if this was not to be done, an additional fugar island might, perhaps, be ceded to the Dutch republic. I told him all this might become a fubject of future difcuf. fion, and I conceived, that if we could agree upon the more essential points, the treaty would not break off on thefe fecondary confiderations. Our converfation had now been extremely long, and M. Delacroix ended by faying, that, although he had taken upon himself to enter with me thusfar upon the fubject, yet I must not confider any thing he faid as binding, or as pledging the republic, till fuch time as he had laid the papers I had given him before the directory; and in order to do this with more accuracy, he again asked me, whether in his report, he was to state the difuniting Belgium from France as a fine quá non from which his majefty would not depart. I replied, it moft certainly was a fine qua non from which his majefty would not depart: and that any propofal which would leave the Netherlands annexed to France, would be attended with much great er benefit to that power, and lofs to the allies, than the prefent re. lative fituation of the belligerent powers could entitle the French government to expect.

M. Delacroix repeated his concern at the peremptory way in which I made this affertion, and afked whether it would admit of no modification? I replied, if France could, in a contre-projet, point out a practicable and adequate one, ftill keeping in view that the Netherlands must not be French, or likely again to fall into the hands of France, fuch a proposal might certainly be taken into confidera

tion.

M. Delacroix by no means encouraged me to explain myfelf

more fully; he repeatedly faid, that this difficulty relative to the Netherlands was one which could not be overcome.

Juft as I was taking leave of him, he begged me to explain what was meant by the words in the meinoire (A.) in the 4th paragraph, beginning de s'entendre mutuellement fur les moyens d'afurer, and ending at leurs poffeffions refpectives. I told him it referred to the deftructive fyftem adopted by France in the Weft Indies, and went to exprefs a wish that the two powers thould agree on fome general and uniform fyftem of internal police in the fettlements there, which would contribute to the fecurity of those poffeffions to the refpective countries, and at the fame time to the happiness of every description of inhabitants in them.

M. Delacroix, a little hurt at my expreffion relative to the fyftem adopted by France, endeavoured to recriminate upon us; but he ended by faying, that they fhould certainly be willing to concur in any arrangement relative to the negroes, which did not militate against the principles of their conftitution. Here our conference ended; and as, during the whole course of it, I bore in my mind the poffibility, that although this, our firft, might be the only favourable opportunity I fhould ever have of speaking on the general principles on which his majefty was difpofed to treat, I endeavoured, by adverting more or lefs to almost every point in my inftructions, to enable M. Delacroix, (if he reports faithfully) to ftate to the directory what I faid, in fuch a manner as to put it out of their power to mifconceive what were his majefty's intentions; to remove all poffibility of cavil on this cafe, and to bring them to a clear and

diftin&

diftinct answer, whether they would agree to open a negotiation on the principle of the flatus ante bellum, or on one differing from it only in form, not in fubftance. I hope, in attempting to do this, I did not, in the first instance, commit myself, or discover more of my inftructions than it became me to do; and that, in the conversation with M. Dela croix, nothing efcaped me which might, at fome fubfequent period, hurt the progrefs of the negotiation. I have, I believe, given this conference nearly verbatim to your lordship; and I was particularly anxious to do this correctly and minutely, as well that you may judge on the propriety of what I faid myself, as that what M. Delacroix faid to me may be accurately known, and remain on record.

It must, however, be remembered (as I obferved in the beginning of this difpatch) that he spoke for himself, as minifter, indeed, but not under the immediate inftructions of the directory; and this confideration will take a little away from the fingularity of fome of the pofitions he advanced.

I confefs, my lord, from the civility of his manner, and from his apparent readinefs to difcufs the fubject, the impreffion which remained on my mind on leaving him was, that the negotiation would go on, but be liable to fo many difficulties, and fome of them fo nearly infurmountable, that, knowing, as I do, the opinion of the directory, I faw little profpe&t of its terminating fuccefsfully. But I did not expect the conduct of the directory would immediately be fuch as to evince a manifeft inclination, and even determination, to break off on the first proposals; and I was not a little furprifed at receiving, on

on Sunday, at three P. M. the inclofed letter (A.) from M. Delacroix: he fent it by the principal fecretary of his department (M. Giraudet) who communicated to me the original of the arreté of the directory, of which this letter, abating the alteration in the form, is a literal copy. After perufing it, I afked M. Giraudet whether he was informed of its contents; and this led to a fhort converfation on them. I told him that both the demands were fo unexpected, that I could not reply to them off hand: that as to the firft, it was quite unufual to fign memorials which were annexed to a note actually figned, and that I tcarcely felt myfelf authorifed to depart from what was, I believe, an invariable rule. That, as to the fecond demand, made in fo peremptory and unprecedented a way, I could, without much he fitation, fay at once that it could not be complied with. M. Giraudet lamented this much; and faid, that this being the cafe, he feared our principles of negotiation would never coincide. I agreed with him in my expreffions of concern. We converfed together afterwards for fome time, but nothing paffed at all worthy of remark. told him I fhould fend my anfwer the next day. On reflecting more attentively on the request that I would fign the two memorials which I had given in, it ftruck me, that the complying with it pledged me to nothing, and that it was merely gratifying them on a point infifted on peevishly, and that the doing it would put them ftill more in the wrong.

