The "August Uprising" And Allied Occupation Of Vietnam, 1945-1946

The abrupt ending of World War II presented the Communists in Indochina with extraordinarily favorable opportunities for the seizure of power. After the Japanese coup of March 1945, French military forces had been interned or swept out of the region. Munitions and other military supplies left behind were seized by the Communists. Five months later, Japanese forces stopped combat operations as soon as they received Emperor Hirohito's cease-fire message. A full month would pass before the initial arrival of Allied occupational forces and still more time would pass before these forces would be in position to control key locations in Indochina.

Ho Chi Minh and his fellow Communists had been preparing for such a chance. Shortly after Japan's 10 August message to the Allied governments announcing its willingness to accept the surrender terms, the Vietnamese Communist Party set in motion what they called the "August Uprising." The ensuing struggle for power signified the start of a conflict which would last at least three decades at varying levels of intensity and with a changing list of participants.

On 11 August, Viet Minh forces struck Ha Tinh Province, north of the ancient Gate of Annam. A few days later they attacked Thai Nguyen, at the northern point of the delta, forty miles from Hanoi, and a key point for controlling roads into the mountainous Viet Bac region. The Viet Bac would become the main base area for the Viet Minh.'

The Viet Minh Central Committee hastily convened a "National Congress" on 16 August in remote Tuyen Quang Province in the Viet Bac— in such a fashion that few representatives of non-Communist organizations

'Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army: The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 83-85; see also Giap, Banner of People's War.

were present to express their views. Planning to disarm the Japanese, take over the governing power from them and also from the government of Bao Dai, and assume the role of leading the people, the Communists hoped to present Allied occupation forces with a fait accompli when the latter arrived. To direct the struggle, the congress appointed a "National Liberation Committee." Following the conference, Ho called on the Vietnamese people to join and support the Viet Minh Front. Declaring the committee to be the provisional government, he announced that "the decisive hour in the destiny of our people has struck." He called for a united fight for independence and prophesied that the struggle would be long and hard.2

On 19 August 1945, the Communists took the initiative in the Tonkin capital of Hanoi. Emperor Bao Dai, under Viet Minh pressure, abdicated three days later. On the 24th, he issued an imperial rescript to the Vietnamese nation in which he advised "all the different classes of people, as well as the Royal Family, to be all united, and to support the Democratic Republican Government wholeheartedly in order to consolidate our national independence." "

3

The U.S. Office of Strategic Services, whose representatives had been in contact with Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese leaders for some time, prepared an analysis of the overall Vietnamese political situation at the time of Bao Dai's abdication. This document noted that the provisional government being established by Ho was dominated by the Viet Minh, "a 100% Communist party, with a membership of approximately 20% of the active political native element," and by a diverse coalition of nationalists organized into "six minority parties and a score of independent ones." The OSS stated that these groups sought an American protectorate similar to that established by the United States in the Philippines. Vietnamese activists reportedly hoped that the United States would "intercede with the United Nations for the exclusion of the French, as well as Chinese, from the reoccupation of Indo-China."

Ho continued his drive to seize control in key locations. The Communists

'Ho, On Revolution, pp. 141-42.

3"Bao Dai's Rescript on His First Abdication," of 24 Aug. 1945 in Allan B. Cole, ed., Conflict in Indo-China and International Repercussions: A Documentary History, 1945-1955 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 18-19.

* Memo, Director OSS to SECSTATE, of 22 Aug. 1954 in U.S., Defense Department, United States-Vietnam Relations: 1945–1967 (Washington: GPO, 1971), bk 8, pp. 46-48 (hereafter cited as U.S.-V.N. Relations).

stated that they had taken over Hue on the 23rd of August. They also claimed to have assumed control, two days later, of the capital of Cochin China, Saigon, although they exercised little actual authority over the region. At the end of the month, the Viet Minh, with the nominal cooperation of other nationalists, established a formal governmental structure. The president of the new government was Ho Chi Minh. Communists held all the major posts in his cabinet. On 29 August, the "Vietnamese Liberation Army," commanded by Giap, entered Hanoi, and seized weapons from Japanese stocks."

On 2 September 1945, the same day the formal signing of the Japanese surrender took place on board battleship Missouri, Ho issued, as president of the provisional government in Hanoi, a "Declaration of Independence" not only for Tonkin, but for the "whole population of Vietnam.” In keeping with the American declaration of 1776, upon which it was partially modeled, this document denounced past French colonial policies. It concluded by noting that "the French have fled, the Japanese have capitulated, Emperor Bao Dai has abdicated," and in lieu thereof, the Vietnamese have "established the present Republican Government."

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General Giap later claimed that this "August Revolution was the first success of Marxism-Leninism in a colonial and semi-feudal country." Ho Chi Minh and his cohorts had wasted no time. In the three weeks between Japan's acceptance of the terms of peace and the surrender ceremony, they had gained some measure of control over the capitals of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China, claimed independence, and announced the establishment of their revolutionary government over all of Vietnam.”

