CASES CITED.

Cond. Rep. 6. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts ads. The State of Rhode
Island, &c. 757.

CHANCERY AND CHANCERY PRACTICE.

1. Courts of chancery will not relieve for mistakes of land. The Bank of the United States v. Daniels. 32.

2. Courts of equity are bound by statutes of limitation as courts of law. Ibid. 3. The decree of the circuit court of the District of Columbia, dismissing a bill filed by the corporation of Georgetown, on behalf of themselves and the citizens of Georgetown, against the Alexandria Canal Company, chartered by congress, praying that the company should be enjoined from building piers in the river Potomac, the erection of the same being an obstruction to the navigation of the river, and injuring its navigation, was affirmed. City of Georgetown v. The Alexandria Canal Company. 91.

4. The jurisdiction of courts of chancery, in cases of nuisance, may be exercised in those cases in which there is imminent danger of irreparable mischief before the tardiness of the law could reach it. Ibid.

5. In what cases, and under what principles, it is competent for some persons to come into, chancery for themselves and others, having similar interests. Foid.

6. The rule in chancery is, if the answer of the defendant admits a fact, but insists on matter by way of avoidance, the complainant need not prove the fact admitted, but the defendant must prove the matter in avoidance. Clarke et al. v. White. 178.

7. In equity, as in law, fraud and injury must concur to furnish ground for judicial action. A mere fraudulent intent, unaccompanied by any injurious act, is not the subject of judicial cognizance.. Fraud ought not to be conceived; it must be proved, and expressly found. Ibid.

8. The complainants in their bill allege that a conveyance of her real estate was made by a daughter to her father for a nominal consideration. The answer denied the matter stated in the bill; and the defendants gave evidence of the transfer of stock, to the value of two thousand dollars, on the day the conveyance was made, claiming that this was also the consideration in the deed. Held, that this evidence was admissible without an amendment of the answer. It rebutted the allegation in the bill, that the deed was made wholly without consideration: Jenkins et al.'v. Pye. 241.

9. Where the defect of title to lands sold was discovered by the vendee after his purchase, and he proceeded to perfect the title in himself, and thus defeat the right of the vendor to the land, and he claimed a rescission of the contract of purchaser, and the repayment of the sum paid by him for the land, it was held, that he could not avail himself of the defect of title while standing in the relation of purchaser, to defeat his agreement to make the purchase; he could, under the most favourable circumstances, only have the contract reformed, and the amount advanced, to perfect the title, deducted from the unpaid purchase money. A court of equity will not rescind such a contract of purchase, and will, on a bill filed by him to have such a contract rescinded, decline giving its aid against the vendors to obtain the expenses of perfecting the title. Galloway v. Finley. 2.

10. It is an established rule in equity, that when the vendor of land has not the

CHANCERY AND CHANCERY PRACTICE.

power to make a title, the vendee may, before the time of performance, enjoin the payment of the purchase money, until the ability to comply with the agreement is shown; but then the court will give a reason able time to procure the title, if it appears probable that it may be procured. Ibid.

11. In reforming a contract for the sale of lands, equity treats the purchaser as a trustee for the vendor, because he holds under the vendor; and acts done to benefit the title by the vendor, when in' possession of the lands, enure to the benefit of him under whom the possession was obtained, and through whom the knowledge that a defect in the title existed was derived. The vendor and vendee shared in the relation of landlord and tenant; the vendee cannot disavow the vendor's title. Ibid.

12. A bill of exceptions is altogether unknown in chancery practice; nor is a court of chancery bound to inscribe in an order book, upon the application of one of the parties, an order which it may pass in a case before it. Er parte Story. 339.

13. In a proceeding by a bill and subpoena in chancery, in the circuit court of the United States of Louisiana, against upwards of two hundred defendants, some of the defendants appeared, and an affidavit was made, that in consequence of an epidemic in New Orleans and at La Fayette, and the absence of many of the defendants, it had been impossible for the defendants to prepare for their defence, and they prayed time for the same. The circuit court allowed the defendants until the following term to appear and make defence. By the Court-The conduct of the circuit court appears to have been strictly conformable to the practice and principles of a court of equity. Ex parte Poultney, Complainants v. The City of La Fayette, Shields et al. 472.

