committees were formed. Other changes were recommended by the Gates Committee for the improvement of internal administration within the established principles of organization.29 Whether or not the changes in the Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy would achieve the Secretary of Defense's goals of greater effectiveness and economy, some long-term results were clear. There would be more management and more layers of review, coordination, and direction, and there would be added overhead. Casualties would include reduction in the delegation of mission-oriented authority within the Navy, and reduction in flexibility and responsiveness to changing service needs. Policies and Strategy As a part of his "new look at defense policies" and his avowed goal of "security with solvency," Eisenhower initiated, immediately after his election on 3 November 1952, a review of strategic concepts and implementation plans, roles and mission, composition and readiness of forces, development of new weapons, and military assistance programs. In the words of Secretary of Defense Wilson, the review "sought a military strategy that would deter both a major war and local aggression and, at the same time, could be implemented and maintained without undermining the social and economic foundations of the Nation." 30 The month of Eisenhower's election witnessed a successful test of a thermonuclear device; the development of hydrogen bomb capabilities was well underway. Nuclear warfare readiness would take increasingly bigger shares of the budget, and in addition to the role of nuclear weapons capabilities to deter general war, the applicability of such capabilities to limited conflict situations would be considered. Impact of the Korean War on the United States Navy At the time of the signing of the uncertain Korean Armistice on 27 July 1953, the Navy, and the Seventh Fleet in particular, were in a high state 29 2 U.S., Department of the Navy, Report of the Committee on Organization of the Department of the Navy (Washington: GPO, 1954). 30 U.S., Defense Department, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July-Dec. 1953, (Washington: GPO, 1954), pp. 1–2; Ries, Management of Defense, p. 167. of readiness for deterrent or combat actions. The experiences of the Korean War had emphasized the importance of maintaining a balanced Navy of sufficient strength to react to emergency situations. The United Nations' response to North Korean aggression was dependent on seapower. Emergency sea transportation was required, together with escorts, to evacuate Americans from South Korea. Ground forces and supplies had to be brought in promptly by sea. Other naval operations, supplementing and supporting actions ashore, were also needed to stop the Communist thrust and force a retreat to the north. Carriers had proven their worth in attacks from the Yellow Sea against airfields beyond the effective range of tactical aircraft operating from Japanese fields, in strikes to retard the advance of the invading forces and against their lines of communication, and in close support of troops ashore, landings, and withdrawals. As a consequence, additional carriers would be maintained after the Korean War. Along with improvements in the conventional warfare readiness of the Fleet, carrier-based nuclear strike capabilities were greatly enhanced by the development of smaller and lighter nuclear bombs which could be delivered by tactical aircraft.31 Destroyers, cruisers, and battleships provided bombardment and gunfire support and blockaded the North Korean coast. The bold amphibious assault at Inchon reversed the North Korean offensive. As this flanking movement threatened the enemy's rear and lines of communication, the Communists hastily retreated. The operation provided a partial answer to those in the United States who had questioned the value of amphibious warfare in the post-World War II era and as a result this form of naval warfare received renewed emphasis. Helicopters, developed after World War II for the ship-to-shore movement of men and supplies, were first used in this role in the Korean conflict. During the war years, the Navy obtained authorization for four faster LSDs, fifteen faster LSTs, and an inshore fire support ship (IFS). The amphibious construction and conversion program which sought APAs and AKAs of higher speeds would continue after the war. One of the areas of decreasing readiness in the months before the Korean War had been mine warfare. The time of reckoning came when Russian contact and pressure mines were encountered in the approaches to Wonsan For the naval aspects of the Korean War, see Field, History of United States Naval Operations: Korea. and elsewhere. As a result, the United States Navy placed renewed emphasis, for a time, on readiness for offensive and defensive mine warfare. Another deficiency at the start of the war concerned Service Force ships. In particular, there were no ammunition ships in Western