[United States v. Coombs.]

that of 1799, ch. 128, afford many pointed illustrations. We do not hesitate, therefore, to say, that in our judgment, the present section is perfectly within the constitutional authority of congress to enact; although the offence provided for may have been committed on land, and above high water mark.

Let us now proceed to the interpretation of the section under consideration. Does it mean, in the clause in which this indictment is founded, to prohibit and punish the plundering, stealing, or destroying of any property belonging to any vessel in distress, or wrecked, lost, stranded, or cast away; only when the same property is then on board of the vessel, or is then upon the sea, or upon any reef, shoal, bank, or rock of the sea, or in any other place within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States? Or does it mean equally to prohibit and punish such plunder, stealing, or destroying of such property; whether the act be done on shore, or in any of the enumerated places below high water mark. In our opinion, the latter is the true interpretation of this clause of the section.

In the first place, this is the natural meaning of the words of the clause, taken in their actual import and connection. There is no absolute locality assigned to the offence. It is not said, as it is in every one of the preceding sections, that the offence shall be committed in a particular place; in a fort, dock-yard, navy yard, &c. &c., or upon the high seas, or in an arm of the sea, or in a river, &c., within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state. The language is, "If any person or person shall plunder, steal, or destroy any money, goods, merchandise, or other effects, from or belonging to any ship, or vessel, &c." The plundering, stealing, or destroying need not, then, be from any ship or vessel. It is sufficient if it be of property "belonging to any ship or vessel." It is no where stated that this property, belonging to any ship or vessel, shall be in any of the enumerated places when the offence is committed; but only that it shall be property belonging to the ship or vessel, which is in distress, or wrecked, lost, stranded, or cast away. Locality, then, is attached to the ship or vessel, and not to the property plundered, stolen, or destroyed. And this qualification is important, because it is manifest congress possess no authority to punish offences of this sort generally, when committed on land; but only to punish them when

[United States v. Coombs.]

connected with foreign trade and navigation, or with trade and navigation among the several states.

In the next place, the mischiefs intended to be suppressed by the section are precisely the same, whether the offence be committed on the shore, or below high water mark. There is, and there can be, no sound reason why congress should punish the offence when committed below high water mark, which would not apply equally to the offence when committed above high water mark. In such case, the wrong and injury to the owners, and to commerce and navigation, is the same; and the public policy of affording complete protection to property, commerce, and navigation, against lawless and unprincipled freebooters, is also in each case the same. There is, then, no reason, founded in the language or policy of the clause, to insert a restriction and locality which have not been expressed by the legislature. On the contrary, upon general principles of interpretation, where the words are general, the Court are not at liberty to insert limitations not called for by the sense, or the objects, or the mischiefs of the enactment.

In the next place, the succeding clauses of the same section greatly aid and fortify this construction; for in neither of them is there any locality given to the offences therein stated; and indeed, any locality would seem inconsistent with the professed objects of these clauses. Thus, in the next clause, it is provided that, "if any person or persons shall wilfully obstruct the escape of any person endeavouring to save his or her life, from such ship or vessel, &c.," he shall be punished in the manner provided for in the section. Now, it is plain that this obstruction may be as well by an act done on shore, as by an act done below high water mark. It may be by cutting a rope, or hawser, or other thing used as a means of escape, and fastened to the shore; or by removing a plank affixed at one end to the shore; or by striking or wounding a person on his arrival at the shore; or by intimidating him from landing, by threatening to fire on him on landing, or otherwise, by attempting, on shore, to prevent him from saving his life. But the remaining clause is still more direct. It provides for the case of holding out or showing a false light, or extinguishing a true light, with the intention to bring any ship or vessel, &c., sailing upon the sea, into danger, or distress, or shipwreck. Now, it is most manifest that these acts are such as ordinarily are done, and contemplated to be done on land. We do not say contemplated, exclusively, to be done on land; for they may be done on

[United States v. Coombs.]

the sea. But to suppose that congress could intend to punish these acts only when done on the sea, and not to punish them when committed on shore, would be to suppose that they were solicitous to punish acts of possible and rare occurrence only; and to leave unpunished those which would be of the most frequent and constant occurrence, for such inhuman purposes; and most mischievous in their consequences.

