Western Pacific. The Pacific Fleet would be assigned 3 of the 7 escort carriers (CVEs) but none of the small aircraft carriers (CVLS).3" The single cruiser assigned to Naval Forces, Far East would be withdrawn in the spring. The Fleet Marine Force (2 landing teams, 1 fighter squadron, and 1 transport squadron) of Naval Forces, Western Pacific, would also be withdrawn.

Meanwhile, the buildup of the Soviet submarine force continued and the United States Navy allocated still more resources to antisubmarine warfare. Step by step it was becoming apparent, as coastal-type submarines were augmented by fleet types, that the Russian objectives included more than coastal defense. The Soviet Navy was estimated to have at least 370 submarines.31 Rather than resulting in an overall funding increase, the need for antisubmarine capabilities-so vital to the nation's securityhad to be accommodated within a budget which continued to decline. The decrease in the total defense budget, the escalating demands of such areas as nuclear warfare and antisubmarine warfare, and the increasing cost of new weapon systems combined to reduce markedly the United States Navy's ability to fight in the early stages of a conventional war.

In the spring and summer of 1949, the forces of Mao Tse-tung were accelerating progress toward their conquest of mainland China, and Communist insurgencies continued in Southeast Asia. To insure a more effective presence in light of the deteriorating situation in the Far East, the Seventh Task Fleet was established on 1 August. Under the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, it was assigned the following tasks:

Operate in Western Pacific and Southeast Asia waters in order to support US policy and interests X maintain readiness for operating in accordance with approved emergency plans X conduct evacuation operations as required and as practicable X and make good will visits to ports as appropriate in the areas controlled by friendly powers.32

The Naval Forces, Western Pacific command was dissolved on 28 August. In September 1949, the world was shocked by the announcement that the

30 SECNAV, "Annual Report," FY 1949; CINCPACFLT, "Semi-annual summary of CINCPACFLT command narrative for the period 1 April 1949-30 September 1949," 8 Nov. 1949. CNO, "Annual Report," FY 1949, p. 12; Jane's Fighting Ships: 1950-1951 (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Co., 1951), p. 332.

31

22 Msg, CNO 192133Z July 1949; SECNAV, "Semi-annual Report," July-Dec. 1949, pp. 167-70.

Soviet Union had exploded an atomic device. Such a test had been expected, but ignorant of the leaks of security information to the Soviets by Klaus Fuchs and others, official estimates put the probable date further in the future. The next month Congress appropriated funds for fifty-eight air groups for the Air Force, ten more than had been requested by the President. Meanwhile, there had been indications that the number of attack carriers might be reduced to six or even four.

As the already severe competition for limited funds allocated to the total national defense effort intensified, differences between Air Force and Navy proponents were increasingly aired in the press and magazines with regard to roles, strategy, the need for carriers, and the effectiveness and vulnerability of the B-36.33

In the heated testimony during congressional hearings that fall, tasks in addition to those involving atomic bombs were discussed. Nevertheless, most witnesses seemed to have assumed that the next war would be a total one involving use of atomic weapons. A notable exception was Fleet Admiral King who, in commenting on the idea that the atomic bomb had changed everything, concluded:

A likely possibility now is that there will be some kind of stalemate unless both sides expect to destroy each other, or a situation might develop similar to that in the last war when both sides were prepared to use toxic gases but none was willing to loose the inevitable terror and destruction.34

Others within the Navy, including Fleet Admiral Nimitz, expressed similar views.

The Navy was assigned an additional responsibility when the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) was established on 1 October 1949. Under the direction and control of the Chief of Naval Operations, as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander MSTS had the same relationship to the Chief of Naval Operations as that of a task fleet commander operating directly under the latter's command. The Chief of Naval Operations also was responsible for management, technical, and fiscal matters integral to the transport operation. Initially, MSTS was com

33

Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea, pp. 31–34; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on the National Defense Program-Unification and Strategy (81st Cong., 1st sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1949), pp. 22, 109–11, 481, 526–27.

Ibid., pp. 238, 251, 294.

prised of the government-owned ships assigned to the Army and Navy for ocean transportation of personnel and material, together with the personnel, facilities, and equipment to support such operations. The command was not responsible for ships assigned to the Navy's combatant fleets or "those required by the individual services in harbors or inland waterways." MSTS was authorized to acquire additional merchant-type ships by permanent assignment or charter.35 Heavy demands would be placed on MSTS during the Korean and Vietnam wars.

