Admiral Buckmaster ordered that minesweepers be deployed to the area in advance of Commodore Short's transports. Since Admiral Buckmaster had the general responsibility for opening ports to shipping and for clearing mines throughout his command area, he also considered minesweeping the river channel into Haiphong.""

To undertake sweeping operations in the entire region, the admiral had operational control of Mine Squadron 106 (Task Group 74.4), commanded by Commander Strauss S. Leon, USNR, and composed of several divisions of 136-foot auxiliary motor minesweepers (YMS). In addition, the admiral discovered that Japanese forces in the Haiphong area had two 70-foot, wooden-hulled trawlers available for limited mine-clearing operations.60

According to General Gallagher, both Admiral Buckmaster and he considered the broader implications of clearing the Haiphong channel. The general noted that this step would remove a major obstacle to the restoration of French authority in northern Vietnam. Conversely, at one point, he also observed that the continued presence of obstacles in this channel "would tend to prevent French aggression." Owing to such considerations, Gallagher stated that, as late as 29 October, Admiral Buckmaster had considered limiting minesweeping activities only to the Do Son approaches.1

It does not appear, however, that there was communication between Admiral Buckmaster and his naval superiors regarding the political implications of clearing the channel into Haiphong. On 17 October, Buckmaster forwarded to Admiral Kinkaid a technical summary detailing the condition of the river approaches to that port. Observing that twenty-three magnetic mines were still unaccounted for in this area and citing the hazards associated with navigating the shallow depths of the channel, Buckmaster stated that if clearance operations were undertaken, he preferred to use the smaller, wood-hulled Japanese trawlers already located in the area. He

"COM7THFLT, OP-PLAN 13-45, ser 000222 of 26 Aug. 1945.

60

61

'Msg, CTF 74 170330 Oct. 1945; COMINRON 106, report, ser 0810 of 23 Nov. 1945.

Ltr, Gallagher to McClure, of 26 Oct. 1945 and Gallagher memo for record, of 29 Oct. 1945, Gallagher Papers, CMH.

concluded his message, copies of which were sent for information to the Pacific Fleet commander and to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, by asking, "do you desire channel swept? If so will leave 1 minesweeping officer in Haiphong to direct Jap sweeping..

...

1 62

The following day, Kinkaid directed Buckmaster to undertake minesweeping of the Haiphong channel with the Japanese trawlers. By the 22nd, the Japanese had begun exploratory operations in this area under the overall direction of an officer from Commander Leon's staff. On the 24th, regular sweeps were initiated. Routine descriptions of these events were included in the comprehensive daily "Presidential Summaries," describing naval operations throughout the world, that the Navy submitted to the White House on 24 and 25 October 1945. These brief statements contained no reference to the possible political significance of the operations that had been foreseen by General Gallagher.63

On 22 and 23 October, as the Japanese-manned units began operations in the river leading to Haiphong, four American minesweepers (YMS-4, YMS-336, YMS-363, and YMS-392) from Commander Leon's Mine Squadron 106 swept the proposed transport zone off Do Son and, from 23 to 29 October, the sea lanes near the Norway Islands (Xuy Nong Chao). Active mines were located in neither of the areas. Beginning on 30 October, these forces contributed to opening a critical coastal line of communication by check-sweeping the West Hainan Strait, but again no mines were found. Early in November, upon completion of these operations, Leon committed the same craft, and additional American LCVPs to help the Japanese finish clearing the approaches to Haiphong. On 23 November, Admiral Buckmaster's minecraft commander reported that five American magnetic

62 Various message files of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, held in the Operational Archives, plus records of the South China Force, held in the Federal Records Center, Mechanicsburg, Pa. were searched. Message files of the Seventh Fleet for the period do not appear to be extant. Admiral Kinkaid's "The Reminiscences of Thomas Cassin Kinkaid" (Columbia University, Oral History Research Office, 1961) makes no reference to U.S. naval operations in Indochina. After a review of this section early in 1971, Admiral Buckmaster notified the Director of Naval History (letter of 11 February 1972): "I don't believe there is anything I can add to it. I kept no diary or personal records, so I have to rely on my memory for events that happened more than 25 years ago;" msg, CTF 74 170330 Oct. 1945. 63 Msg, COM7THFLT 180116 Oct. 1945; msg, CTG 74.4 221031 Oct. 1945; msgs, “Presidential Summaries," of 24 and 25 Oct. 1945; msg summaries, COM7THFLT, 22 Oct.-11 Nov. 1945.

(Mark 13) mines had been swept and that the channel was considered "safe for all types of craft. ...

64

Well before the completion of this final minesweeping task, the Chinese 52nd Army had begun embarking in United States Navy ships at the anchorage near Do Son. The first element of Transportation Squadron 24 reached this area on 26 October. On the following day, the embarkation of Chinese forces in landing craft over the beaches of Do Son began and by 30 October, 12,000 Chinese troops were on board the transports which then set sail for the north. The other two elements of the squadron arrived at the loading area on 2 November and departed two days later carrying the remaining 11,000 officers and men of the Chinese army.