American Policy and the Future of Vietnam

During much of World War II, President Roosevelt left no doubt concerning his strong personal objections to continued French rule in Indochina. Elliott Roosevelt reported that, at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, his father expressed his feelings in these terms: "The native Indo

"Giap, People's War, People's Army, pp. 51–52, 84-85; Lancaster, Emancipation of French Indochina, pp. 120-21.

* Quoted in John T. McAlister, Jr., Viet Nam: The Origins of Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 193–94.

7

Giap, Banner of People's War, p. 9; see also Hammer, Struggle for Indochina, pp. 98–105 and McAlister, Viet Nam: The Origins of Revolution, pp. 185-98.

Chinese have been so flagrantly downtrodden that they thought to themselves: Anything must be better, than to live under French colonial rule! Should a land belong to France? By what logic and by what custom and by what historical rule?"

In March 1943, in a conversation with British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, the President suggested that a trusteeship be established for Indochina. Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, in a discussion with Roosevelt at the Tehran Conference in November 1943, asserted that France should not be permitted to regain control of Indochina and that, "the French must pay for their criminal collaboration with Germany." The President stated that "he was 100 percent in agreement" with the Soviet marshal. Roosevelt added that he had discussed with Chiang Kai-shek the possibility of creating a trusteeship for Indochina prior to granting independence to the indigenous peoples, perhaps twenty or thirty years later. Stalin also favored the idea."

Ten months later, in January 1944, President Roosevelt stated to Secretary of State Hull: "France has milked it [Indochina] for one hundred years. The people of Indo-China are entitled to something better than that." Roosevelt further explained that he saw no reason to "play in with the British Foreign Office in this matter. They have never liked the idea of trusteeship because it is, in some instances, aimed at future independence."

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Aware of Roosevelt's desire to keep the French out of Indochina, Under Secretary of State Edward Stettinius advised the President on 2 November 1944 that a French military mission had arrived in Ceylon, received American recognition, and parachuted officers into Indochina to support a resistance movement. The American leader reacted sharply, and on 3 November directed Stettinius to "not give American approval to any French military mission. . . . We have made no final decisions on the future of Indo-china. . . ." Stettinius also quoted the report of an Office of

8

Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), p. 115; for a general discussion of President Roosevelt's views on Indochina, see Gary Hess, "Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina," Journal of American History, LIX (Sept. 1972), pp. 353-58.

Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p. 115; minutes of meeting, JCS at White House, 7 Jan. 1943 in U.S., State Department, Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Cassablanca, 1943 of Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers (Washington: GPO, 1968), p. 514; minutes of meeting of 28 Nov. 1943 in U.S., State Department, The Conferences of Cairo and Tehran, 1943 of Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers (Washington: GPO, 1961), p. 485.

10

'Memo, President to SECSTATE, of 24 Jan. 1944 in U.S., State Department, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Vol. III of Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944 (Washington: GPO, 1965), p. 773.

Strategic Services representative with the British-led Southeast Asia Command:

There can be little doubt that the British and Dutch have arrived at an agreement with regard to the future of Southeast Asia, and now it would appear that the French are being brought into the picture. . . . It would appear that the strategy of the British, Dutch and French is to win back and control Southeast Asia, making the fullest use possible of American resources, but foreclosing the Americans from any voice in policy matters.

Roosevelt warned Stettinius again on 1 January 1945 that he did not want "to get mixed up in any military effort toward the liberation of Indochina from the Japanese." Finally, during a press conference on 23 February, the President commented:

With the Indo-Chinese, there is a feeling they ought to be independent but are not ready for it. I suggested . . . to Chiang, that Indo-China be set up under a trusteeship-have a Frenchman, one or two Indo-Chinese, and a Chinese and a Russian because they are on the coast, and maybe a Filipino and an American-to educate them for self-government.'

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Roosevelt's hopes of establishing a trusteeship for Indochina aroused serious British opposition that climaxed at the Yalta Conference. As a result, on 3 April 1945, Secretary of State Stettinius, announced a new policy approved by the President that trusteeships should only apply to prewar mandated territories, lands taken from the Japanese, and "other territories as might be voluntarily. . . placed under trusteeship." Roosevelt was then in Hot Springs, Georgia, as a result of deteriorating health. By the time of his death on 12 April, the President was aware of British and French plans to occupy Indochina at the end of hostilities.12

During a State Department review of the trusteeship policy, between 20 and 23 April, other reasons for abandoning the proposed trusteeship status for Indochina came to light. The specialists on the European desk adamantly

11

Memo, Under SECSTATE to President, of 2 Nov. 1944 and President to Under SECSTATE of 3 Nov. 1944 in Ibid., pp. 778-80; Presidential Press Conference, of 23 Feb. 1945 in Cole, Conflict in Indo-China, p. 48; President to SECSTATE, of 1 Jan. 1945 in U.S., State Department, The British Commonwealth and the Far East, Vol. VI of Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945 (Washington: GPO, 1969), p. 293.

12 U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 1, p. A-20; Hess, "Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina," pp. 354, 363; Walter LaFeber, "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina: 1942-1945," American Historical Review, LXXX (Dec. 1975), pp. 1277-95.