the nature of war and is still changing it." As a rule, such thinking largely neglected the probability of lesser wars. Discussing the "military role of traditional armed forces," one respected writer who dealt with military strategy stated: "Obviously, the relative importance of the army and navy in wartime would be considerably diminished if not eliminated by a device which could be operated more or less independently of them and which was capable of producing havoc great enough to effect a decision by itself." He stated, as an essential point, that "it is still possible for navies to lose all reason for being even if they themselves remain completely immune.” The roots were already planted for a United States policy of using the threat of atomic weapon strikes to deter conventional as well as nuclear war. In contrast to these views, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal noted that

Seapower did not win this war. Neither did air power, and neither did ground forces. The war was won and the peace is being preserved through the combined striking power of all three, each force being utilized in accord with strategic demands. Because the same combination will be needed to meet or to stamp out any future threat of war, we must preserve all the components in that combination.37

36

In the fall of 1945, Admiral King suggested that the potential of the atomic bomb would lead to "adjustments of both national policy and national defense, probably with increase of complexities and difficulties." At the same time, he concluded that "sea power-which includes naval air power-will continue to play an important part in the history of the world." On the other hand, during congressional hearings some witnesses felt that navies were no longer necessary and therefore that there was no need to "waste" money on the seagoing service of the United States. 38

In retrospect, it seems remarkable that the requirements for the Navy in the postwar years were recognized so realistically by the Chief of Naval

30

Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1928), pp. 2, 5; Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1946), pp. 81-82; Vannevar Bush, "Scientific Weapons and a Future War," Life Magazine, XVI (14 Nov. 1949), p. 113; Brodie, Atomic Bomb and American Security, p. 7.

38

'Department of Armed Forces; Davis, Postwar Defense Policy, pp. 181-98; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Naval Affairs, Hearings on Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval Establishment, 1945 (79th Cong., 1st sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1946), pp. 1186–99.

Operations. Early in 1946, in testimony before Congress, Fleet Admiral Nimitz stated:

Our peacetime operating force plan must meet certain requirements for naval forces which will continue whether or not our possible enemies retain battle fleets with which to contest command of the sea. Among these requirements, which can be met by naval forces only, are:

(a) Amphibious forces with which to transport troops to overseas positions and land them against opposition;

(b) Carrier air forces which are the only means of providing a highly effective mobile tactical air force at sea or in coastal areas distant from our own prepared air bases—and which can serve as a striking force for the destruction of specific targets;

(c) Surface fighting ships to support the amphibious forces and carrier forces and to furnish gunfire support for amphibious landings;

(d) Submarine forces of great power and a high degree of technological development;

(e) Antisubmarine and naval reconnaissance forces, surface and air, capable of effectively covering the approaches to our coasts and our essential supply lines at sea and of covering and supporting our ships;

(f) Supply ships and auxiliaries for the logistic support of all forces overseas, including the land armies and land air forces39

The capabilities enumerated by Nimitz would prove indispensable to the conduct of the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and lesser crises. One force not highlighted was the mine force. Yet, minesweeping and minelaying would constitute important naval roles in Korea and Vietnam.

40

Early in 1946, Admiral Nimitz also stressed the importance of preserving a substantial number of World War II ships and craft in a reserve fleet.* The United States would draw heavily on these resources to meet the needs of the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.

The Question of Reorganization

By the fall of 1945, the debate over the future organization of the national defense had grown more intense. Despite disagreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the report of their Special Committee for Reorganiza

U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on Navy Department Appropriation Bill for 1947 (79th Cong., 2nd sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1946), p. 32.

tion was forwarded to the President on 16 October 1945. It seemed more than coincidence that the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, which was responsible for War Department matters, began hearings the very next day on two Senate bills-S.84 and S.1482. Senate Bill S.1702 and House Bill HR 550 were also placed on the record. Each bill proposed a single department of defense. S.84 included a Director of Supply. S.1482 proposed six divisions-Scientific Research and Development, Aeronautics, Army, Navy, Procurement, and Military Intelligence. The main provision of both S.1702 and HR 550 was "a separate branch to be known as the Air Force." The former of these two bills, which originated before the United States entered the war, was explicit in including in the proposed Air Force the "Air Corps of the Army, the Navy Flying Corps, and the aviation activities of the Marine Corps, and all that pertains thereto. . . ."

