"not believe that the time... [was] oportune to consider detailed legislation which would undertake to write the pattern of any proposed consolidation, if indeed such consolidation is ultimately decided to be a wise course of action." 14 As the hearings of the Woodrum committee drew to a close, the Joint Chiefs of Staff convened the Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense. When Admiral King saw the special committee paper entitled "Point of Departure for Work of Special Committee," two months after it had been approved by deputies of the Joint Chiefs, he concluded that their approval "has set up a situation which bars an objective view of the whole problem of the reorganization of national defense." The committee report, completed in April 1945, recommended organizing a single department of defense in which the Army, Navy, and Air Force and commanders of areas, theaters, and independent commands would be directly subordinate to a "Commander of Armed Forces." The latter would have his own budget officer and be Chief of Staff to the President. The senior naval representative, Admiral James O. Richardson, submitted a dissenting report.1 16 A Senate bill which proposed a single defense department, a Director of Supply, and other significant features, had been introduced in January 1945, but was not considered until after the war.1 14 The Postwar Navy 17 During the first two years after World War II, the national defense U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, Report on Post-War Military Policy (78th Cong., 2nd sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1944), p. 4. According to his biographer, General Marshall was irritated with the President for opposing any proposal for consolidation and with the Navy for its influence on Roosevelt, but the general followed the example of Leahy and King in refraining from appearing before the committee; Forrest C. Pogue, Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945, Vol. III of George C. Marshall (New York: Viking Press, 1973), pp. 364–65. 15 Memo, COMINCH to VCNO, ser 5937 of 17 Aug. 1944. 16 10 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Department of Armed Forces Department of Military Security (79th Cong., 1st sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1945) (hereafter cited as Department of Armed Forces), pp. 411-36; ltr, Chairman, General Board to SECNAV, GB No. 446, ser 284 of 15 June 1945. "For a comprehensive discussion of organizational changes which took place in the Army, the Navy, and the Department of Defense from 1900 to 1959, the origins of these changes, and factors influencing the changes, see Paul Y. Hammond, Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, organizations and the relationships between them would be, in the main, those carried over from wartime. One of the few changes during this period concerned command authority within the Navy. President Harry S. Truman's Executive Order 9635 disestablished, on 10 October 1945, the billet of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, whose responsibilities were transferred to the Chief of Naval Operations. King, now Fleet Admiral, provided for a smooth transition by transferring the main functions and key staff officers of the former command to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations). The new Deputy CNO was Vice Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Jr., who had been Chief of Staff, United States Fleet, under King. In December 1945, when Admiral Cooke was given a well deserved major command at sea, as Commander Seventh Fleet, the new Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, logically chose for Cooke's relief the talented officer who had served in Pearl Harbor since November 1943 as his Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Rear Admiral Forrest P. Sherman. 18 Wartime experiences were reflected in the postwar "bilinear" relationships in the Navy Department organization. The Chief of Naval Operations exercised command of the Navy (ashore and afloat) and control of the bureau chiefs as related to determining requirements. He coordinated the shore establishment with the operating forces. Although reporting directly to the Secretary of the Navy for decisions on policy, the bureau chiefs were responsible to the under secretary and assistant secretaries for administration and logistic control related to procurement, production, and research." During the postwar period, United States military programs were largely shaped by the objectives of liquidation of the war and reconversion to a peacetime economy. The American people characteristically viewed war and peace discretely; once the war was over, the need for military readiness tended to be underestimated. As a consequence, the nation shifted quickly from total war to what a relieved populace hoped was total peace. President Truman announced that the armed services were being reduced as quickly as 18 COMINCH, "Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, Headquarters," 1946 in "United States Naval Administration in World War II,” pp. 34–37; Furer, Administration of the Navy Department, pp. 167–68. The other offices headed by Deputy Chiefs of Naval Operations were Personnel, Administration, Logistics, and Air. 19 Ibid., possible to the strength required for the tasks of disarming Germany and Japan and occupying these formerly hostile countries. 20 The government tended to rely, to a large extent, on continued collaboration between World War II allies for the solution of postwar problems. Great hope was placed on the developing United Nations organization, and through it the achievement of world collaboration and well being. The concept from which the United Nations originated was included in an InterAllied Declaration issued in London—ten days before Germany violated its nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union in June 1941. "Enduring peace" was envisaged as being attainable through the collaboration of "free peoples" working together in peace as well as in war. Those countries then allied against the Axis powers represented free peoples, as understood in Western nations.21 But, this was no longer the case when Russia joined the war against Germany. The great hopes expressed for the United Nations organization were not realized. The causes and conditions which bind allies together in time of peace are far different from those that exist in time of war. Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal was one of those men who recognized possible limitations to the effectiveness of the United Nations. Testifying before Congress on 19 September 1945, he recommended that the United States remain militarily strong. Forrestal highlighted the Navy as a major contributor to that strength and stated: All this sounds as if I did not have confidence in the world organization for peace. I have. But that confidence can only be justified if, while these organizations are in the process of transfer from paper to living reality, all the world knows that the United States will not tolerate the disorder and the destruction of war being let loose again upon the world.22 Postwar Naval Operations The months following V-J Day witnessed the hasty demobilization of U.S. forces. Fleet Admiral Nimitz, in his first annual report as Chief of Naval Operations, described the situation faced by the Navy during this time: 20 President Truman's First Annual Message to Congress, 14 Jan. 1946 in Fred L. Israel, ed., The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents, 1790–1966 (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1967), Vol. III, p. 2913. 21 Quoted in Everyman's United Nations: A Complete Handbook of the Activities and Evolution of the United Nations During Its First Twenty Years, 1945-1965, 8th ed. (New York: United Nations, 1968), pp. 4–7. 22 Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 97. The end of the war found the Navy with all facilities directed toward an invasion of Japan-an unparalleled undertaking that required tremendous reserves of men, ships, aircraft and materials, and imposed unprecedented problems of transportation. For almost four years a large part of the resources of the country and the entire energy of the Navy had been directed toward the building and maintenance of its war machine. New procedures and fresh techniques had been evolved that insured a continuous flow of materials of war. The conduct of war became normal, and when fighting stopped, the situation was abnormal. The urge of men who have served in war to return to their civil pursuits and the strong desire of families to have service members return home are natural forces of great strength which could not be ignored. In consequence of this factor, the Navy was required to release personnel at a rate much faster than that at which ships could be laid up and arrangements completed for disposal of surplus materials. Support of United States foreign policy remains a primary responsibility of the Navy. Support of the occupation forces was necessary and is being continued by the Seventh Fleet in the Far East and by the Twelfth Fleet in Europe. It has been necessary to keep those Fleets up to complement during demobilization whatever personnel shortages developed elsewhere. At the present time the United States Navy stands paramount among the naval forces of the world. To insure that it remains so during the present difficult period of transition and in the future, certain steps have been taken. These steps include a vast reorganization within the limitations of statutory post-war personnel and the continuation of research and development of new equipment and weapons. The pattern for this period is clear: Reduction, reorganization, training, and preparation for the future.23 In the months following V-J Day, the Fleet was hard pressed to fulfill extensive demands for operations in distant areas, primarily in the Pacific. Amphibious operations were needed to land combat, logistic, and administrative units for occupation and disarmament of the former enemy in the "CNO, "Annual Report," FY 1946, pp. 1-3. Japanese home islands. Other naval tasks involved supporting these occupational forces and carrying out such operations as might be needed in nearby waters. One of the most demanding and dangerous tasks was the prolonged effort required to clear the areas where American naval mines had been sown. In the case of China, more than one million Japanese military forces had to be disarmed and evacuated. Disarmament of these troops was China's responsibility, but assistance by the United States was required for associated naval tasks, including the transportation of many Japanese back to their country. In addition to such assignments, the Fleet helped speed the return of American military personnel of all the services back to the United States. In this operation, called Magic Carpet, all types of naval ships were involved, including carriers, battleships, cruisers, amphibious types, and auxiliaries. From 1 October 1945 to 1 May 1946, over two million men were returned to the United States by the Fleet. Of the 384 ships involved, all except fifteen were in the Pacific.24 Initially, naval operations in the Tokyo area were the responsibility of Commander Third Fleet; soon however, this region was incorporated into the area of responsibility of Commander Fifth Fleet. The latter officer was charged with control of the coastal waters and sea approaches to Japan, and the East China Sea. The Seventh Fleet zone of control encompassed the coastal waters of China, the navigable portion of the Yangtze River, and the Yellow Sea. The North Pacific Force operated north of the 40th parallel.25 It soon became apparent that the Seventh Fleet's tasks would be complicated by the struggle for power in China between the Communists and the Chinese Nationalist Government. The outcome of this struggle would influence the Vietnam conflict. Ominous signs had appeared in the Far East when, before its last-minute entry into the war against Japan, the Soviet Union obtained concessions from the Chinese Government with regard to Outer Mongolia and Manchuria. The end of World War II found the Army of the Soviet Union occupying Manchuria. The Russians furnished captured Japanese arms and other equipment to the Chinese Communists who, under Mao Tse-tung, controlled parts of Northern China. Soviet forces occupied the Kurile Islands and Sakhalin. The Cairo Declaration issued by the Allies had promised a unified, free, and democratic Korea. To facilitate 25 CINCPAC/POA, OP-PLAN 12-45 (Rev.), of 14 Aug. 1945. |