14. Every court of equity possesses the power to mould its rules in relation to the time and manner of appearing and answering, so as to prevent the rule from working injustice. And it is not only in the power of the court, but it is its duty to exercise a sound discretion upon this subject; and to enlarge the time whenever it shall appear that the purposes of justice require it The rules in chancery proceedings in the` circuit courts prescribed by thi Court, do not, and were not intended to deprive the courts of the United States of this well known and necessary power. Ibid.

CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. The circuit court of each district, sit within and for that district, and are bounded by its local limits. Whatever may be the extent of the jurisdiction of the circuit court, over the subject matter of suits, in respect to persons and property, it can only be exercised within the limits of the district. Congress might have authorized civil process from any circuit court to have run into any state of the Union. It has not done so, It has not, in terms, authorized any civil process to run into any other district; with the single exception of subpoenas to witnesses within a limited distance. In regard to final process, there are two cases, and only two, in which writs of execution can now by law be served in any other district than that in which the judgment was rendered; one in favour of private persons in another district of the same state; and the other in favour of the United States, in any part of the United States. Toland v. Sprague. 300.

2. Foreign attachment.

A

CIRCUIT COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
1. The circuit court of the District of Columbia has jurisdiction to issue a man-
damus to the postmaster general of the United States, commanding him to
credit the amount found due to certain contractors for carrying the mail
of the United States; the amount due to the contractors having been ascer-
tained by the solicitor of the treasury of the United States, acting under
an act of congress, referring the accounts to him. Kendall, Postmaster
General v. The United States. 524,

2. Mandamus.

3. District of Columbia.

COMMERCE.

Constitutional law. 1.

COMMISSIONERS TO ADJUST LAND TITLES IN LOUI-
SIANA.

The acts of the commissioners appointed to adjust and settle land titles in Loui-
siana, under the acts of congress authorizing and confirming the same; are
conclusive as to all titles to lands which have been confirmed, according to
the provisions of the different acts of congress on the subject. Strother v.
Lucas. 410.

COMMON LAW.

1. At the date of the act of congress establishing the government of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the common law of England was in force in Maryland;
and of course remained and continued in force in the part of the district
ceded by Maryland to the United States. The power to issue a mandamus
in a proper case, is a part of the common law; and it has been fully recog-
nised as in practical operation in a case decided in the court of that state.
Kendall, Postmaster General v. The United States. 524.

2. Mandamus.

3. District of Columbia.

4. Circuit court of the District of Columbia.

COMPACTS BETWEEN STATES.

1. Compact between Virginia and Maryland, relative to the river Potomac.
City of Georgetown v. The Alexandria Canal Company. 91.

2. The act of congress, which granted the charter to the Alexandria Canal
Company, is in no degree a violation of the compact between the states of
Virginia and Maryland; or of any of the rights that the citizens of either,
or both states, claimed as being derived from it. Ibid.

COMPOSITION WITH CREDITORS.

1. It is generally true in cases of composition, that the debtor who agrees to
pay a less sum in the discharge of a contract, must pay punctually. If the
agreement stipulates for partial payments, and the debtor fails to pay, the
condition to take part is broken, the second contract forfeited; and is no bar
to the original cause of action. Clarke et al. v. White. 178.

2. In a composition for a debt, by which one party agreed to deliver goods to
VOL. XII.-5 I

COMPOSITION WITH CREDITORS.

the amount of seventy per cent. in satisfaction of a debt exceeding ten
thousand dollars, and omitted to deliver within one dollar and forty-one
cents of the amount; the mistake is too trivial to deserve notice. Ibid.
3. If, upon failure or insolvency, one créditor goes into a contract of general
composition common to the others; at the same time, having an underhand
agreement with the debtor, to receive a larger per cent.; such agreement
is fraudulent and void. Ibid.

4. The rule cutting off underhand agreements in cases of joint and general
compositions, as a fraud upon the other compounding creditors, and because
such agreements are subversive of sound morals and public policy; has no
application to a case where each creditor acts not only for himself but in
opposition to every other creditor: all equally relying on their vigiance to
gain a priority, which, if obtained, each being entitled to have satisfaction,
cannot be questioned. Ibid.