When his time to testify came, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal apprised the committee of a study completed by a group headed by Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt. Eberstadt's report dealt with broader aspects of national security than had been considered in the reorganization plans. In addition to recommending the establishment of three departments-Army, Navy, and Air— the document proposed a National Security Council to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a Central Intelligence Agency would report, and further proposed a National Security Resources Board, a Military Munitions Board, a Military Education and Training Board, and a Central Research and Development Agency.*

41

Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins, USA, submitted the War Department's plan proposing a single defense department; a single Chief of Staff over Army, Navy, and Air Forces; a Director of Common Supply and Hospitalization; and theater and area commanders. Navy witnesses at the hearings disagreed with basic assumptions in Collin's plan and the congressional bills. Some doubted that the benefits claimed by the proponents would in fact be realized. Particular concern was expressed that implementation of the plan would have a serious impact on the integrity of the Navy and on the preservation of seapower. Such was the concern of Fleet Admiral King, who declared: "I am apprehensive that such an organization would permit reduction in maintenance and use of our sea power by individuals who are not thoroughly familiar with its potentialities, as has happened in several other countries." 42

41 Eberstadt Report, pp. 1-14.

2 Department of Armed Forces, pp. 124, 156.

A bill, proposed by a subcommittee after the hearings, made no mention of any of the positive factors that had contributed to complete victory in the most extensive war in history. Stating that "our splendid victories were achieved in spite of the shortcomings of our security measures, not because of their virtues," the subcommittee proposed a bill focusing on such alleged deficiencies as the "slow, costly, and erratic industrial mobilization; limited intelligence on the capacities of enemies and allies; incomplete integration of political purpose and military objective, with consequent confusion in command; waste of limited material and irreplaceable human Also highlighted were "the savage potentialities implicit in scientific developments. ." Senators Styles Bridges and Thomas C. Hart submitted dissenting "minority views" stating that, instead of working out a constructive compromise, the subcommittee had adopted the Army's proposals practically unchanged.*3

resources.

On 19 December 1945, President Truman issued a seven-point program for the reorganization of the armed forces. He strongly urged the establishment of a single department with three coordinated branches (Army, Navy, and Air), a Chief of Staff of the Department of Defense, and a commander for each of the branches." Senate Bill S.2044 was adopted by the Military Affairs Committee in April 1946, closely following the President's recommendations. The legislation also incorporated a number of features of the Eberstadt Report, such as mechanisms for civilian-military coordination. The bill was next considered by the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs. The depth of concern felt by naval officers was expressed when Fleet Admiral Nimitz observed that "officers of the Army often lacked adequate appreciation of the capabilities and limitations of naval forces." General Alexander A. Vandergrift, Commandant of the Marine Corps, concluded that "the War Department is determined to reduce the Marine Corps to a position of studied military ineffectiveness," and Admiral John H. Towers, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, expressed the fear that the Army Air Forces would absorb naval aviation."

43

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Report on Department of Common Defense (79th Cong., 1st sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1946), p. 2; U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on National Defense Establishment (80th Cong., 1st sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1947), p. 6 (hereafter cited as National Defense Establishment).

"Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II of Memoirs (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1956), p. 49.

45 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs, Hearings on Unification of the Armed Forces (79th Cong., 2nd sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1946), pp. 80, 90, 106, 147–50, 278.

On 13 May 1946 the President instructed the War and Navy Departments to identify their points of agreement and disagreement on a plan for defense reorganization. The departments listed areas of agreement, disagreement, and "less than full agreement." These issues were set forth in a letter to the President, who then stated his position on the points on which there was less than full agreement and enclosed a proposed executive order which delineated the missions and functions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force." The War and Navy Departments agreed to draft a plan for unification of the military services based on the scope and spirit of the President's proposals. Vice Admiral Sherman and Major General Lauris Norstad, USA, were assigned the task of drawing up the plan. Their plan would provide the basis for an act of Congress in 1947.

Continuing Demands for Naval Deployments

In 1946, the Seventh Fleet faced continuing operational demands in the Far East. The Soviet Union recognized Manchuria as a part of China, subject to the retention of certain rights. The Soviets promised to withdraw their troops from the area by 1 February 1946, but this deadline was not met. Within China, United States efforts to effect a political compromise between the Nationalist government and Mao Tse-tung's Communists failed. Fighting resumed in July, ending a temporary cease-fire. Ships of the United States Naval Forces, Western Pacific command protected United States interests and supported American foreign policy in China. In addition to undertaking periodic visits to Asiatic ports, the United States normally maintained ships on station at Tsingtao and Shanghai.

Vice Admiral Cooke assumed command of the Seventh Fleet on 8 January 1946. Carrying out operations begun in 1945, the fleet's amphibious force repatriated Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans. These operations continued until 8 April, when Japanese and Chinese-manned ships were able to transport the remainder of the troops. By then 321,061 Japanese and 70,108 Koreans from China and 18,965 Chinese from Korea had been returned home in Seventh Fleet ships.

A special diplomatic visit to Manila was conducted by Seventh Fleet aircraft carriers Antietam (CV-36) and Boxer (CV-21), cruiser Topeka (CL-67) and seven destroyers in connection with Philippine Independence

"Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 50-53.