Along with this paper were sent documents proving, it was alleged, the claims of the dossier. It is difficult to make extracts from these that would adequately summarize the evidence, and so the reader is referred to the documents themselves.

Before sending the note to Serbia, AustriaHungary asked the advice of Germany as to what should be done. Germany, according to her own statement, replied as follows:

The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of this view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Serbia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy would receive our approval. We were fully aware in this connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Serbia would bring Russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with our duty as an ally. However, recognizing the vital interests of Austria-Hungary which were at stake, we could neither advise our ally to a compliance that would have been inconsistent with her dignity, nor could we deny her our support in this great hour of need. We were all the more unable to do this inasmuch as our interests also were seriously threatened as a result of the continuous Serbian agitation. If Serbia, with the help of Russia and France, had been allowed to imperil the existence of the neighboring monarchy any longer, this would lead to the gradual downfall of Austria and would result in submission to Slavic sway under the Russian scepter, thus making

the position of the Germanic race in Central Europe untenable. A morally weakened Austria breaking down as the result of the advance of Russian PanSlavism would no longer be an ally on whom we could count and upon whom we could rely, such as we need in view of the attitude of our eastern and western neighbors, which has constantly grown more threatening. We therefore gave Austria an entirely free hand in her action against Serbia. We have taken no part in the preparations.8

The German Government, however, denied all knowledge of the contents of the note until after it was sent. But this denial has not been fully credited by Germany's opponents. They contend that the German Government knew beforehand just what action Austria would take and could have prevented her from going as far as she did.10

8 G. W. B., S., 772. 9 B. W. P., 18, 25.

10 R. O. B., 18; F. Y. B., 35.

The French minister at Munich in an official communication to the French acting foreign minister (July 23) said: "The [Bavarian] President of the Council said to me to-day that the Austrian note, the contents of which were known to him, was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could be accepted by Serbia."

The North German Gazette said (September 21, 1914) that the statement charging the Bavarian Government with foreknowledge of Austria's note to Serbia "has been shown to be an invention by the official Dementi of the Royal Bavarian Government." See F. Y. B., 21; War Chronicle, Dec., 1914,

19.

The British ambassador at Vienna in a dispatch to his Government (July 30) said: "Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador [at Vienna] knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor." B. W. P., 95.

The question as to whether the German foreign office knew in advance the contents of the Austrian note was a mooted one up until about a year ago, when evidence came to light which corroborates the Allied contention that Germany was responsible for Austria's unreasonable ultimatum to Serbia. A correspondent of the London Times declared (July, 1917) that he had learned from a thoroughly reliable source of a conference held at Potsdam July 5, 1914, at which the German Emperor and chancellor, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, and others were present. "The meeting discussed and decided upon all the principal points in the Austrian ultimatum which was to be dispatched to Serbia eighteen days later." It was thought probable that "Russia would refuse to submit to such a direct humiliation and that war would result. That consequence the meeting definitely decided to accept. This charge has been flatly denied by the official North German Gazette, which declares that no such conference was ever held.

The indictment of the Times correspondent, however, is supported by the following convincing evidence:

Hugo Haase, Minority Socialist leader, in a speech made in the Reichstag July, 1917, spoke of "the conferences in Berlin on July 5, 1914," as if they were well-known. (The Times cor

respondent contended that this statement referred to the alleged Potsdam Conference.) Prince Lichnowsky, who was German ambassador at London at the time of the break in August, 1914, makes this statement in his secret memorandum published some months ago: "I learned that at the decisive conference at Potsdam on July 5th the Vienna inquiry received the unqualified assent of all the controlling authorities, with the further suggestion that it would not be a bad thing if war with Russia should result." The German foreign minister in his reply to Price Lichnowsky does not deny the statement made regarding the confernce, but only pleads an alibi for himself.

Still more weighty testimony comes indirectly from a member of the conference, Baron Wangenheim, who was German ambassador at Constantinople at the time. On July 25, 1914, Wangenheim told Marquis Garroni, former Italian ambassador at Constantinople, that he had returned on the previous day from Berlin, where, in obedience to a summons from the Emperor, he had been present at a conference at which war was decided upon. The plan was, he said, for Austria, after an interval of a few weeks, to make such demands on Serbia as the latter could not possibly meet and in consequence of this refusal "war would ensue in forty-eight hours." The report of

this conversation between the German and Italian diplomats has come to us through Mr. Lewis Einstein, who was an attaché of the American embassy in Constantinople in 1915. He says that this account was given to him by Marquis Garroni himself, and that the incident herein described had been publicly referred to in Italy by Signor Barzilai.

But the most damaging evidence of all is that given by Mr. Morgenthau, former American ambassador at Constantinople. It seems that Ambassador Wangenheim was on familiar terms with Mr. Morgenthau, and was inclined at times to give a freer rein to his tongue than comported with ambassadorial discretion. Baron Wangenheim had left "for Berlin soon after the assassination of the Grand Duke" and Mr. Morgenthau afterwards learned from him the cause of his absence. The following is in part an account in our ambassador's own words of which the German baron said in unguarded conversations:

"The Kaiser, he told me, had summoned him to Berlin for an Imperial conference. This meeting took place at Postdam on July 5th. The Kaiser presided; nearly all the ambassadors attended. . . . Moltke, then Chief of Staff, was there, representing the army, and Admiral von Tirpitz spoke for the navy. The great bankers, railroad directors, and the cap