CONQUEST.

Even in cases of conquest, the conqueror does no more than displace the sove-
reign, and assume dominion over the country. "A cession of territory is
never understood to be a cession of the property of the inhabitants. The
king cedes only that which belongs to him; lands he had previously grant-
ed, were not his to cede. Neither party could so understand the Louisiana
treaty. Neither party could consider itself as attempting a wrong to indivi-
duals, condemned by the whole civilized world. The cession of a territory'
should necessarily be understood to pass the sovereignty only, and not to
interfere with private property." No construction of a treaty, which would
impair that security to private property, which the laws and usages of na-
tions would without express stipulation have conferred, would seem to be
admissible, further than its positive words require. "Without it, the title
of individuals would remain as valid under the new government, as they
were under the old; and those titles, at least so far as they were consum-
mate, might be asserted in the courts of the United States, independently
of this article." Strother v. Lucas. 410.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

"to regu

1. Under the clause of the constitution giving the power to congress
late commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states," con-
gress possesses the power to punish offences of the sort enumerated in the
ninth section of the act of 1825. The power to regulate commerce, in-
cludes the power to regulate navigation, as connected with the commerce
with foreign nations, and among the states. It does not stop at the mere
boundary line of a state; nor is it confined to acts done on the waters, or
in the necessary course of the navigation thereof. It extends to such acts
done on land which interfere with, obstruct, or prevent the due exercise of
the power to regulate commerce and navigation with foreign nations, and
among the states. Any offence which thus interferes with, obstructs, or
prevents such commerce and navigation, though done on land, may be
punished by congress, under its general authority, to make all laws neces-
sary and proper to execute their delegated constitutional powers. The
United States v. Coombs. 72.

2. Although the constitution does not in terms extend the judicial power to all

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

controversies between two or more states; yet it in terms excludes ǹone, whatever may be their nature or subject. The State of Rhode Island v. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 657.

3. The Supreme Court, in construing the constitution as to the grants of powers to the United States, and the restrictions upon the states, has ever held, that an exception of any particular case presupposes that those which are not excepted, are embraced within the grant or prohibition: and have laid it down as a general rule, that where no exception is made, in terms, none will be made by mere implication or construction. Ibid."

4. In the construction of the constitution, the Court must look to the history of the times, and.examine the state of things existing when it was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief and the remedy. Ibid. 5. The Supreme Court cannot presume that any state which holds prerogative rights for the good of its citizens, and by the constitution, has agreed, that those of any other state shall enjoy rights, privileges, and immunities in each as its own do, would either do wrong, or deny right to a sister state or its citizens; of refuse to submit to those decrees of the Supreme Court, rendered pursuant to its own delegated authority, when in a monarchy, its fundamental law declares that such decree executes itself. Tbid.

6. In the case of Olmstead, the Supreme Court expressed its opinion, that if state legislatures may annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and the rights thereby acquired, the constitution becomes a solemn mockery, and the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by its own tribunal. So. fatal a result must be deprecated by all; and the people of every state must feel a deep interest in resisting principles so destructive of the Union, and in averting consequences so fatal to themselves. Ibid.

7. Boundaries of states.

8. Jurisdiction.

9. Supre Court of the United States.

CONSTRUCTIONS OF STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. If a section of an act of congress admits of two interpretations, one of which brings it within, and the other presses it beyond the constitutional authority of congress; it is the duty of the Supreme Court to adopt the former construction: because a presumption never ought to be indulged, that congress meant to exercise or usurp any unconstitutional authority; unless that conclusion is forced on the Court, by language altogether unambiguous. The United States v. Coombs. 72.

2. Upon the general principles of interpreting statutes, where the words are general, the court are not at liberty to insert limitations not called for by the sense, or the objects, or the mischiefs of the enactment.

Ibid.

CONSTRUCTIONS OF STATUTES OF THE STATES OF THE UNITED STATES.

The Supreme Court, in accordance to a steady course of decision for many years, will carefully examine and ascertain if there be a settled construction by the state courts of the statutes of the respective states, where they