The Viet Minh Thrust into Laos

Giap's forces followed their 1952 offensive into the mountainous T'ai country of northwestern Tonkin with a three-division thrust into Laos in the spring of 1953. The French reacted by withdrawing the bulk of the Army's offensive power from the Red River Delta and dispersing it at isolated strong points where the forces were largely dependent on air transport for logistic support. By the middle of April, twenty French battalions were either encamped on the Laotian Plain of Jars or were located near the capital, Luang Prabang. Local guerrilla forces and three regular Viet Minh divisions occupied the attention of the French Union forces which remained in the delta region. On 7 May 1953, Giap pulled back two of his divisions from Laos into Tonkin, leaving a third to harass the French and subvert the Laotians. That summer the Laotian Communist Pathet Lao forces, combined with "Vietnam People's volunteers," launched an attack against Sam Neua and captured territory in northern Laos. According to Giap this created "a new threat to the enemy."

The Navarre Plan

General Henri Navarre had relieved Salan in April 1953. The new Commander of French Armed Forces, Far East was hand-picked by Prime Minister Mayer on the recommendation of Marshal Alphonse Juin. Included in Navarre's experiences between two world wars were operations against Syrian guerrillas and in the pacification campaigns in Morocco. In World War II he had served in the underground during the German occupation of France.13

Soon thereafter, a United States Joint Military Mission, headed by Lieutenant General John W. O'Daniel, USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Pacific, was sent to "discuss with General Navarre. . . requirements for and utilization of U.S. military aid. . . .” Although O'Daniel normally

"O'Ballance, Indo-China War. pp. 189–92; Giap, People's War, People's Army, p. 192; CIA, "Probable Developments in Indochina through mid-1954," 4 June 1953 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. 47-49, states that four Viet Minh divisions thrust into Laos while two remained in the delta.

13 Bernard B. Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1967), pp. 28–29.

reported to his unified commander, Commander in Chief, Pacific, he was sent in this instance as a representative of the JCS, "under the over-all supervision of the Commander in Chief, Pacific. . . ." One of O'Daniel's tasks was to "expedite revision and aggressive implementation of French military plans for successfully concluding the war in Indochina, including the early initiation of aggressive guerrilla warfare, aimed at knocking the enemy off balance, disrupting enemy supply lines, and gaining the initiative for anticommunist forces." Early aggressive military action against the Viet Minh was deemed essential.14

During General O'Daniel's visit to Indochina, he was briefed by Navarre on the new aggressive concept of operations for the conduct of the war. According to the plan, the French would take the initiative that summer in local offensives and commando and guerrilla actions. They would attack the flanks and rear of the enemy in the north during the fall and winter, progressively pacifying regions not directly involved in the battle. The plan promised a maximum of cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, and a continuance of "the effort of instructing and organizing the Army of the Associated States so as to give them more and more participation as well as more autonomy in the conduct of operations.'

15

The outline of the plan, as reported by General O'Daniel in the summer of 1953, differed in one significant respect from the plan as recounted in General Navarre's memoirs-in the timing of the French offensive. In his book, Agony of Indochina, Navarre stated that the basis of his plan was similar to that of General Salan, namely:

1. During 1953–1954 campaign, maintain a strategically defensive attitude north of the 18th Parallel, and seek to avoid a general battle. On the other hand, take, whenever possible, the offensive south of the 18th Parallel, in order to clean up South and Central Indochina and recover our forces there. In particular, to seek to liquidate the L.K.5 [Vietnam from Tourane to just north of Saigon].

2. Having obtained the superiority in mobile forces, i.e., starting in autumn 1954, take the offensive north of the Porte d'Annam, with the goal of creating a military situation permitting a political solution to the conflict.16

During O'Daniel's trip to Indochina, he and other members of the mission also discussed naval operations with Vice Admiral Auboyneau, who had

14

Memo, JCS to SECDEF, of 10 June 1953 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. 59-67.

15

Memo, JCS to SECDEF, of 11 Aug. 1953 in Ibid., pp. 134–37.

18 See Navarre, Agony of Indochina, pp.135–36.

replaced Vice Admiral Ortoli in April 1952 as Commander of French Naval Forces, Far East." Admiral Auboyneau agreed to reorganize his forces to include a joint amphibious command, with the purpose of "attaining increased amphibious effectiveness," and to delegate "increased responsibility to Vietnamese leaders and units." 18

As the Navarre plan was being assessed in Washington, American policymakers were concerned that the situation might worsen. A United States Central Intelligence Agency assessment of 4 June 1953 stated that, "if present trends in the Indochinese situation continue through mid-1954, the French Union political and military position may subsequently deteriorate very rapidly." Secretary of Defense Wilson summarized the situation as follows: "Communist aggression in Indochina presents, except for Korea, the most immediate threat to the free world. For more than 6 years communist forces, supplied with weapons and equipment from Communist China and Soviet Russia, have been waging open warfare." 19

Admiral Felix B. Stump, the new Commander in Chief, Pacific, endorsed, with some reservation, the Navarre concept forwarded by O'Daniel, as it was relayed by O'Daniel to the JCS. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the plan were set forth in a memorandum of 11 August 1953 signed by their chairman, General Bradley. The Joint Chiefs of Staff hesitated to predict actual results, but felt the plan offered "a promise of success sufficient to warrant additional U.S. aid. . . .

