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eliminated, the maritime war in the Pacific was nearing a close.

The end came much sooner than most expected, as the final blows were launched from one of the captured islands, Tinian. On 6 August, a uranium bomb-armed by Captain William S. Parsons, Jr., head of the Los Alamos Ordnance Division, during the flight of an Air Force B-29 (commanded by Colonel Paul W. Tibbets, USA)-essentially destroyed Hiroshima by the release of blast, heat, and nuclear radiation from an explosive force equivalent to 14,000 tons of TNT. Three days later, a plutonium bomb-armed by the bomb commander and weaponeer, Commander Frederick L. Ashworth-inflicted devastating damage on Nagasaki with a blast equivalent to 20,000 tons of TNT. On 15 August Japanese Emperor Hirohito ordered his armed forces to cease fire immediately.

The Allied victory over Japan marked the beginning of a new period, a period when a major influence on the course of events would be the unchallenged strength of the United States upon the sea.

The United States Navy

And Postwar Conflict

The United States emerged from World War II as the greatest sea power the world had ever seen. As long as its naval supremacy was maintained America would have secure oceanic lines of communication with other countries. The direct and indirect influence of seapower on the international scene could be applied by maintaining naval presence in troubled areas, projecting power overseas, and providing support and assistance to allies in local crises. America could enjoy the benefits of seapower in the advancement of its interests abroad and in the rehabilitation of war-torn nations. The United States Navy could act as a stabilizing factor in a troubled world and serve as a complement to diplomatic efforts in the pursuit of national objectives.

Nevertheless, as World War II came to a close there were signs that the continuing importance of the United States Navy was being questioned. Some feared that the Navy might be reduced to a point of insufficiency to support American interests, and that steps might be taken which would adversely effect the readiness and effectiveness of the Fleet. While facing the problems of transition from war to peace, the nation became increasingly concerned over an expanding struggle for power in the post-war world. Indochina was but one of the areas on the worldwide scene in which Communists were attempting to exploit instabilities and weaknesses left in the wake of the most far-reaching war in history. Crises in widely scattered regions took on the dimension of a global peacetime struggle. The result was unexpected demands for naval deployments to the Far East and the Mediterranean.

In view of the declining number of effective units in the Fleet, full use had to be made of the flexibility and mobility of naval forces and reallocation of limited resources to meet the varying demands. A process of change in the composition of naval operating forces, their employment,

their support, and their strategic and tactical direction, and in departmental responsibilities and authority began in the wake of World War II. The process would continue during the prolonged Vietnam conflict. To lay a foundation for understanding the capabilities of the United States Navy during this period some understanding is needed of the evolutionary changes in the Navy brought about by World War II.

In part, the Fleet's extraordinary wartime effectiveness had stemmed from it size, composition, and versatility. It stemmed also from a simple and direct chain of command and from an efficient alignment of departmental responsibilities. The latter provided responsive support to the Fleet with a minimum of overhead and a minimum of diversion of the naval chain of command's attention from its primary tasks of war planning, readiness, and operations. The division of responsibilities within the Navy Department had been the culmination of a process underway since the beginning of the "New Navy" near the end of the nineteenth century, a process influenced by a shift of naval policy from coastal defense and commerce raiding to Fleet actions for control of the sea, and by the experiences and demands of two world wars. The outgrowth of a movement to bring the knowledge and experience of seagoing naval line officers to bear on the management of the affairs of the Navy Department and its direction of the Fleet, resulted in the creation of the position of Chief of Naval Operations in 1915. Rather than establishing a naval general staff with supervisory responsibilities over the entire department, as advocated by a vocal group of naval officers, a congressional act provided that the Chief of Naval Operations would, "under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet, and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war."1

Demands of a "Two-Ocean War"

Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the operating forces were not ideally organized for a global war. There were three fleets-the Pacific Fleet, the Atlantic Fleet, and a tiny Asiatic Fleet. In 1941, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, had also been designated Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. He was to assume

1 Quoted in Elting Morison, "Naval Administration: Selected Documents on Navy Department Organization, 1915-1940," 1945, p. II-3.

