porting goods into South China. They transferred to the Chinese ownership of that section of the railroad running between Kunming and Hokow, in southern China. These concessions represented the price paid by the French for a separate agreement, completed on the same day, by which the Chinese promised to withdraw all their forces from northern Indochina and relinquish control there by the end of March 1946. One French official expressed the opinion that the decision to withdraw occupational forces from northern Indochina was based also on the Chinese hope that this action would set an example for the Soviets, who continued to occupy positions in Manchuria.2

For months prior to the signing of the Sino-French accords, parallel negotiations had been underway in Hanoi between Sainteny and Ho Chi Minh, the latter continuing to claim the title of President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Typically, the Communists welcomed negotiations as a means toward achieving their objectives, taking "advantage of the contradictions between the French and Chiang Kai-shek forces. 3 The fact that these negotiations were conducted constituted de facto recognition of Ho's revolutionary government. Such recognition bolstered Ho's claims of his regime's legitimacy and enhanced beliefs held by many people that the Viet Minh movement provided the most likely prospect for attaining independence from colonial rule.

While Sainteny attempted to gain Viet Minh concurrence to restoring at least some degree of French influence in northern Indochina, Ho sought not only to obtain Vietnam's independence but also to gain the right for his government to rule all three sections of the country. According to an American diplomat who visited Hanoi at this time, Sainteny responded to the Viet Minh demands by offering "complete independence within [the] French community." Ho, in turn, informed the United States representative of his suspicions that such a formula represented only "new language to describe usual French control... [of Vietnamese] affairs."

Meanwhile, the French Navy had assembled at Saigon and other Vietnamese ports almost all of its seagoing units in the Far East in order to

2

* "Franco-Chinese Agreement Concerning Sino-Indochinese Relations," of 28 Feb. 1946 in Cole, Conflict in Indo-China, pp. 7–9; msg, U.S. Embassy, China, of 1 Mar. 1946 in U.S., State Department, The Far East, Vol. VIII of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946 (Washington: GPO, 1971), pp. 28–31.

*Msg, Assistant Chief, Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, of 27 Feb. 1946 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VIII, pp. 26–27.

form an amphibious force. This consisted of 3 cruisers, 7 destroyer types, a transport group of 8 ships (including aircraft carrier Béarn, which operated as a supply and troop ship), and a unit of 2 LSTs and 8 LCIs. By 28 February, embarkation of 21,700 men of the landing force and their arms, ammunition, vehicles, and equipment was essentially completed. The French amphibious force got underway for Tonkin on the following day. The 6th of March would be the last day, for two weeks, in which tides would be high enough to permit these French ships to transit the Haiphong channel.5

As usual, power and diplomacy played complementary roles. It hardly seemed coincidental that Sainteny reached an agreement with Ho the same day that the French flotilla steamed up the Haiphong channel, which had been cleared the previous fall by Rear Admiral Buckmaster's minesweepers. The Preliminary Agreement recognized "the Republic of Vietnam as a free state, having its own government, parliament, army and treasury. . . ." A proviso stipulated that the new state would be part of "the Indo-Chinese Federation and... the French Union." The French and Viet Minh agreed to abide by the results of a referendum of the people of Cochin China to to determine if they desired to be unified with Annam and Tonkin.

The Viet Minh pledged to "accept amicably the French army when, in conformance with international agreements, it relieves the Chinese forces." However, in an annex to the basic agreement, French forces in northern Indochina were limited to a mere 15,000 men, fewer than the number already in the Haiphong area with the amphibious expedition. The annex further stipulated that, within five years, all French forces, except those charged with the defense of naval and air bases, would be relieved by the Vietnamese Army. Both parties were required to "stop hostilities immediately" and "to create the favorable climate necessary to the immediate opening of friendly and frank negotiations" on a number of matters reserved for future resolution. These matters included "the diplomatic relations of Vietnam with foreign states; the future status of Indo-China; and French economic and cultural interests in Vietnam." "

Hours before Ho Chi Minh and Sainteny signed these documents in Hanoi, the French Expeditionary Force, commanded by General Leclerc,

5

6

Mordal, Navy in Indochina, pp. 164–68; Kilian, Naval Infantrymen, pp. 52–62.