» 20

Admiral Radford succeeded General Bradley as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 August 1953. Having just completed his tour as Commander in Chief, Pacific and Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, a tour lasting from April 1949 until June 1953, Admiral Radford had a current understanding of the situation in Southeast Asia and the Far East. He had visited the friendly countries in the area and conferred with their military and civilian leaders. His tour had included all except the last month of the Korean War. Having been responsible for the performance

17 Naval officers on the mission were Captain Stephen Jurika, Jr., and Ensign Pence, USNR, of the Pacific Fleet staff.

18 Ltr, Chief, Joint Military Mission to Indochina to JCS, of 14 July 1953 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. 69–72.

19 U.S., Defense Department, Semianual Report of the Secretary of Defense, Jan.-June 1953 (Washington: GPO, 1953), p. 61; CIA, "Probable Developments in Indochina through Mid1954,” 4 June 1953 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, p. 47.

20

Memo, JCS to SECDEF, of 11 Aug. 1953 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. 134–35; memo, OP-35 to CNO (no date, ca. Aug. 1953).

of units of the Fleet, under operational control of the Supreme Allied Commander when in the Korean area, he was familiar with the problems of that limited war. Impressed with Radford's capabilities, experiences, duties, and personality, key naval aviators recognized and respected him as their leader. A strong proponent of carrier air power, he had served three tours in the Bureau of Aeronautics and as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air. His combat experience included command of carrier divisions and carrier task groups in World War II and participation in the intense naval actions during the last ten months of the war. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal had brought him to Washington in 1945 to head the "Secretary's Committee of Research on Reorganization" in connection with the question of unification. He had served as Vice Chief of Naval Operations from January 1948 to April 1949.

On 28 August 1953, in one of his early actions as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford signed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense commenting on the Navarre plan. In it the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the previous wording to have been "overly optimistic with respect to the 'promise of success' offered by the Navarre concept." The JCS noted that the actual success would "be dependent upon the aggressiveness and skill with which the French and Vietnamese forces conduct their future operations.'

99 21

Reorganization Plan No. 6

When Dwight D. Eisenhower became President of the United States in January 1953, he developed the "New Look" for his administration. One of the areas in which he sought changes concerned the responsibilities of those charged with providing for the common defense.

Some further steps toward functional centralization had already been taken. The Defense Supply Management Agency was established in July 1952 under the Office of the Secretary of Defense, although with limited responsibilities for the time being. In August, the office of Director of Installations was established whereby "direct surveillance over the planning and construction of all public works by the military departments was centralized in the Office of the Secretary of Defense." 22 The National Security

21

Memo, JCS to SECDEF, of 28 Aug. 1953 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. 138–39.

U.S., Defense Department, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July-Dec. 1952 (Washington: GPO, 1953), p. 5.

Agency was formed in November to work on cryptography and communications security.

During his campaign for the Presidency, Eisenhower called for the creation of a commission to study the operations, functions, and acts of the Department of Defense. After the election, Truman suggested that Secretary of Defense Lovette place his recommendations on the record.

Lovette, who had been Assistant Secretary of War for Air at the time of the 1944 hearings on defense reorganization, expressed his views in a letter dated 18 November 1952. He wrote that certain areas had been identified in which the organization of the Department of Defense and the statutory agencies—the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board-should be improved and their authorities and responsibilities clarified. The changes, he concluded, appeared to require legislative action. Lovette outlined two alternate plans for reorganization. The one he considered the less radical would confine the Joint Chiefs of Staff to planning functions and reviewing war plans. It would relieve them of operating responsibilities in their services, and give the chairman a vote. The balance of the military staff functions would be transferred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military officers in that office would have responsibilities to the secretary, similar to the Army General Staff Corps. They would aid him on such matters as resolving conflicts between the services and "matters involving policies regarding budgets, procurement, logistics, manpower, personnel, intelligence, etc." The JCS would not "operate" or "command." The secretary would be the President's Deputy Commander in Chief. Unified commands would report directly to the secretary and receive orders by his direction. He would establish these unified commands and assign them to the military departments as Secretary of Defense agents.

23

The incoming President appointed a committee consisting of Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovette, Nelson A. Rockefeller, General Omar N. Bradley, USA, Vannevar Bush, Milton S. Eisenhower, Arthur S. Flemming, and David Sarnoff to study defense reorganization. In its 11 April 1953 report the committee noted opinions which held that the original act, in requiring that the military departments be "separately administered," limited the Secretary of Defense's authority, especially with respect to functions

23

SECDEF, Semiannual Report, Jan-June 1953, pp. 10, 65–66; Ltr, Lovette to Truman, of 18 Nov. 1952 in Army, Navy, Air Force Journal, XC (10 Jan. 1953), pp. 541-43.