operational command in the latter capacity only when two or more fleets were concentrated or operated in conjunction with one another. Shortly after America entered the fray, the United States Fleet commander was assigned worldwide responsibilities. Confronted by a "two-ocean war," President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8984 on 18 December 1941, which provided that the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet:

shall have supreme command of the operating forces comprising the several fleets of the United States Navy and the operating forces of the naval coastal frontier commands, and shall be directly responsible, under the general direction of the Secretary of the Navy, to the President of the United States therefor.2

Admiral Ernest J. King became Commander in Chief, United States Fleet on 30 December 1941 and established his headquarters in Washington.

Insofar as the exercise of operational command was concerned, the Fleet's ability to respond flexibly and effectively to the dynamic needs of World War II was enhanced through the grouping and regrouping of forces in numbered fleets and through the use of a decimal system for designating task forces, groups, units, and elements. This task-oriented system would again prove its value in the Vietnam era.

At the start of World War II the business of the Department of the Navy was distributed among seven bureaus headed by flag officers. Except for those under the operating forces, each facility of the shore establishment was assigned to one of the bureaus.3 Navy Regulations provided for a mutual exchange of information between the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the bureaus, such as in matters requiring cooperation, and the Chief of Naval Operations kept the bureaus and offices of the department informed on matters related to the "war efficiency" of the Fleet. From the time of the establishment of his office, the Chief of Naval Operations had placed major emphasis on obtaining bureau actions responsive to the needs of the operating forces. Having no specific authority over the bureaus, he achieved this responsiveness with leadership and actions subject to the

2 Executive Order 8984 of 18 Dec. 1941 in Title 3-The President, 1938-1943 Compilation of Code of Federal Regulations (Washington: GPO, 1968), p. 1046; Julius A. Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (Washington: Naval History Division, GPO, 1959), p. 109; Richard W. Leopold, “Fleet Organization, 1919–1941,” 1945, pp. 5–6.

3

Furer, Administration of the Navy Department, pp. 8, 126. The seven bureaus were Aeronautics, Medicine and Surgery, Ordnance, Ships, Supplies and Accounts, Yards and Docks, and Navigation. The latter became the Bureau of Naval Personnel in 1942.

Secretary of the Navy's approval. To meet the urgent demands of World War II, the President's Executive Order 9096 of 12 March 1942 assigned the Chief of Naval Operations direct authority within the Navy Department where Fleet effectiveness was concerned. Under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations was now charged with:

the preparation, readiness and logistic support of the operating forces comprising the several fleets, seagoing forces and sea frontier forces of the United States Navy, and with the coordination and direction of effort to this end of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department except such offices (other than bureaus) as the Secretary of the Navy may specifically exempt.

The order stated that the duties of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations might be assigned to one officer, "who shall be the principal naval adviser to the President on the conduct of the War, and the principal naval adviser . . . to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of the activities of the Naval Establishment." It further specified that "duties as Chief of Naval Operations shall be contributory to the discharge of the paramount duties of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet." Two weeks later, on 26 March, Admiral King relieved Admiral Harold R. Stark as Chief of Naval Operations.*

As result of the authority assigned under the two positions, the relative freedom from involvement in departmental management and administration, and the delegated authority, King was able to carry out his weighty responsibilities with a remarkably small staff and a minimum of "red tape."

The departmental overhead structure was similarly small, especially when compared with that in the Navy Department and above it in the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam era. Throughout World War II, the Navy secretariat consisted of one secretary, an under secretary, and two assistant secretaries. Yet, more than 100,000 ships and craft joined the Fleet during World War II, 80,000 aircraft were accepted over a fiveyear period, and Marine Corps strength totalled almost a half-million men at the end of hostilities.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization which played such an important role during the Vietnam era, had its origin in World War II. This body met formally for the first time on 9 February 1942. The Joint Chiefs re

* Executive Order 9096 of 12 Mar. 1942 in Code of Federal Regulations, pp. 1121-22; Furer, Administration of the Navy Department, pp. 132-34; Ernest J. King and Walter M. Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1952), pp. 356–59.

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