Indochina's waterways and the lengthy coastline of Vietnam, the size of the French Navy's seagoing and riverine forces was marginal at best. The Beginnings of a Vietnamese Navy Initial steps in the development of armed forces for the State of Vietnam had begun at the end of 1949. Problems encountered in efforts to develop a Vietnamese navy were similar to those that would be faced when the United States assumed military advisory responsibilities within Vietnam following the French-Viet Minh War. The French-Vietnamese Military Agreement of 30 December 1949 called for the French to provide the cadre for the navy and to furnish its basic training and instruction. Only a river navy was proposed in Admiral Ortoli's preliminary plan of April 1950. Another plan, drafted concurrently by the Naval Ministry in Paris, recognized that the most pressing problem was the establishment of the nucleus of an officer corps. To that end, the Paris plan provided for the training of a small number of Vietnamese at the French Naval Academy at Brest. But the three students selected for the schooling did not last the year. 30 Except for these plans, no progress was made in 1950. Some reports said the lag in developing Vietnamese naval forces was caused by personnel and budgetary limitations. Admiral Ortoli blamed the Permanent Military Committee in Saigon, to which the High Commissioner, General de Lattre, had assigned the task of making preliminary studies for the Vietnamese Navy.31 Concerned over the delays, the Naval Ministry in Paris insisted on action. 31 Ortoli submitted a new development plan in April 1951. It included provisions for two naval assault divisions in 1951, a recruit training center in 1952, several river flotillas in 1953, four motor minesweepers in 1954, and a seaplane squadron in 1955. Paris accepted Ortoli's proposal, but added a requirement for seagoing ships. In the proposal of the French naval secretary, 1 corvette (Chamois class, 647 tons) would be transferred in 1952 and, through new construction in France, 2 escort ships (Le Corse class, 1,290 tons) and 4 minesweepers (Sirius class, 365 tons) would be 30 Navy Division, TRIM, Study, "Naval Forces of Vietnam," 10 Dec. 1955, p. 1. NA Saigon, reports, 9-52 of 15 Jan. 1952 and 67-52 of 24 Apr. 1952, JN 15531, boxes 32 and 33, FRC; Victor J. Croizat, "Vietnamese Naval Forces: Origin of the Species," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, IC (Feb. 1973), pp. 49-58. added. Ortoli was asked to propose a budget for the construction of a recruit training center, for the recruiting of cadres for the Navy, and for shipbuilding. 32 Due to a desire to create a single armed service, General de Lattre did not agree initially with the concept of a separate navy. Ortoli had his own reservations. He was afraid that the manning of a Vietnamese navy would interfere with recruitment of Vietnamese for the French Navy in Indochina. As a result, the French naval secretary modified his proposals for a seagoing navy and agreed to the original plan providing for a limited river navy. In November 1951, construction of the Recruit Training Center at Nha Trang began and an officer's training course for deck and engineering officers was established on board a French ship. Early in 1952, the French High Commissioner in Indochina and Commander French Naval Forces, Far East, proposed opening the training center that year; organizing two dinassauts; transferring three YMSS to the Vietnamese in 1953; and creating a naval staff, an administrative and technical service, and a coast guard in 1954.33 On 6 March 1952, Chief of State Bao Dai signed Imperial Ordinance Number Two. This ordinance, the first since 1949, provided for the establishment of a Vietnamese navy.3* The French took a tangible step toward such a navy when, in reorganizing their military mission in May, they included a department charged with "commanding, administering, and managing the units of the Vietnamese Navy and directing its development." Although over two years had gone by since the decision to establish a navy, little progress had been made with the foremost problem-that of providing and training the personnel to man the force. To fill the complements of the Far Eastern fleet, then limited to a 10,000-man French ceiling because of a ban on draftees and demands elsewhere, 400 Vietnamese had been recruited. Although these Vietnamese received some training, they were assigned only to auxiliary units, small landing craft attached to Army units, and non-rated duties with the French river forces. 35 The training problems were formidable. Although many Vietnamese 32 "Naval Forces of Vietnam," pp. 1-2. 