Far East. Normally comprised of one cruiser division, three destroyer divisions, a small amphibious task group, and logistic support ships, Naval Forces, Western Pacific conducted protective patrols, as in the Taiwan Strait, and periodically visited important Asiatic ports. Station ships continued to be located at Tsingtao and Shanghai. By 1947, the Cold War in the Mediterranean had become more critical. The United States weighed the consequences if Greece or Turky came under Soviet domination. Matters were brought to a head when Britain informed the United States, on 24 February, that it could not extend financial and economic support to Greece and Turkey beyond the end of the fiscal year.* Threatened internally by a strong guerrilla force and externally by Communists who controlled countries along her northern border, Greece's government might not long survive. In the case of Turkey, there was no serious internal threat, but, in response to continuing Russian pressures, the nation had kept its armed forces fully mobilized since the end of World War II. Unaided, it was questionable if the weak financial and economic condition of Turkey could continue to support this high state of readiness. President Truman promptly took action to fill the gap that would result from British withdrawal of assistance. He obtained $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey and gained congressional permission to send civilians and military personnel there for supervision and training. The policy statements in his message to Congress had implications far beyond those of responding to a local emergency. In what became known as the Truman doctrine of "containment,” he stated: I believe... it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. Visits by United States Navy ships to Greek ports increased sharply. A large portion of the United States Naval Forces, Mediterranean either operated nearby or was so positioned that other ships of the force could reach the area on short notice. At the request of the President, carrier Leyte (CV-32) and nine other ships were dispatched to Greece "as a token of our See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on a Bill to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey in series Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine (80th Cong., 1st sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1973). intention, hoping to persuade the British to stay on, at least until our aid to Greece became effective." When, in July 1947, the situation took a serious turn, with paramilitary forces crossing the border, Truman asked Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, "how large a part of our Mediterranean fleet [could be moved] to Greek ports?" Forrestal responded that a large group could be sent on short notice." In the same month, half-way around the world, Commander Task Force 38, Rear Admiral Samuel Ginder, with carrier Antietam, cruiser Duluth (CL-87), and a destroyer division visited Manila on 4 July for the first anniversary of the independence of the Republic of the Philippines. Soon thereafter, in response to a request from the Philippine Government for ships and material and in compliance with a Presidential directive in June, the United States Naval Advisory Group, Philippines was established. As confirmed by an agreement signed on 14 March 1947, the United States retained bases at Sangley Point, Bagobantay, Subic Bay, and Baguio. Later, Sangley Point and Subic Bay provided important support of naval operations related to the Vietnam conflict. Reorganization of American Defense On 26 July 1947, Congress enacted a law changing the way in which the common defense had been organized for 149 years. This was but the beginning of a long series of statutory and executive changes over the next decades. As stated by Congress, the intent was: "a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States," "integrated policies and procedures," "three military departments," "authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control," "effective strategic direction of the armed forces," "their operation under unified control," and "integration into an effective team of land, naval, and air forces." A new echelon was created 5 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 106–09. "CNO, "Annual Report," FY 1947, p. 25; COMNAVPHIL, "A Narrative History of U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines from 1 September 1945 until 1 January 1948," 19 Feb. 1948, pp. 10-11; SECNAV, "Annual Report," FY 1948, p. 8. For an overview of changes in the first decade after passage of the National Security Act of 1947, see Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956). For management implications, see John C. Reis, The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the U.S. Armed Services (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964). between the President and the departmental secretaries. A council was formed "to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security." The Joint Chiefs of Staff now received directions from another official in addition to the President. Headed by a Secretary of Defense, the resultant National Military Establishment consisted of three departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force), a War Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Munitions Board, and a Research and Development Board. During the hearings before the newly organized Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department that spring, one of the issues had been the power to be granted the Secretary of Defense. Some witnesses emphasized the need for decisions and advocated strong powers for the secretary, even to the point of giving him power to change the functions of the military services, subject to the direction of the President. Others were concerned with the secretary's power over the budget, the broad authority granted to one man, the lack of a clear definition and delineation of his powers, and the overall results if a super-ambitious man was appointed to the job. One point of view was that the secretary's proper role should be that of a policy-maker, exercising