If, then, the other clauses of the same section defining offences of a kindred nature, have no reference whatever to any locality, but indifferently apply to the same offence, whether committed on land or on the sea; and if (as is the fact) all these clauses are connected together, and must be read together, in order to arrive at the denunciation of the punishment which is equally applied to all; there does seem to us to be very strong reason to believe that congress, throughout the whole enactment, had the same intent: an intent to punish all the enumerated offences, whether committed on land or on tide waters; because they were equally within the same mischief, and the prohibitions equally necessary to the protection of the commerce and navigation of the United States.

It has been suggested, that there is not the same necessity for the interposition of congress in the case of the offence contained in the present indictment, when committed on land, as when committed on the sea, or in other places within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States; because, when committed on land, the offence is, or may be, cognizable by the state judicatories, under the state laws. But this reasoning is equally applicable to the other offences enumerated in the other clauses of the same section; and yet it can hardly be doubted that they were designed to be punished when committed on land. And it may be further suggested, that it could scarcely be deemed prudent or satisfactory wholly to rely upon state legislatures or state laws, for the protection of rights and interests specially confided by the constitution to the authority of congress.

Independently, however, of these considerations, there are others, which ought to have great weight; and, in our opinion, decisive influence in a question like the present. In the first place, the act of 1825, ch. 276, manifestly contemplates, that in some of the offences enumerated in it, the state courts would or might have a concurrent jurisdiction; for the 23d section of the act expressly provides, "that nothing in this act contained shall be construed to deprive the courts VOL. XII.-L

[United States v. Coombs.],

of the individual states of jurisdiction, under the laws of the several states, over offences made punishable by this act." Now, there are no other sections in the act, to which this last section can more pertinently apply than to offences committed on land, within the ninth section. It does, indeed, apply with equal force to the 23d section of the act, (which is also derived from the power to regulate commerce,) which provides for the punishment of conspiracies, combinations, and confederacies, "on the high seas, or within the United States," to cast away, burn, or otherwise destroy any ship or vessel, for the fraudulent purposes stated in the section; and also affixes a like punishment to the building or fitting out, aiding in the building or fitting out, "within the United States," of any ship or vessel, with intent that the same shall be cast away, burnt, or destroyed for the like purpose.

In the next place, it is a most important consideration, that in cases of shipwreck there must always be great practical difficulties in ascertaining the precise place, whether below or above high water mark, where the property is first plundered, stolen or destroyed; as well as by direct evidence to identify the particular persons by whom the offence was committed. These dreadful calamities usually occur upon coasts, and in places where the officers and crew are total strangers to all the inhabitants. The personal sufferings of the officers and crew, often disable them from making any efforts, or giving any care or aid in the preservation of the property. The hurry and confusion incident to such events, make them intent upon consulting their own safety, and often absorb all their thoughts. The darkness of the night, as well as the perils of the weather, often compel them to forego all resistance to the depredators; and the latter often assemble in numbers so large as to make opposition hopeless, and identification of individuals and of packages impracticable. While some are on the waves bringing the plunder to the shore; others are or may be on the shore stationed to guard and secure the booty. Under such circumstances, if the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States were limited to acts of depredation or destruction, committed below high water mark the enactment would become practically almost a dead letter; for in most cases it would be impossible to establish, by direct proof, that the property was taken below high water mark. A prosecution in the state court would, in many cases, be equally liable to a failure, from the utter impossibility of establishing whether the act was not committed within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United

[United States v. Coombs.]

States. The wisdom of the enactment, therefore, which, upon a prosecution in the courts of the United States, should cut off any defence founded upon the mere absence of such proof where the offence was committed, would seem to be as clear as its policy is obvious. It could scarcely escape the attention of the legislature as indispensable for the due administration of public justice. And so far from wondering that the section in question does not contain any restriction as to locality of the offence, the surprise would have been great, if it had been found there. We think ourselves justified in saying, that upon the true interpretation of the section, it contains no such restriction: and that there is no ground, in constitutional authority, in public policy, or in the nature or object of the section, which call upon us to insert any.

Upon the whole our opinion is, that it be certified to the circuit court for the southern district of New York, that the offence committed was within the jurisdiction of that court.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the circuit court of the United States, for the southern district of New York, and on the question and point on which the judges of the said court were opposed in opinion, and which were certified to this Court for its opinion, agreeably to the act of congress, in such case made and provided, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this Court, upon the point which has been certified to this Court, by the said circuit court, that the said offence so committed, was within the jurisdiction of the said circuit court; and it is ordered and adjudged, that this opinion be certified to the said circuit court accordingly.