"Franco-D.R. Vietnam Agreements," of 6 Mar. 1946 in Cole, Conflict in Indo-China, pp.

40-42.

prepared to land at Haiphong. At 0840 on 6 March, as French landing craft reached a point approximately 2,000 meters east of Haiphong, a heavy volume of artillery and small-arms fire was encountered. Amazingly, this attack was launched by the Chinese-not the Viet Minh. Return fire by the French ships was withheld for more than an hour. Then, a half-hour of "very effective" bombardment followed, highlighted by a direct hit that demolished an ammunition depot. The Chinese called a truce and sent officials to destroyer Triomphant to negotiate a settlement. The intensity of the action was indicated by the 439 holes later counted in her superstructure. French losses during the engagement totaled 24 dead and about 100 wounded. Later, Chinese officials claimed that they had failed to receive orders to implement the Sino-French accords of 28 February, under which French landings were authorized. Following further Sino-French discussions on board Triomphant French forces began to land on 7 March without opposition. Not until 16 March 1946 would Chinese officials allow French troops to enter Hanoi.

On 8 March 1946, in a separate Anglo-French arrangement, the French agreed to take on Mountbatten's duties. Faced with this development, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, on 28 March, formally designated the French military commander in Indochina the Allied agent for Japanese repatriation. In the words of a British official historian, this decision meant that Great Britain "ceased to have any responsibility whatever in French IndoChina...." The agreement expedited the withdrawal of all British forces from Indochina, a process completed by April.

On 10 April, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting with their British counterparts as the Combined Chiefs of Staff, stated through diplomatic channels that they had "no objection to the relief of Chinese troops in northern French Indo-China by French forces, since they consider that such arrangements are a matter for determination by the Governments of France and China." The Combined Chiefs added that "since the FrancoChinese agreement completes the reversion of all Indo-China to French. control," the French military commander in the area should assume all "duties and responsibilities for disarmament and evacuation of Japanese in Indo-China." 10

10

Mordal, Navy in Indochina, pp. 167-77; Kilian, Naval Infantrymen, pp. 67-73.

Kirby, Surrender of Japan, pp. 305-06.

Msg, SECSTATE, of 10 Apr. 1946 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VIII, p. 34–35.

The first of the follow-on negotiations, agreed to on 6 March, began in mid-April when a preliminary conference of Viet Minh and French leaders convened in Dalat. It soon became evident that little progress could be made at this conference delineating the authority of the "free state" of Vietnam. Even less headway was made in scheduling the referendum in Cochin China. One of the issues complicating these negotiations was the Communist charge that the limited French military actions in Cochin China represented a breach of the truce. Against such a background of mutual hostility and distrust, the Dalat conference was concluded in May without any real success except for an agreement to reopen negotiations in France later that summer."1

The Chinese 60th Army was redeployed from Haiphong to Manchuria at the end of April by twenty-seven United States Navy LSTs. Even then, a few small Chinese units remained in Indochina and there were reports of scattered armed clashes between Chinese and French troops. This dangerous situation did not end until August, when the final units of Chiang Kai-shek departed.12

The Republic of Cochin China

Vietnamese nationalist leaders in Cochin China-many of whom opposed union of that region with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam-had been seeking to establish a separate government. On 30 May Vice Admiral d'Argenlieu recognized the Republic of Cochin China as a provisionally autonomous state. D'Argenlieu's recognition was contingent upon the referendum in the South (already agreed to in principle by both sides) and ratification by the constitutional body of the French Union. The Viet Minh claimed that this recognition violated the accords previously signed with the French.13

In Tonkin, the signing of the Preliminary Agreement on 6 March 1946 had not resulted in an amicable acceptance of the French Army in Tonkin, the complete cessation of hostilities, or the creation of a favorable climate

11

"Ibid.; Lancaster, Emancipation of French Indochina, pp. 154–55; Giap, People's War, People's Army, p. 91.

12 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VIII, pp. 33, 36–37, 42-43; COMNAVFOR WESTPAC, "Narrative of Seventh Fleet,” p. 11; Mordal, Navy in Indochina, pp. 188–89; Edgar O'Ballance, The Indo-China War, 1945-54: A Study in Guerrilla Warfare (London: Faber and Faber, 1964), p. 64.

13 Lancaster, Emancipation of French Indochina, pp. 156–58.