Pacific waters and no supply ship equipped for underway replenishment remained in the Pacific Fleet. Having to return more frequently to Sasebo, Japan, the combatant ships could not be used initially with maximum efficiency in sustained operations. One result of this experience was that there would be no such gaps in underway replenishment capabilities when the need later arose in Southeast Asian waters. Insofar as the United States Pacific Fleet was concerned, the period following the signing of the armistice in Korea was one of transition from wartime to a period of suspended hostilities. The Fleet had to maintain a state of readiness for the immediate resumption of combat operations in Northeast Asia, if necessary, while carrying out other widespread commitments in response to threats and crises throughout the entire Western Pacific area. Task Force 95 conducted patrols to help maintain the Korean armistice. Under Commander Seventh Fleet, Task Force 77 maintained two carriers at sea in the area of Japan and Korea, and conducted occasional maneuvers off Formosa. Task Force 72 continued patrol operations related to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.32 Plans called for a major reduction of ships in the Western Pacific, including the withdrawal of two carriers in January 1954. This reduction would later be revised in the light of events in Southeast Asia and concern over possible actions by the People's Republic of China. Once again the United States Navy faced a difficult time in maintaining a balanced Fleet of adequate strength to meet future challenges. The ceasefire in Korea meant reductions to a peacetime budget. Over the preceding seven years, the size of the American nuclear weapon stockpile had been rapidly increasing and Air Force strategic forces greatly expanded. Further expansion would be stimulated by another of the momentous events of 1953. On 20 August, the Soviet Union announced the explosion of a hydrogen bomb. The United States Atomic Energy Commission confirmed the explosion, disclosing that a test involving both fission and thermonuclear reactions had occurred. The postwar military budget of fiscal year 1954 was higher than that B2 CINCPACFLT, "Annual Report," FY 1954, pp. 1–3. at the start of the Korean War. However, with the emphasis on strategic warfare readiness, the Navy's share of funds was considerably smaller than in any of the prewar years. Modernization of the Fleet would have to be achieved in addition to meeting the continuing demands for readiness and worldwide deployments. Among the expanding requirements were nuclear propulsion, the equipping of ships with guided missile systems, the enhancement of antisubmarine warfare capabilities to meet the challenge of fast, deep-diving submarines, and the further development of the capabilities for carriers and their aircraft to deliver nuclear weapons. Replacement of ships built in World War II would continue to be deferred. Increased Aid An increase in military aid to the French in Indochina was approved in September 1953. One requirement not covered by the plan concerned aircraft carriers. La Fayette was scheduled for relief by Arromanches in midJune 1953 and to enter drydock about mid-September for a six-month overhaul. The French needed an additional carrier which could be used for training French pilots in the use of the newly delivered Corsairs and then would be available to relieve Arromanches in the spring of 1954. Defense Minister Pleven had already initiated negotiations for a light carrier during his visit to Washington in March 1953. Accordingly, the President, with congressional approval, ordered the loan of Belleau Wood (CVL-24). La Fayette (transferred to France in 1951 under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program) and Belleau Wood were of the light carrier types built on cruiser hulls for service in World War II. Faster than the escort types, they were better able to land and recover fighter-type aircraft. Their aircraft capacity, however, was limited to a normal load of twenty-six. Owing to the time taken to provide a qualified French crew, Belleau Wood (rechristened Bois Belleau) did not reach France until December 1953, two and a half months later than originally scheduled. The poor condition of her boilers at the time of reactivation and the need for further repairs caused some delay, as did French use of the ship to deliver planes to India.33 The French Army would be badly in need of air support that 33 Pierre Barjot, Histoire de la Guerre Aeronavale (Paris: Flammarion, 1961), pp. 402-05; memo, OP-30 to OP-03, ser 00025 of 25 July 1953; the authorization act, Public Law 188, is contained in U.S., Congress, United States Statutes at Large: 1953 (83rd Cong., 1st sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1953), Vol. 67, p. 363; memo, Defense Member, NSC Planning Board to Presidential Assistant, of 10 Apr. 1954 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. 380-81. |