As to the strange demand of an ultimatum, it was perfectly clear what it became me to fay; and I hope that in the inclofed anfwer (K 2)

B.

the affurances which he has already given to the minifter for foreign affairs, as well by word of mouth, as in his official note; and he repeats that he is ready to enter with that minifter into every explanation of which the ftate and progrefs of the negotiation may admit; and that he will not fail to enter into the difcuffion of the propofals of his court, or of any counter-project which may be delivered to him on the part of the executive directory, with that candour, and that spirit of conciliation, which correfpond with the juft and pacific fentiments of his

court.

Lord Malmesbury requests the minister for foreign affairs to accept the affurances of his high confideration.

No. 33.

The underfigned minifter for foreign affairs is charged by the executive directory, to anfwer to lord Malmesbury's two notes of the 27th and 29th Frimaire (17th and 19th December, O, S.) that the executive directory will liften to no proposals contrary to the conftitution, to the laws, and to the treaties which bind the republic.

And, as lord Malmesbury announces at every communication, that he is in want of the opinion of his court, from which it refults that he acts a part merely paffive in the negotiation, which renders his prefence at Paris ufelefs; the underfigned is further charged to give him notice to depart from Paris in eight and forty hours, with all the perfons who have accompanied and followed him; and to quit, as expeditioufly as poffible, the territory of the republic.

The underfigned declares, moreover, in the name of the executive

Manifefto of the British Government against France.

The negotiation which an anxious defire for the restoration of peace had induced his majefty to open at Paris, having been abruptly: terminated by the French government, the king thinks it due to? himself and to his people, to state, in this public manner, the circumftances which have preceded and attended a tranfaction of fo much importance to the general interefts of Europe.

It is well known that early in the prefent year his majefty, laying afide the confideration of many circumftances of difficulty and difcouragement, determined to take fuch fteps as were beft calculated to open the way for negoitation, if any cor

(K 3) refponding

refponding defire prevailed on the part of his enemies. He directed an overture to be made in his name, by his minifter in Switzerland, for the purpose of afcertaining the difpofitions of the French government with refpect to peace. The anfwer which he received in return was at once haughty and evafive; it affected to queftion the fincerity of thofe difpofitions of which his majefty's conduct afforded fo unequivocal a proof; it raised groundlefs objections to the mode of negotiation propofed by his majesty (that of a general congrefs, by which peace has fo often been reftored to Europe); but it ftudioudy paffed over in filence his majefty's defire to learn what other mode would be preferred by France. It at the fame time afferted a principle which was ftated as an indifpenfable preliminary to all negotiation a principle under which the terms of peace must have been regulated, not by the ufual confiderations of juftice, policy, and reciprocal convenience; but by an implicit fubmiffion, on the part of all the powers, to a claim founded on the internal laws and feparate conftitution of France, as having full authority to fuperfede the treaties entered into by independent ftates, to govern their interefts, to control their engagements, and to difpofe of their dominions.

A pretenfion in itself fo extravagant could in no inftance have been admitted, or even liftened to for a moment. Its application to the prefent cafe led to nothing lefs than that France fould, as a preliminary to all difcution, retain nearly all her conquefts, and thofe particularly in which his majefty was most concerned, both from the ties of intereft, and the facred obligations of treaties: that the fhould

in like manner recover back all that had been conquered from her in every part of the world; and that the fhould be left at liberty to bring forward fuch further demands on all other points of negotiation, as fuch unqualified fubmiffion on the part of those with whom the treated could not fail to produce.

On fuch grounds as thefe it was fufficiently evident that no negotiation could be established: neither did the anfwer of his majesty's enemies afford any opening for continuing the difcurfion, fince the mode of negotiation offered by his majefty had been peremptorily rejected by them, and no other had been stated in which they were willing to concur.

His majefty was however not difcouraged even by this refult from still pursuing fuch measures as appeared to him most conducive to the end of peace; and the wishes of his ally the emperor correfponding with thofe which his majefty had manifefted, fentiments of a fimilar tendency were expressed on the part of his imperial majetty at the time of opening the campaign; but the continuance of the fame fpirit and principles, on the part of the enemy, rendered this fresh over ture equally unsuccessful.

While the government of France thus perlifted in obftructing every measure that could even open the way to negotiation, no endeavour was omitted to miflead the public opinion throughout all Europe with refpect to the real cause of the prolongation of the war, and to caft a doubt on those difpofitions which cou d alone have dictated the fteps taken by his majefty and his auguft ally.

In order to deprive his enemies of all poffibility of fubterfuge or evafion, and in the hope that a juft

fenfe