65

The medical aspect of this operation was of particular concern to the crews of the American transports. According to the final report of Commander Transportation Squadron 24, the Chinese troops had marched 500 miles overland into Tonkin through areas notorious for the prevalence of malaria, cholera, and other diseases. Further, the arrival of the squadron in Indochina coincided with the "usual fall cholera epidemic," a point impressed on the medical officers of the squadron when one Chinese soldier in the first element died from this disease within seven hours of reaching an American ship. In the interest of protecting both American crews and Chinese troops, medical officers carefully screened embarkees, rejecting approximately five percent of them as too sick to make the sea voyage. Nonetheless, 35 Chinese died during the voyage north and approximately 350 more were discovered to have dysentary or cholera. Not surprisingly, Commodore Short noted that the medical problems of this mission were "unparalleled in the experience of this command." "

66

Although the original destination of the Chinese troops had been Manchuria, threatened opposition by local Russian and Chinese Communists to their debarkation there resulted in the rerouting of the convoy to

COMINRON 106, reports, ser 0758 of 4 Nov. 1945 and ser 0810 of 23 Nov. 1945: CTG 74.4, report, ser 0759 of 4 Nov. 1945. Despite the minesweeping operations, General Gallagher continued to have the impression as late as January 1946 that magnetic mines in northern ports of Indochina "would continue to help keep the French from undertaking large-scale landing operations in that area"; see memo of conversation. Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, of 30 Jan. 1946 in U.S., State Department, The Far East, Vol. VIII of Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1946 (Washington: GPO, 1971), p. 20.

65 COMTRANSRON 24, report, ser 042 of 25 Nov. 1945.

Ibid., pp. 3–5, encl F; COM7THPHIBFOR, report, ser 01000 of 22 Dec. 1945, encl B, p. 8; Admiral Buckmaster made similar remarks in his letter to the Director of Naval History, 11 Feb.

Chinwangtao, North China. Shortly before the landing of the Chinese at Chinwangtao, Rear Admiral Buckmaster returned to Hong Kong from Indochina. Prior to leaving Vietnam, he arranged for the transportation of the Chinese 62nd Army from the Haiphong region to Formosa. When preparations were almost complete, Chiang Kai-shek decided that this force of 20,166 officers and men could be more usefully employed in Manchuria. However, General Wedemeyer, pointing out that the units were not equipped for winter operations, persuaded the Chinese to follow the original plan. Between 15 November and 6 December, tank landing ships (LSTs), APAs, and AKAS of the Seventh Fleet, assisted by several chartered Liberty Ships, transported this force to Takao, Formosa.67

In December 1945, as the bulk of the Chinese occupational forces were withdrawn, General Wedemeyer directed General Gallagher to leave Indochina with his advisory group because of "unsettled conditions" in the area. Before the month was out, 5,700 more Chinese troops were withdrawn by sea. These troops, of the Northeastern Garrison, were transported to northern China by six American Liberty Ships and three LSTs. Soon thereafter the Chinese 93rd Army returned across the border into southern China.68

In the south, some British forces still remained to carry out their overall occupational responsibilities. However, except for control and repatriation of the Japanese, the responsibility for law and order had been delegated to the French. With the help of riverine and amphibious operations, France was increasing its degree of control at key points below the 16th parallel.

In the north, the French started negotiations which would authorize their return to Tonkin. Meanwhile, the departure of major Chinese units was providing the Viet Minh with favorable conditions for strengthening their political and military position in Tonkin.

07 COM7THPHIBFOR, report, ser 01000 of 22 Dec. 1945, encl B, pp. 47; Daniel E. Barbey, Mac Arthur's Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations: 1943–1945 (Annapolis, Md.: U. S. Naval Institute, 1969), pp. 336-41; COMNAVFOR WESTPAC, "Narrative of Seventh Fleet," p. 10; msg, HQ China Theater, CM-in-1868 of 5 Nov. 1945; LST GRP 42, war diary, Nov. 1945.

68

'COMNAVFORWESTPAC, "Narrative of Seventh Fleet," p. 10; msg, HQ China Theater CM-in-1868 of 5 Nov. 1945; msg, Assistant Chief, Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, of 24 Feb. 1946 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946: Diplomatic Papers Vol. VIII, p. 28; ltrs, Gallagher to McClure, of 26 Oct. and 9 Nov. 1945, Gallagher Papers, CMH.

The Outbreak Of Hostilities
And First Phase Of The

French-Viet Minh War, 1946-1950

Starting with a major amphibious landing and riverine operations, the French would reestablish positions in Tonkin in the spring of 1946. The last of the British forces would depart and the U.S. Seventh Fleet would withdraw most of the remaining Chinese troops. A struggle between the French and the Vietnamese Communists would intensify in northern Vietnam, resulting in open hostilities as the year came to a close. This would mark the start of the French-Viet Minh War, a war which would be a forerunner of the Vietnam War of the 1960s. Experiences of French Union Forces would be similar in many respects to problems the Americans later would encounter.

In January 1946 a proposal to remove southern Vietnam from Admiral Lord Mountbatten's strategic control prompted the cautious reentry of American policy-makers into the Indochina situation. United States authorities expressed their opposition to the proposed shift, noting that the British had not completed the disarmament and repatriation of Japanese forces in accordance with occupation agreements established for the postwar period. On 27 February, as a result of American objections,' a compromise was reached by which Lord Mountbatten continued to have responsibility for disarming and evacuating Japanese troops, while the French assumed strategic control of southern Indochina.

On 28 February, the French Ambassador to China and the Chinese Foreign Minister reached agreements in several separate but interconnected accords. In one agreement the French conceded to the Chinese unhindered use of the port of Haiphong and the Haiphong-Kwangsi railroad for trans

1 Memo, OP-35 to OP-03, of 25 Jan. 1946.