of Wasp (CVA-18) and Essex (CVA-9), a screen unit of eight destroyers, and a submarine unit were assigned. The other was a Logistic Support Group (TG 92.2), commanded by Captain George H. Browne and consisting of the underway replenishment ships."

While maintaining a high state of readiness for contingencies, the force conducted a wide variety of training, including air-strike exercises, antisubmarine and air-defense operations, and day and night replenishment. One of the carriers that later joined the force, Boxer, reported that its lack of the new and more powerful catapults being installed in the Fleet, combined with low-wind conditions, led to a number of cancellations of planned jet fighter sorties. But this was an isolated problem. The overall offensive capabilities of the force were considered excellent.

8

In the spring of 1954, the force would be expanded to three carriers, twelve destroyers, and a larger logistic support group. Its deployment would be extended as a result of the deteriorating situation at Dien Bien Phu and training operations would be interrupted twice when the force was placed in readiness for possible combat action.

9

In the light of future events, one of Admiral Phillips's recommendations of particular interest was that the Subic-Cubi-Sangley area facilities in the Philippines should be completed to serve as a fleet base, especially in view of its proximity to the Southeast Asian trouble spot. The validity of this recommendation would later be confirmed, when these facilities had to be expanded on an urgent basis in the 1960s to meet the needs of the Fleet and to support the programs of military assistance.

Navarre's Offensive

On 12 December 1953 General Navarre had notified his subordinate commanders of his decision to launch the promised offensive. His target was one of the six inter-zones into which the Communists had subdivided Vietnam for the administration and organization of their infrastructure. The Fifth Inter-Zone (Lien Khu V) in south-central Vietnam stretched along the coast from south of Tourane to north of Nha Trang and westward to the mountains along the Laotian and Cambodian borders. In addi

COMISTFLT, OP-ORDER 10-54, ser 01A of 28 Feb. 1954.

*COM1STFLT, report, ser 010A of 29 Apr. 1954; CAG 12, report, ser 031 of 4 Oct. 1954. 'COMISTFLT, report, ser 010A of 29 Apr. 1954.

tion to their political apparatus extending down the pyramid of zones, provinces, districts, inter-villages, and villages, the Viet Minh now had an estimated 30,000 troops in the Fifth Inter-Zone.

Prior French operations in this area had been of the hit and run variety and had not established continuous control. In Atlante, as his campaign was called, Navarre planned to move up the coast, establishing bases in three or four successive operations. Tasks would involve finding and destroying the enemy, detecting and eliminating traps and mines, installing a military police and administrative system, repairing roads and bridges, and carrying out general public reconstruction. By this means he intended. to establish firm control over the populated narrow lowland region along the coast from Cape Varella to Fai Fo. In addition to the political value of the region, this was the main channel for supplies and personnel, either along Route 1 and the railroad, or waterborne off the coast.

Despite signs of an imminent major action in the T'ai highlands of Tonkin and his 5 December 1953 decision to accept battle there, Navarre assigned top priority to Atlante, stating to his subordinates:

In view of the considerable strategic and political results which one is entitled to expect from the complete execution of that operation, I have decided to subordinate to it the conduct of the whole Indochina campaign during the first semester of 1954.10

Called Arethuse, the first phase of this offensive consisted of the seizure of Tuy Hoa by an amphibious assault and subsequent operations from a base area to be established there. The amphibious force, including LSTS and merchant ships from Tourane, was asssembled at Nha Trang under the command of the captain of landing ship dock Foudre. The transport group consisted of LSD Foudre, LSTS Rance and Chéliff, and the merchant ships. A landing force of two parachute battalions, two Navy commando units (Jaubert and Montfort), an Army commando unit, a 75-millimeter recoilless rifle battalion, a 105-millimeter artillery battery, an airfield engineer company, artillerymen, and pioneers was embarked. Dumont D'Urville, two patrol craft, Commandant Duboc and L'Inconstant, a seaplane tender, Commandant Robert Giraud, and a naval air detachment of Grumman Goose aircraft formed a naval support group.'

11

"NA Saigon, report, 40-54 of 25 Mar. 1954, JN-N-59-2184, box 44, FRC.

On 19 January 1954 part of this force conducted an amphibious demonstration off Qui Nhon to fix Viet Minh troops stationed in the area, and then headed south during the night to rejoin the rest. The next day—as Army forces from Nha Trang advanced along Route 1 and troops from the mountain plateau headed east to open Route 7—the amphibious landing commenced. Weather conditions were favorable except for a low cloud ceiling. As spotters in two Grumman Goose aircraft guided preparatory gunfire from the Navy ships, the first wave of landing craft entered the lagoon and landed commandos and engineers on the northern bank of the Da Rang River. In the afternoon another landing was conducted, this time on the south bank.

No serious opposition was encountered, although mine clearance operations ashore slowed the advance. Two hours after the initial landing on the dried-mud flats, Commando Montfort, with air support by a Grumman Goose, seized the bridge approaches at Cung Son on Route 7 to the west of Tuy Hoa. By evening, the beachhead was well established; Tuy Hoa and its bridge were under French control. That night the ships furnished starshell illumination. Although beach conditions frustrated the landing of field artillery on the 21st, the guns were landed successfully the next day. Commandos continued to guard the bridge and its approaches until the force coming down from the plateau arrived on 24 January. With the amphibious phase of Arethuse completed, Tuy Hoa would serve as a logistics base area for operations along the coast and into the highlands.12

An American Assessment of the Progress

It was probably no coincidence that General O'Daniel arrived on 23 January 1954 to make another assessment for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result of the trip, which lasted until 5 February, he was generally optimistic about the military situation. After a visit to the garrison at Dien Bien Phu, O'Daniel stated: "I feel that it can withstand any kind of an attack that the Viet Minh are capable of launching. However, a force with two or three battalions of medium artillery and with air observation could make the area untenable. The enemy does not seem to have this capability at

"Ibid.; NA Saigon, report. 11-S-54 of 18 Mav 1954, JN-N-59-2184, box 44, FRC; Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, pp. 46-47; Lessons of the War in Indochina, Vol. II, p. 189; for an account of the fighting in the highlands, see Fall, Street Without Joy, pp. 185–250.