not altogether the right, was with nationalism. The result was a complete triumph for nationalism and the eclipse (temporary it is to be hoped) of internationalism. A triumphant, undisciplined nationalism is in large part responsible for the war of 1914. If internationalism had in the beginning joined forces with democracy instead of autocracy and had made reasonable concessions to nationalism and thus neutralized patriotism, she might have triumphed instead of her opponent. If such had been the result, the summer of 1914 might have ushered in an era of world peace instead of one of world war.

The failure of Europe to unite into a successful permanent league to enforce peace based on the principle of a concert of action left the way open for the formation of smaller groups based on the principle of the balance of power. We thus find that early in the twentieth century the great European powers were alined into two rival groups. Probably as good a startingpoint as any for the history of these groups is the Treaty of Frankfort, signed in 1871. One of the provisions of this treaty was that Alsace and a part of Lorraine should be ceded to Germany. The loss of these provinces was a great humiliation to France. When the proposed treaty was brought before the French assembly for ratification, it is said that the members

broke down and wept over the clause that compelled them to sacrifice a portion of their country's territory. The French people have never allowed this feeling to die out, but on the contrary have been nursing it to keep it warm. They have regarded Alsace and Lorraine as lost provinces, and have kept the statue in Paris representing Strasburg (in Alsace) draped in mourning.

Bismarck realized that this feeling would lead France into another war with Germany unless he could continue to keep the odds against her. After 1871 he did not want war; he preferred a period of peace for the internal development of the newly-created empire. Besides, he thought it would not be safe to subject united Germany to the strain of another war until the cement that held the members of the union together had had time to dry. His policy, therefore, was to isolate France and thus deprive her of all hope of success in a war with Germany. To this end he approached Austria and Russia with a view to allying them with Prussia. Since the war of 1866, he had maintained a very friendly attitude toward Austria. He had also in 1863 offered the Tsar of Russia aid in putting down the Polish revolt and had thereby won his lasting gratitude. Conditions being thus favorable, he was able to bring the rulers of Austria, Germany, and Russia together in Berlin (1872) and

the Three Emperors' League was the result. It was not an alliance but apparently an informal understanding.

The success and permanence of this league was endangered by the rivalry of Austria and Russia in the Balkans. This rivalry became acute at the time of the Berlin Congress (1878). Russia had, without the aid of the great powers, concluded a successful and righteous war with Turkey and forced her to sign the treaty of San Stefano. By the terms of this treaty Turkey was left with only a strip of territory in Europe, and Russia was put in a favorable position with reference to the Balkan states. Great Britain and Austria-Hungary protested against this settlement of the Balkan question, and a European congress was held at Berlin to revise the treaty of San Stefano. The decision of the powers was a diplomatic victory for AustriaHungary and a defeat for Russia. Bismarck supported Austria-Hungary's demands in the congress and thereby strengthened the cordial feeling existing between his country and Austria-Hungary but at the same time incurred the ill will of Russia. The Three Emperors' League now fell into abeyance, and though Russia did not formally withdraw at this time, relations between Germany and Russia were strained for a few years.

Bismarck, feeling that he would have now to

count on the possible enmity rather than on the friendship of Russia, decided to draw more closely to Austria-Hungary. In 1879 Germany and Austria formed a defensive alliance against Russia. The treaty provided that if "one of the two Empires were to be attacked by Russia, the two contracting parties are bound to lend each other reciprocal aid with the whole of their imperial military power, and, subsequently, to conclude no peace except conjointly and in agreement. If one of the contracting parties should be attacked by any power other than Russia this mutual obligation was to be binding only in case the attacking power were "upheld by Russia.'' 1

Italy became a party to the alliance in 1882. To take this step Italy had to suspend a deepseated historic enmity toward Austria, for this power had frequently thwarted efforts on the part of the Italian people to liberate and unify the peninsula. Besides, she still held the Italian-speaking districts of Trieste and Trent, which Italy coveted. One reason for her taking this unnatural step was that she was ambitious to play the rôle of a great power and was angered at France for having taken Tunis (1881), because she had picked out this region as a suitable field for Italian occupation.

1 For the whole treaty, see Stowell, The Diplomacy of the War of 1914, 540-41.

The league of the three powers was known as the Triple Alliance. It was made for a definite period and has been renewed from time to time. Italy did not formally withdraw from it until May, 1915. The text of the treaties between Italy and the Teutonic powers has never been published in full; but, judging from the clauses that are known, we infer that these treaties embody substantially the same engagements as those of the Austro-German alliance, with additional agreements regarding the Balkans.2

Bismarck had thus succeeded in his policy of isolating France. But this period of isolation ended in 1891, when France and Russia formed the Dual Alliance. The terms of the agreement have not been made public, but apparently there are binding engagements as to joint action in certain international situations. In July, 1914, the French ambassador at Berlin told Von Jagow, German secretary of state, that France's obligations to Russia were as binding as those of Germany to Austria.3

The formation of the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance had divided Europe into two hostile camps. Great Britain for a while stood aside in isolation, maintaining a policy of neutrality toward both groups. She thus had the power of tipping the scales in favor of the side

2 For the articles that have been published, see p. 182. 8 F. Y. B., 74.