controls of a very broad nature. Under this concept, he would be a coordinator or a planner. Another point of view was that the secretary should act as a representative, or deputy, of the President rather than as a representative of the military services to the President. Under the 1947 act, the Secretary of Defense was directed to: (2) Exercise direction, authority, and control...; (3) Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or over- (4) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates . ; * For especially pertinent testimony on this and other related issues, see National Defense Establishment, pp. 30, 68, 75, 101, 113, 139, 148, 155, 200, 203, 222, 241, 325, 348, 412, 458, 522, 577; see also U.S., Congress, House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Hearings on the National Security Act of 1947 (80th Cong., 1st sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1947), pp. 218, 240, 265, 348, 357, 454, 580, 668, 669 (hereafter cited as National Security Act of 1947). In addition, the Secretary of Defense was designated Chairman of the War Council, with "the power of decision." Other members of the council were the Army, Navy, and Air Force secretaries, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force. Primarily, the council was to "advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy." Limitations were placed, however, on his authority. The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were to administer their organizations as "individual executive departments and retain all powers and duties not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense." They were authorized, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, to present any report or recommendation to the President or Director of the Budget. Still encompassing the United States Navy, including naval aviation and the Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy was ostensibly to continue much as before. The Navy was to be "organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea.' In particular, the act specified that "the Navy shall generally be responsible for naval reconaissance, antisubmarine warfare and protection of shipping." The Joint Chiefs of Staff became a statutory body under the direction of the Secretary of Defense as well as the President. They were to "act as the principle military advisors" to both. "The Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, if there be one" was a member. During World War II, President Roosevelt had "refused to issue a formal definition of JCS duties and functions, arguing that a written charter might hamper the Joint Chiefs of Staff in extending their activities as necessary to meet the requirements of the war." Now they were assigned specific duties, namely: 9 (1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces; (2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military service logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans; (3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security; (4) to formulate policies for joint training of the military forces; (5) to review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and military plans; and (6) to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations. . . .9 National Defense Establishment p. 13; William A. Hamilton, "The Decline and Fall of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" Naval War College Review, XXII (Apr. 1972), p. 53. For a comprehensive study of the Joint Chiefs, see Davis, "Origin of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff." One of the duties assigned by the bill, that of reviewing major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, would involve them in peacetime controversies. During the hearings, Admiral Sherman stated that the purpose of some sections of the proposed bill was to make certain that neither the Secretary of National Defense nor a military chief could act as a "single military commander: and to prevent the establishment either of a large military staff or a large bureaucracy over the three military departments." He envisaged "a small executive force... to consist of 15 to 25 $10,000-a-year-men'. . . .' Proponents of centralization predicted substantial savings through "elimination of duplication." Other witnesses were undecided whether economies would in fact result. A few predicted higher costs, as from increased overhead. In the final bill, the Secretary of Defense was authorized only three special assistants and was forbidden a military staff. The Joint Chiefs were restricted to a staff of 100.10 In addition to provisions for the National Defense Establishment, the National Security Act established a National Security Council, a Central Intelligence Agency (under the council), and a National Security Resources Board. The council was to be composed of the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the secretaries of the military departments, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. Later, the National Security Council and its staff would be deeply involved in the decision to aid the French and the Associated States of Indochina, and in many subsequent decisions concerning such matters as military assistance, national strategy, and involvement of combat forces.11 After passage of the 1947 act, the Navy Department continued to run its affairs basically as it had in the past, with no major changes in organization or internal responsibilities. It soon became apparent, however, that complications had been added to processes of administration, management, and justification of programs and budgets. One of the impacts would be the diversion of a far greater percentage of the efforts by the Navy's leadership to external relationships. Heretofore, the two departments had dealt directly with the President and his Bureau of the Budget as they determined the levels of budget submissions, balanced the needs of the departments, and 10 National Defense Establishment. pp. 16, 155. "For National Security Council background, see Alfred D. Sander, “Truman and the National Security Council: 1945-1947," The Journal of American History, LIX (Sept. 1972), pp. 369–88. |