33 83 Ibid.; Croizat, "Vietnamese Naval Forces," pp. 50-51. Ordinance Number One, signed by Bao Dai on 1 July 1949, was the basic constitutional document of the Bao Dai regime and remained the legal basis for the State of Vietnam until passage of the constitution of the Republic of Vietnam; Fall, Two Viet-Nams, p. 215. 35 ONI, "Development of and Plans for the Vietnamese Navy," The ONI Review, VIII (Mar. 1953), p. 123; Croizat," Vietnamese Naval Forces," p. 52. populated the coastal and inland waterway regions, and earned their living from fishing or operating small craft, those with a technical education were few and illiteracy was common. Faced with heavy commitments to their own operations, the French were hesitant in diverting their limited resources to the supply of instructors for the lengthy process of creating a Vietnamese navy. Two programs were initiated to acquire the necessary officers. Those needed immediately would be obtained by providing accelerated training to selected university graduates. The longer-range policy would be to train cadets in the established French naval schools. The first Vietnamese naval officer aspirants chosen after the short-lived group selected in 1949 were 9 former officers in the merchant marine (6 line and 3 engineering) who received a six-month course of instruction on board French ships. After graduation on 1 October 1952, they were assigned to French combat units for practical experience prior to the commissioning of the first Vietnamese ships and craft. A second shipboard class of 12 line and 4 engineering officer candidates began another course on 1 November 1952; 5 more officer candidates left for the French Naval Academy in Brest. By the end of January 1953, 25 officer candidates would be enrolled in courses of two or more years at naval schools in France; 16 at the Naval School and 5 at the Engineering School, both located in Brest, and 4 at the Paymaster School in Toulon. Before an adequate enlisted training program could begin, a recruit training center had to be constructed. The site chosen was the deep-water bay at Nha Trang. While the center was under construction, French personnel were selected to form the first faculty and began to study Vietnamese. Since it would take some time before they became proficient in the language, the ability to speak some French was a prerequisite for the first recruits. The French instructors (five officers and twenty-five petty officers) arrived in May 1952. The initial class (150 apprentice seamen and 25 petty officer candidates including many who had served in the French Union forces) was admitted in June. The Nha Trang Naval School opened officially on 12 July. 36 Although developments in 1952 were encouraging, the Vietnamese still had no navy of their own, despite the French-Vietnamese Military Agreement of 1949. It would not be until the spring of 1953 that the Vietnamese Navy finally would have its modest beginning. ONI, "Development of and Plans for the Vietnamese Navy," pp. 123-25. The Tangled Events Of 1953 The Effects of the Protracted War on France By 1953, the French-Viet Minh War had entered its seventh year. The Communist strategy of a "long-term resistance war" was beginning to have its effects. Giap later claimed that the Communists undertook a prolonged conflict because the French, after World War II, were considered to be weary of war, beset by internal political dissension, capable of democratically expressing their impatience, and lacking the "psychological and political means to fight a long-drawn-out war. . . ." A decade and a half later, the United States engaged in the seemingly endless Vietnam War, in a remote area, and constrained by limited objectives and the controlled application of force-would experience a similar erosion of national resolve. Within Vietnam, the Communists had emphasized propaganda from the start as a key element in their struggle to gain control. This psychological offensive was orchestrated with military, cultural, and economic measures. Its importance in overall strategy was reflected by the statement of General Giap, with regard to the early phases of the war, that "the most essential and important task was to make propaganda among the masses and organize them. . . ." In stressing "armed propaganda," Giap stated that "political activities were more important than military activities, and fighting less important than propaganda...." French impatience increased as many reports were received of scattered guerrilla-type actions by individuals and small groups. These reports presented a cumulative image of far greater enemy successes than were actually being achieved. Discontent and divisiveness were fueled by persistent propaganda on the part of the Viet Minh and the world Communist movement, and by others voicing opposition to continuing the war. The eventual impact 1Quoted in Fall, Two Viet-Nams, p. 113; see also Giap, People's War, People's Army, pp. 98-100. |