitutional authority of congress over the subject matter of the section. One is, the delegation of the judicial power, which is declared to extend "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." The other is, the delegation of the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states;" and, as connected with these, the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing power," &c. In regard to the first clause, the question which arises is, what is the true nature and extent of the admiralty jurisdiction. Does it, in cases where it is dependent upon locality, reach beyond high water mark? Our opinion is, that in cases purely dependent upon the locality of the act done, it is limited to the sea, and to tide waters, as far as the tide flows; and that it does not reach beyond high water mark. It is the doctrine which has been repeatedly asserted by this Court; and we see no reason to depart from it. Mixed cases may arise, and indeed often do arise, where the acts and services done re of a mixed nature; as where salvage services are performed partly on tide waters, and partly on the shore, for the preservation of the property saved; in which the admiralty jurisdiction has been constantly exercised to the extent of decreeing salvage. That this is e rightful exercise of jurisdiction by our courts of admiralty, was assumed as the basis of much of the reasoning of this Court, in the case of the American Insurance Company v. Canter, 1 Peters' Rep. 511. It has also been asserted and enforced by Lord Stowell, on various occasions; and especially in the case of The Augusta v. Eugenie, 1 Hagg. Adm. Rep. 16; The Jonge Nicholas, 1 Hagg. Adm. Rep. 201; The Ranger, 2 Hagg. Adm. Rep. 42; and The Happy Return, [United States v. Coombs.] 2 Hagg. Adm. Rep. 198. See also The Henry, of Philadelphia, 1 Hagg. Adm. Rep. 264; The Vesta, 2 Hagg. Adm. Rep. 189; The Salecia, 2 Hagg. Adm. Rep. 262. And this has been done, not only in conformity to the doctrines of the maritime law; but also to what has been held in the courts of common law. For it has been laid down, that if the libel is founded upon one single continued act, which was principally upon the sea, though a part was upon land; as if the mast of a ship be taken upon the sea, though it be afterwards brought ashore, no prohibition lies. Com. Dig. Adm. F. S.; 1 Rolle Adm. 533, C. 13; Com. Dig. Adm. E. 12. It is true, that it has been said that the admiralty has not jurisdiction of the wreck of the sea. 3 Black. Com. 106, 107. But we are to understand by this, not what, in the sense of the maritime and commercial law, is deemed wreck or shipwrecked property; but "wreck of the sea" in the purely technical sense of the common law; and constituting a royal franchise, and a part of the revenue of the crown in England; and often granted as such a royal franchise to lords of manors. How narrow and circumscribed this sort of wreck is, according to the modern doctrines of the courts of common law, may be perceived by the statement of it in Mr. Justice Blackstone's Commentaries. Black. Com. 290 to 317. Who also shows, that it is this, and this only, which is excluded from the admiralty jurisdiction. Lord Stowell manifestly acted upon the same doctrine, in the case of The Augusta v. Eugenie, 1 Hagg. Adm. Rep. 17; 3 Black. Com. 106, 107. 1 A passage has been sometimes relied on, in one of the earliest judgments of Lord Stowell-the case of The Two Friends, 1 Rob. Rep. 271; in which it is intimated, that if the goods, which are subject to salvage, have been landed before the process of the admiralty court has been served upon them, the jurisdiction over them for the purposes of salvage may be gone. But his lordship, so far from deciding the point then, greatly doubted it; and has, as it should seem, since silently overruled the objection. Indeed, the supposed difficulty in that case was not that the instance court had not jurisdiction; but that in cases of salvage on the instance side of the court, no process of the court could be served on land, but only on the water. Now, this is wholly inapplicable to the courts of the United States, where admiralty process, both in the instance and prize sides of the court, can be served on land as well as on water. These explanations have been made, for the sake of clearing the case from some apparent obscurities and difficulties, as to the nature and extent of the admi [United States v. Coombs.] ralty jurisdiction, in cases where it is limited by the locality of the acts done. In our judgment, the authority of congress, under this clause of the constitution, does not extend to punish offences committed above and beyond high water mark. But we are of opinion, that, under the clause of the constitution giving power to congress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states," congress possessed the power to punish offences of the sort which are enumerated in the ninth section of the act of 1825, now under consideration. The power to regulate commerce, includes the power to regulate navigation, as connected with the commerce with foreign nations, and among the states. It was so held and decided by this Court, after the most deliberate consideration, in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 189. to 198. It does not stop at the mere boundary line of a state; nor is it confined to acts done on the water, or in the necessary course of the navigation thereof. It extends to such acts, done on land, which interfere with, obstruct, or prevent the due exercise of the power to regulate commerce and navigation with foreign nations, and among the states. Any offence which thus interferes with, obstructs, or prevents such commerce and navigation, though done on land, may be punished by congress, under its general authority to make all laws necessary and proper to execute their delegated constitutional powers. No one can doubt, that the various offences enumerated in the ninth section of the act, are all of a nature which tend essentially to obstruct, prevent, or destroy the due operations of commerce and navigation with foreign nations, and among the several states. Congress have, in a great variety of cases, acted upon this interpretation of the constitution, from the earliest period after the constitution; as will be abundantly seen by the punishment of certain offences on land, connected with piracies and felonies on the high seas, in the act of 1790, ch. 36, sec. 10 and sec. 11; and in the acts for regulation of commerce and navigation, and for the collection of the revenue, passed from time to time: in which many of the penalties, forfeitures and offences provided for, are such as are, or may be done on land; and yet which arise from the power to regulate commerce and navigation, and to levy and collect duties. The ship registry act of 1792, ch. 45; the act of 1798, ch. 52, for the enrolment and licensing of vessels in the coasting trade and fisheries; the act of 1790, ch. 102, for the regulation and government of seamen in the merchants' service; and the revenue collection act, from the act of 1789, ch. 5, to |