have hitherto had. They must in. crease the arrogance and ferocity of the common enemy of all nations; they muft fortify the credit, and fix the authority of an odious government over an enflaved people; they muft impair the confidence of all other powers in the magnanimity, conftancy, and fidelity of the British councils; and it is much to be apprehended they will inevitably tend to break the fpring of that energy, and to lower that fpirit which has characterifed in former times this high-minded nation, and which, far from finking under misfortune, has even rifen with the difficulties and dangers in which our country has been involved.

2dly, Becaufe no peace, fuch as may be capable of recruiting the ftrength, economizing the means, augmenting the refources, and providing for the fafety of this kingdom, and its infeparable connections and dependencies, can be had with the ufurped power now exercifing authority in France, confidering the defcription, the charac ter, and the conduct, of those who compofe that government; the methods by which they have obtained their power; the policy by which they hold it, and the maxims they have adopted, openly profeffed, and uniformly acted on, towards the deftruction of all governments not formed on their model and fubfervient to their domination.

3dly, Because the idea that this kingdom is competent to defend itfelf, its laws, liberties, and religion, under the general fubjugation of all Europe, is prefumptuous in the extreme, contradictory to the fuppofed motives for our prefent eager folicitations for peace, and is certainly contrary to the standing policy both of state and commerce,

by which Great Britain has hitherto flourished.

4thly, Becaufe, while the common enemy exercifes his power over the several states of Europe in the way we have seen, it is impoffible long to preferve our trade, or, what cannot exift without it, our naval power. This hoftile fyftem feizes on the keys of the dominions of thefe powers, without any confideration of their friendship, their enmity, or their neutrality; prefcribes laws to them as to conquered provinces; mulets and fines them at pleasure; forces them, without any particular quarrel, intò direct hoftility with this kingdom, and expels us from fuch ports and markets as the thinks fit; infomuch that (Europe remaining under its prefent flavery) there is no harbour which we can enter without her permiffion, either in a commercial or a naval character. This general interdict cannot be begged off; we muft refift it by our power, or we are already in a state of vaffalage.

5thly, Becaufe, whilft this ufurped power fhall continue thus conftituted, and thus difpofed, no fecurity whatever can be hoped for in our colonies and plantations, thofe invaluable fources of our national wealth and our naval power. This war has fhewn that the power prevalent in France, by intentionally diforganizing the plantation fyftem (which France had in common with all other European nations), and by inverting the order and relations therein eftablished, has been able, with a naval force altogether contemptible, and with very inconfiderable fuccours from Europe, to baffle in a great meafure the most powerful armament ever fent from this country into the Weft Indies, and at an expenfe hitherto unparalleled, and has; by

the

the force of example, and by the effects of her machinations, produced, at little or no expence to herfelf either of blood or treafure, univerfal defolation and ruin, by the general deftruction of every thing valuable and neceffary for cultivation, throughout feveral of our islands, lately among the moft flourishing and productive. The new fyftem, by which thefe things have been effected, leaves our colonies equally endangered in peace as in war. It is therefore with this general fyftem (of which the Weft India fcheme is but a ramification), that all ancient establishments are effentially at war for the fake of felf-prefervation.

6thly, Because it has been declared from the throne, and in effect the principle has been adopted by parliament, that there was no way likely to obtain a peace, commonly fafe and honourable, but through the ancient and legitimate government long established in France. That government, in its lawful fueceffion, has been folemnly recognized, and affiftance and protection as folemnly promifed to thofe Frenchmen who fhould exert themfelves in its restoration. The political principle upon which this recognition was made, is very far from being weakened by the conduct of the newly-invented government. Nor are our obligations of good faith, pledged on fuch trong motives of policy to thofe who have been found in their allegiance, diffolved, nor can they be fo, until fairly-directed efforts have been made to fecure this great fundamental point. None have yet been employed with the smallest degree of vigour and perfeverance. 7thly, Because the example of the great change made by the ufurpation in the moral and political 1796.

world (more dangerous than all her conquefts), is, by the prefent procedure, confirmed in all its force. It is the firft fuccefsful example furnished by hiftory of the fubverfion of the ancient government of a great country, and of all its laws, orders, and religion, by the corruption of mercenary armies, and by the feduction of a multitude bribed by confifcation to fedition, in defiance of the fenfe, and to the entire deftruction of almoft the whole proprietary body of the nation. The fatal effects of this example must be felt in every country. New means, new arms, new pretexts, are furnified to am bition; and new petfons are intoxicated with that poison.

8thly, Becaufe our eagernefs in fuing for peace may induce the perfons exercifing power in France erroneously to believe, that we act from neceffity, and are unable to continue the war; a perfuafion which, in the event of an actual peace, will operate as a temptation to them to renew that conduct which brought on the prefent war; neither fhall we have any of the ufual fecurities in peace. In their treaties they do not a knowledge the obligation of that law, which for ages has been common to all Europe. They have not the fame fentiments nor the fame ideas of their intereft in the confervation of peace, which have hithe to influenced all regular governments; they do not in the fame manner feel public diftrefs, or the private mifery of their fubjects; they will not find the fame difficulty on the commencement of a new war, to call their whole force into fudden action, where, by the law, every citizen is a foldier, and the perfon and properties of all are liable at once to arbitrary requifitions. On (G)

the

oufly adhering to, and firmly abiding by them, I thus folemnly record them, in juftification of my own conduct, and in difcharge of the duty I owe to my king, my country, and the general interefts of civil fociety.

WENTWORTH FITZWILLIAM.

Proceedings in the House of Commons, Proceedings in the House of Commons, Dec. 14, 1796, respecting a Vote of Cenfure on Adminiftration, for Juing certain Sums of Money, with out the Confent of Parliament.

On the 14th of December, Mr. Fox made the following motion in the house of commons:

"That his majesty's minifters having authorized and directed, at different times, without the confent, and during the fitting of parliament, the iffue of feveral fums of money for the fervice of his imperial ma

jefty, and alfo for the fervice of the army under the prince de Condé, have acted contrary to their duty, and the truft repofed in them, and have thereby violated the conftitutional privileges of this houfe."

Mr. Bragge moved the following

amendment to Mr. Fox's motion. He propofed to leave out from the firft word that, and to infert,

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the meafure of advancing the feveral fums of money, which appear, from the accounts prefented to the houfe in this feffion of parliament, to have been iflued for the fervice of the emperor, though not to be drawn into precedent but upon occafions of fpecial necellity, was, under the peculiar circumftances of the cafe, a juftifiable and proper exercife of the difcretion vefted in his majefty's minifters by the vote of credit, and calculated to produce confequences which have proved highly ad

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Mr. Fox propofed a third amendment, to add at the end of the first propofed amendment, the words, Although no documents have been laid before the house to prove either the neceffity or the expediency of the faid measure." (Negatived.)

houfe divided, and it was rejected On Mr. Fox's original motion the by a majority of 285 to 8r.

the meafure of advancing the feveIt was refolved, finally, "That ral fums of money, which appear from the accounts prefented to the houfe in this feffion of parliament to have been iffued for the fervice

of the emperor, though not to be drawn into precedent but upon occafion of fpecial neceffity, was, un der the peculiar circumftances of the cafe, a juftifiable and proper

exercife of the difcretion vested in his majesty's minifters by the vote of credit, and calculated to produce confequences which have proved highly advantageous to the interefts of Europe." common caufe, and to the general