returned to the north, the French shifted their patrol units to the coasts of northern Annam and Tonkin.51

French ships and craft were placed under regional operational commands. For inshore and riverine activities, two of these commands were organized under the operational control of Commander Naval Forces (COMAR), Indochina and designated COMAR Tonkin and COMAR Mekong, the latter in the Cochin China region. Regional commands for offshore surveillance were established under Commander Naval Division, Far East. These were, SURMAR (a French acronym for Surveillance Maritime) Tonkin, covering the sector from the Chinese border to 18° north, and SURMAR Annam, which controlled the area extending from 18° north to 10°30′ north to the Thailand border.52

To increase the effectiveness of their maritime patrol efforts, the French established a third subordinate command, Commander Naval Aviation, under COMAR Indochina. The former was assigned land-based squadrons of Sea Otter observation aircraft and Catalina amphibian patrol planes, based near Saigon at Cat Lai and Tan Son Nhut respectively. Catalinas also were based near Haiphong at Cat Bi. Although used primarily for observation and coastal surveillance missions, the naval air units were under the operational control of the French Air Force commander in Indochina, 53

The French were convinced that conducting small-scale amphibious raids against Viet Minh supply points along the coast was one effective means of interdicting the enemy's logistics. These operations resulted in a number of successes in destroying small enemy craft beached on the coast or the personnel facilities and supply depots that supported these units. Nevertheless, in their critique of the war, French officers noted that one of the frustrating aspects of such operations was the ability of the enemy to escape before contact was made. For this reason, French tacticians emphasized the need for the utmost speed of execution directly against predetermined locations of enemy forces. These authorities noted that encirclement tactics were

52 NA Saigon, report. 1-S-50 of 21 Julv 1950, JN 11285, box 6. FRC; ONI. "French Naval and Air Operations in Indochina' p. 431.

NA Saigon, report, 1-S-50 of 21 July 1950, JN 11285, box 6 FRC; Lessons of the War in Indochina, Vol. II, p. 336; Naval Section, "Area Report on Southeast Asia by the Military Group of the Joint State-Defense Survey Mission to Southeast Asia," 22 Nov. 1950, encl 8, p. 2 (hereafter cited as Melby-Erskine Report).

typically unproductive in the face of the enemy's skillful ability to avoid combat when it was in their interest to do so.

54

By the middle of of 1950, the French naval units involved in the war increased to approximately 165 ships and craft. French naval personnel totaled about 12,000, 10,000 of whom were assigned to the riverine, amphibious, and logistic components of COMAR Indochina. The seagoing forces included only 1 combatant ship of destroyer size or larger (a light cruiser) and 7 major auxiliary ships (1 transport; 2 oilers; 1 repair ship; 3 LSTs), with a carrier occasionally on the scene. The balance of the French forces was composed of patrol and landing craft, minesweeping units, and utility types. Approximately 40 of the landing craft, and a number of naval commando units were organized into 6 dinassauts, 4 of which operated in the delta regions of Cochin China and Cambodia and 2 in Tonkin.

55

A cruiser, 7 corvettes, 6 minesweepers, 2 escort ships, 3 launches, and 2 squadrons of naval observation aircraft had the formidable task of patrolling a coastline measuring approximately 1,500 nautical miles in length, an assignment that obviously could not be completely fulfilled without additional ships and inshore craft. Nevertheless, the French Navy reportedly achieved considerable success. Between 1,200 and 1,800 suspicious junks and sampans were hailed each quarter. Intelligence assessments indicated that Viet Minh infiltration by sea along the coast, by 1950, had been drastically reduced and perhaps eliminated in certain areas.

56

After three years, the first phase of the French-Viet Minh War was drawing to a close. During this time, naval power along the coast and on inland waters had made it possible for the French to make major progress toward winning the war. They had ejected the Communists from centers over which they had gained control at the start of the French-Viet Minh War. French forces had been reinserted in Tonkin and were increasingly extending their control in the populous delta and coastal regions.

On the other hand, as will be covered later, Communist successes in China and events elsewhere on the worldwide scene were already drastically changing the situation.

Lessons of the War in Indochina, Vol. II, pp. 185-87.

65 As calculated by Coast and Geodetic Survey using Base Line method.

56

Mordal, Navy in Indochina, pp. 277-83; ONI, "French Naval and Air Operations in Indochina," pp. 435-36.

Declining Naval Power, Defense Changes, And Increasing Tension

As 1949 drew to a close, mainland China was in Communist hands. The Viet Minh would now have a sanctuary north of the border for the training and equipping of their Army. China could act as a base for the injection of supplies by land across the border, or by sea, into positions along the coast. In addition, there was the possibility that the Chinese Communists might intervene militarily.

