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Lemnitzer, aware of the problem, exhorted the services to work continually toward faster deliveries of aid material. Later that month, Secretary of the Navy Matthews complained to the Secretary of Defense that the detailed information required on military aid "is entirely excessive and unnecessary and results in unjustifiable overhead costs.'

"44

While Washington grappled with the question of aid to France and the Associated States, events were moving rapidly in Asia. During the spring of 1949, as the Communists took over more and more key locations in China, French military officers had become increasingly aware of the vulnerability of their outposts just south of the Chinese border. An overall study of the situation in Indochina, completed in June by General Georges Revers, the French Chief of Staff, essentially called for consolidation before any attempt was made to extend French positions. Noting the vulnerable and extended French supply lines to the northeastern frontier posts of Cao Bang and Lang Son, Revers called for their abandonment. He urged the French to concentrate upon the pacification of the Red River Delta region and recommended that the formation of Vietnamese armed forces. be expedited. Later events, including French defeats at Cao Bang and Lang Son, would prove the soundness of his recommendations, but they were not then accepted. Instead, during the last half of 1949, the French extended their control to a series of towns north of Hanoi. As they concentrated on keeping lines of communication open to the positions just south of the Chinese border, they faced a never-ending task of reacting to Viet Minh attacks which became increasingly bold.*5

At 0400 on Sunday morning, 25 June 1950, the North Korean People's Army launched its attack across the 38th parallel. On 27 June, President Truman directed "acceleration of the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces." This order was accompanied by the President's approval of a Joint Chiefs' recommendation to increase military aid for Indochina to $31 million for fiscal year 1950. The Navy's share of the total was $13.5 million, permitting an increase in the LCVPs initially programmed, as well as in other small craft and equipment."

46

"Ltr, OP-35, of 31 May 1950; memo, OP-35 to OP-03, ser 000120 of 6 June 1950; ltr, SECNAV to SECDEF, ser 0324P411 of 27 June 1950; memo, OP-35, ser 0040 of 14 June 1950. 45 Lessons of the War in Indochina. Vol. II, p. 18; O'Ballance, Indo-China War, pp. 93–94. Quoted in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 1, pt. IVA.2, pp. 10-11; memo, OP-4C to OP-35, ser 000103 of 6 July 1950; memo, OP-35 to OP-03, ser 000120 of 6 June 1950.

On that same day, President Truman reported to the American people that he had taken a number of steps to meet Communist aggression not only in Korea but also in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indochina. With the sanction of a United Nations' Security Council resolution denouncing the breach of the peace, the United States entered the fray. Truman named General George C. Marshall "from civilian life" to the position of Secretary of Defense.

Superimposed on Korean War tasks was the additional mission assigned by President Truman to the Seventh Fleet to prevent a possible invasion of Formosa by Chinese Communist forces. At the same time, the Seventh Fleet was directed to prevent Nationalist attacks from Formosa against mainland China. The forces immediately available were meager. To carry out tasks assigned by General MacArthur, the units under Commander Naval Forces, Far East, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, then consisted of 1 antiaircraft cruiser, 1 destroyer division, 1 mine squadron, 4 amphibious ships, 1 fleet tug, and 1 submarine. Under the operational control of Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Arthur W. Radford (who served also as Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet), the Seventh Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, had 1 attack carrier, 1 heavy cruiser, 1 destroyer squadron, 2 aircraft patrol squadrons, 1 submarine division, and 5 logistic ships."

The Seventh Fleet's striking force, including carrier Valley Forge (CV-45) and other units in Southeast Asian waters, was ordered north for the Formosan and Korean tasks and placed under the operational control of Admiral Joy. Together with the small force already in nearby waters, they were hard-pressed to carry out even the most vital tasks until help arrived from the Eastern Pacific and the Atlantic, the Naval Reserve, and the Reserve Fleet.

Initial Deliveries of Military Aid

The first shipment of American military aid to the French in Indochina comprised eight Dakota aircraft (C-47s), transferred to the French in Saigon on 29 June 1950. A Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)

47

Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea, pp. 41-47.

arrived in Saigon on 3 August. Its Navy Section consisted of Commander James B. Cannon and a staff of seven officers and men.

The Army portion of priority items, enough to equip twelve battalions, arrived in commercial ships by mid-August. About the same time, Dixmude departed France and proceeded to Alameda, California, to pick up the F6F aircraft. As a result of more debate on types of aircraft, Dixmude did not leave California until the end of September, arriving at Saigon on 28 October. French LST Rance, escorting six LSSLs and carrying the first shipment of LCVPs, reached Saigon late in November. On 23 December 1950, the United States signed military aid agreements with the governments of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and France.

48

At long last, American aid was flowing to the hard-pressed naval forces engaged in the French-Viet Minh War.

48 "Dossier Relatif a l'Aide U.S.," pp. 2–3, 6, 17; NA Saigon, reports, 34-50 or 13 Nov., 39-C-50 of 22 Nov., and 42-C-50 of 30 Nov. 1950, JN 11284, box 13, FRC; "Estimate of the Situation for Indochina," Navy Member Report to Melby-Erskine Mission, 31 July 1950, encl. 8, p. 1; P. Ortoli, "The French Navy in Indochina," La Revue Maritime, trans. by Remote Area Conflict Information Center, LXXX (Dec. 1952), pp. 1497-1505.

The War Intensifies, 1950-1953

By the time American military aid had begun to arrive, the French situation had become precarious. As the summer of 1950 ended, the expected Viet Minh offensive was well underway against French positions south of the border with China's Kwangsi Province. Initiating his attack near the end of the southwest monsoon season, Giap recaptured Dong Khe in September. This was more than an isolated victory, for it severed the French line of communication to the northwest along Route 4. Since supplies and reinforcements could no longer reach the French stronghold at Cao Bang, that post was evacuated. As the 1,500-man garrison retired to Lang Son, which anchored the southern end of the Cao Bang ridge paralleling Route 4, the Viet Minh ambushed the French column repeatedly in the mountains and cut it to pieces. Subsequently, the Viet Minh captured other positions along Route 4, leaving Lang Son precariously exposed. This strategic point on the line of communication from China also was abandoned by the French.1

The only French success along the northern front was at Mon Cay, where seapower was brought to bear. Deploying all available naval forces to the Tonkin region, Vice Admiral Paul Ortoli, Commander French Naval Forces, Far East, landed the badly needed reinforcements when the Viet Minh threatened the last of the French border positions. Supplied by sea and under the protective guns of their navy, the French continued to repulse Viet Minh efforts to take the town."

Naval Requirements

As the French withdrew from their northern outposts, the United States evaluated the assistance needs of the Southeast Asian area as a whole.

'O'Ballance, Indo-China War. pp. 114–16.

NA Saigon, reports, 31-C-50 (A) of 8 Nov. 1950 and 36-C-50 of 15 Nov. 1950, JN 11284, box 13, FRC.

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