between Germany and the United States. On August 19, 1915, the British unarmed steamer Arabic was torpedoed near the site of the destruction of the Lusitania. It was bound for New York, was unarmed, carried no contraband, and was sunk without warning. A considerable number of the crew and passengers, including two Americans, lost their lives.15 The German Government seemed to appreciate the seriousness of the situation and to fear that our Government would regard the destruction of American lives on the Arabic as an unfriendly act. Consequently, Count Bernstorff, the German ambassador at Washington, in a communication to Secretary Lansing in reply to his last Lusitania note, declared (September 1) that he had been instructed to make for his Government the pledge mentioned on the previous page.16 The German Government, however, tried (September 7) to excuse its submarine commander on the ground that although he had been ordered not to sink merchantmen without warning, he was under the impression that the Arabic was going to ram his vessel. It, therefore, declined to assume responsibility for the act even if it should be proved that the commander of the undersea boat had been mistaken.17

15 Rogers, 97; Jour. (10), 170-2, 203-229.

16 Jour. (10), 166.

17 Jour. (10), 167-8,

A week later Secretary Lansing forwarded evidence to the German Government which proved that the Arabic received no warning and that it did not see the submarine before it was fired upon. The commander of the submarine was, therefore, without excuse in assuming that the Arabic was preparing to ram his vessel.18

There was no immediate response to this note, but on October 5 the German Government declared its willingness to disavow the act and pay indemnities for the American lives lost. The incident was thus closed and America had won a diplomatic vietory.19

18 Ibid., 170-2.

19 Ibid., 172-3.

CHAPTER XV

MINOR CONTROVERSIES AND THE SUSSEX

CASE

THE fact that Great Britain's control of the sea put Germany at a disadvantage in purchasing munitions of war from us caused some pro-German Americans to agitate in favor of the prohibition by our Government of the export of arms and ammunition. Encouraged by this agitation the Teutonic allies protested against this trade, contending that our Government should lay an embargo on arms if it were to maintain a really neutral attitude toward the belligerents. These protests came in the form first of a hint or request in the German note of February 16, 1915; then as a complaint in a memorandum presented by the German ambassador, Count Bernstorff, April 4, 1915; and finally as a formal appeal from the AustroHungarian Government June 29, 1915.

The main arguments advanced to support their protest were that the trade in munitions had assumed such proportions as had never been known before and that the United States

was enjoying a complete monopoly of the sale of war supplies. It was admitted that Germany had allowed her nationals to sell ammunition to belligerents in previous wars, but in those cases the trade was open to many neutrals and it was only a question as to what share of this trade each neutral should get. The Austrian note even went so far as to say that the weight of authority on international law was in favor of the contention that a neutral nation may not permit the traffic in contraband of war when it assumes such dimensions as to involve the neutrality of the Government.1

Our Government in its replies took the position that a neutral power has no right to change its laws on neutrality during a war provided such a change would affect unequally its relations with the belligerents and that an embargo on arms laid by our Government would be such a change; that this opinion is upheld by a very large majority of the authorities on international law and is explicitly confirmed by an article of the Hague Convention.2

1 Jour. (9), 91, 92, 125-127, 146–149.

2 The preamble to Convention XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval Warfare, Hague Conference, 1907, contains the following statement:

"these rules should not, in principle, be altered, in the course of the war, by a neutral Power, except in a case where experience has shown the necessity for such change for the protection of the right of that Power."

Article 7. "A neutral Power is not bound to prevent the

Besides, it has been the universal practice for nations to permit the sale of munitions to belligerents, a practice in which both Germany and Austria have engaged in previous wars. In one of these wars-that between the Boer republics and Great Britain-the situation was parallel to the one at the present time. The Boer Allies were shut off from getting war supplies, but this fact did not cause Germany to stop the sale of munitions to Great Britain. It is true that in this case the amount sold was not so great as in the present war, but the principle involved is not affected by the extent of the business.

A very important practical reason was also given to explain "why the Government of the United States has from the foundation of the Republic to the present time advocated and practiced unrestricted trade in arms and military supplies. It has never been the policy of this country to maintain in time of peace a large military establishment or stores of arms and ammunition sufficient to repel invasion by a well equipped and powerful enemy. . . . In consequence of this standing policy the United States would, in the event of attack by a foreign power, be at the outset of the war seri

export or transit, on behalf of one or other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of use to an army or fleet." Hague and Geneva Conventions, United States Navy Department, p. 70.