Southeast Asia was but one of many trouble spots on the world scene. Throughout the first phase of the French-Viet Minh War, instabilities in the wake of World War II had continued elsewhere in the Far East and in the European area. Crisis situations in both regions were often caused or accompanied by Communist efforts to expand their control or influence. Cold War associated events posed increasing threats to countries bordering the Mediterranean. These threats, accompanied by a rapid decline in the British Navy, led to expanding requirements for American naval presence in that region. In the Far East, the struggle between the forces of Chiang and Mao in China, the split of Korea into two occupation zones with the Communists in control of the north, the war in Indochina, and the unsettled conditions in other parts of Southeast Asia placed continuing demands on the United States Pacific Fleet. American policy-makers devoted increased attention to steps which might be taken to prevent further Communist gains.

Reductions in overall defense funding and the increasing emphasis on capabilities for the delivery of atomic bombs had resulted in a major decline in the strength of the Navy and other conventional forces during this period. As a result of the top priority accorded to Europe, force levels in the Far East were reduced to the point where capabilities no longer matched commitments.

The period also witnessed a fundamental alteration in the United States. organization for the national defense, followed shortly by other changes

which represented, in many respects, even more drastic departures from earlier assignments of responsibilities.

Decisions on the fiscal year 1947 budget (covering 1 July 1946 to 30 June 1947) had not taken into account the extent of requirements to be placed on the Navy in remote waters. At the end of this fiscal year, Fleet Admiral Nimitz reported that "despite numerous difficulties the Navy has maintained its forces in Europe and the Far East, often at great sacrifice to the remainder of the Naval Establishment, but in so doing has fulfilled its primary mission in support of United States Foreign Policy."

"1

Efficient utilization of the limited naval forces in the Pacific was complicated by a Unified Command Plan placed in effect on 1 January 1947 whereby operational control of units of the Pacific Fleet would be divided between three unified commands. The Chief of Naval Operations would be the Joint Chiefs of Staff Executive Agent for one, and the Chief of Staff of the Army would be the agent for the other two.

The plan was an outgrowth of a proposal by the Army Chief of Staff, the purpose of which was "to attain a greater degree of unified command. than now exists." The proposal brought to a head one of the basic differences between Army and Navy operations: on land, command was usually divided, quite logically, into areas determined by political-military-geographical considerations; at sea, boundaries drawn on a map for command purposes detracted from the flexibility of Fleet operations and from the efficient utilization of naval ships. A continuous naval presence was not always required to exert naval influence or to control specific maritime regions. Highly mobile naval forces can range the vast expanse of the oceans, exercise overall command of the sea, and regroup as necessary to respond promptly to local situations.

As Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Nimitz recommended that the Atlantic Fleet and Pacific Fleet commanders should continue to operate "under the CNO in time of peace and as determined by the JCS in the event of hostilities." A major issue was the division of responsibility between General MacArthur and the Pacific Fleet commander. Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, did not believe that the general could adequately discharge responsibilities for far-flung operations in the Pacific, in view of General MacArthur's major responsibilities in Japan. He proposed the appointment of "an individual

1CNO, "Annual Report," FY 1947, p. 2.

over-all commander in a delimited Central Pacific Ocean Area who will be neither General MacArthur nor the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet." 2

Nimitz finally agreed to a compromise Joint Chiefs of Staff plan which received the approval of President Truman. As a result, the world was divided into areas, each under a Unified Commander in Chief who had operational control over all the Army, Army Air Force, and Navy forces within his assigned area. In European waters, command of naval operations was exercised by the Chief of Naval Operations (the Joint Chiefs of Staff Executive Agent) directly through Commander United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, with logistic support provided by the Atlantic Fleet. Three unified commands were established in the Pacific; the Alaskan Sea Frontier Forces of the Navy were placed under the operational control of Commander in Chief, Alaska, an Army Air Force officer; General MacArthur was designated Commander in Chief, Far East, and a new command, Naval Forces, Far East, was established under MacArthur's operational control; and Admiral Towers became Commander in Chief, Pacific. Staff layering was minimized since Towers continued to serve as Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. As directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet assigned units to the other unified commands, provided logistic support, and carried out naval command functions other than operational control.

3

Normally assigned one cruiser, four destroyers, and miscellaneous logistic support ships and smaller craft, Commander Naval Forces, Far East assumed responsibilty for the patrols off Korea which had formerly been under control of the Seventh Fleet. Ships assigned to this command were frequently rotated with those under the Pacific command, so that all could gain training and experience in task force operations. While awkward and far from ideal, this measure was necessary to ensure that the deployed naval forces were in the highest possible state of readiness for fleet actions which might be required on short notice.

Under CINCPACFLT, Commander Naval Forces, Western Pacific was responsible for protecting United States interests and supporting American policy in China and in other areas not under the Commander in Chief,

2 JCS, "Decisions Leading to the Establishment of Unified Commands;" CINCPACFLT, "Semi-annual Summary of 1 October 1946-31 March 1947," 18 Apr. 1947; CNO, "Annual Report, FY 1947," pp. 15-16.