By the latter part of 1949 the fall of Nationalist China was imminent. On 1 December, Admiral Sherman ordered that a carrier be permanently deployed to the Western Pacific. Boxer joined the Seventh Task Fleet on 29 January 1950, the first carrier to be so assigned since the summer of 1947. The task fleet was redesignated the Seventh Fleet on 11 February 1950. A few months later, this small fleet was desparately needed in an emergency effort to help stem Communist aggression in Korea, and to deter war between the mainland Chinese Communists and the Taiwan-based Nationalists.

These events and others on the worldwide scene had been imparting an increased sense of urgency to the question as to whether or not the United States should furnish military and economic aid to the French Union Forces in Indochina.

35

SECNAV, "Semi-annual Report," July-Dec. 1949, pp. 176–77.

American Military Aid

Until 1950, the French, insofar as the United States was concerned, were on their own in the war against the Viet Minh. Repeatedly Francestruggling to recover from the effects of World War II and the German occupation, and beset with troubles elsewhere-had sought American arms, munitions, naval ships and craft, and other military equipment. Although support was provided to assist metropolitan France, the United States continued to withhold aid for the reestablishment of control over Indochina.

From the beginning of the Marxist revolutionary movement, one of its doctrines had been the exploitation of suitable "wars of national liberation," and one of its assumptions had been that conflicting objectives of "capitalist" nations would weaken their resistance to the movement. Events added substance to that assumption when, after World War II, two objectives complicated American policy toward Indochina. One objective, stemming from the principle of self-determination, was progress toward independence of the Indochinese peoples from colonial rule. The other, resulting both from this principle and from the cumulative threat of international communism, was maintenance of the area's freedom from Communist control. Both objectives were consistent, and conceivably could have been accommodated in a long-range plan of action. Balancing of the two objectives did, however, pose problems as to priorities, and was complicated by uncertain assessments of the Vietnam conflict. The result was indecision and ambiguity in the American position. As Secretary of State Acheson later evaluated the situation:

1

Both during this period [prior to 1950] and after it our conduct was criticized as being a muddled hodgepodge, directed neither toward edging the French out of an effort to re-establish their colonial role, which was beyond their power, nor helping them hard enough to accomplish it or, even better, to defeat Ho and gracefully withdraw. The description is accurate enough.1

Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 672-73.

On 8 January 1947, three weeks after the Viet Minh attacks which triggered the war, the State Department had notified the American Ambassador in Paris that the sale of arms and armaments to France would not be approved "in cases which appear to relate to Indochina." Yet, early the next month, the State Department said it wanted to avoid the appearance that the United States was in any way endeavoring to undermine the posiion of full recognition of French sovereignty, stating that the "French should know it is our desire to be helpful and we stand ready to assist [in] any appropriate way we can to find [a] solution for [the] Indochinese problem." No overall solution for the problem was suggested. On the one hand, expressing concern over "continued existence dangerously outmoded colonial outlook and methods in area," the United States urged France to be "more than generous in trying to find a solution." On the other hand, recognizing the association of Ho Chi Minh with the international Communist movement, the United States told France that "we are not interested in seeing colonial empire administrations supplanted by philosophy and political organizations emanating from and controlled by Kremlin. . . .

2

From the earliest days of the war, the French had sought "more moderate" leaders than Ho. The key figure in the French plan was former Emperor Bao Dai, head of the short-lived government which the Japanese had established in the wake of their Indochina coup in March 1945. When Bao Dai abdicated under Viet Minh pressure in August 1945, he accepted an appointment as the Supreme Political Advisor to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. However, after departing for Hong Kong, where he resided for more than a year, Bao Dai took no active role in Indochinese affairs. Then, in January 1947, the French asked him to form a broadly based coalition of Vietnamese nationalists. Bao Dai demanded, as a precondition for his active leadership of Indochinese affairs, firm assurance of support for the longstanding goals of the Vietnamese nationalists for independence and unity. He reportedly told one French representative that he would demand as much or more of the French than Ho Chi Minh.3

Despite the expressed American desire for a non-Communist Vietnamese government, the French move did not receive Washington's unqualified

2

Quoted in U.S.-V.N. Relatiors. bk 1. pr. 1. pp. A44-A46.

'Msg, U.S. Ambassador France, of 22 Jan. 1947 in U.S., State Department, The Far East Vol. VI of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947 (Washington: GPO, 1972), p. 66; Lancaster, Emancipation of French Indochina, pp. 175, 179; Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, pp. 207-08.