officer other than Commander Seventh Fleet (Vice Admiral Alfred M. Pride) was deemed desirable by Admiral Carney because of the continuing threat to Taiwan from mainland China, the need of a carrier strike force in that area to deter or counter an invasion attempt, the possibility of simultaneous crises there and in Indochina, uncertaintly as to the permanence of the Korean Armistice, and the different chains of command for the Japan-Taiwan area and for other portions of the Western Pacific. In a letter in which the CNO summarized his concept of using Commander First Fleet as a deployed task force commander under CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT, Carney stated that "the realism of the threat in the Pacific lends added importance to any thinking which involves the utilization of the Commander First Fleet as the tactical commander for special operations."

Complying with Carney's desires, Stump ordered the commander of the First Fleet, Vice Admiral William K. Phillips, and a small operational staff, west to assume command. Phillips was well acquainted with the situation in the Western Pacific and the plans for action, if ordered. He had served as Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet from September 1952 to October 1953, under both Admirals Radford and Stump.

6

The usual function of Commander First Fleet, normally operating off the West Coast of the United States, was fleet training. At Carney's instigation, the First Fleet commander already had been assigned responsibilities for coordinating and evaluating fleet readiness in the Western Pacific as well as off the West Coast of the United States. Carney envisaged occasional visits to the Far East to confer with Commander Seventh Fleet and Commander Naval Forces, Far East on training and readiness matters. Admiral Phillips's mission, while in command of the "Fair Weather Traning Force," was to conduct training in the South China Sea, to determine the state of readiness of forces assigned to him, and to evaluate the feasibility of future utilization of the Subic Bay-Sangley area as an operating base. He also had the classified mission of maintaining readiness for combat operations in case of a decision to employ his force against China or in support of French Union forces.

Phillips organized his ships into two task groups. One was an Attack Carrier Striking Group (TG 70.2), commanded by Rear Admiral Robert E. Blick, Jr. (also Commander Carrier Division 3), to which a carrier unit

"Ltr, Carney to Stump, of 8 Mar. 1954.

of Wasp (CVA-18) and Essex (CVA-9), a screen unit of eight destroyers, and a submarine unit were assigned. The other was a Logistic Support Group (TG 92.2), commanded by Captain George H. Browne and consisting of the underway replenishment ships."

While maintaining a high state of readiness for contingencies, the force conducted a wide variety of training, including air-strike exercises, antisubmarine and air-defense operations, and day and night replenishment. One of the carriers that later joined the force, Boxer, reported that its lack of the new and more powerful catapults being installed in the Fleet, combined with low-wind conditions, led to a number of cancellations of planned jet fighter sorties. But this was an isolated problem. The overall offensive capabilities of the force were considered excellent."

In the spring of 1954, the force would be expanded to three carriers, twelve destroyers, and a larger logistic support group. Its deployment would be extended as a result of the deteriorating situation at Dien Bien Phu and training operations would be interrupted twice when the force was placed in readiness for possible combat action.

9

In the light of future events, one of Admiral Phillips's recommendations of particular interest was that the Subic-Cubi-Sangley area facilities in the Philippines should be completed to serve as a fleet base, especially in view of its proximity to the Southeast Asian trouble spot. The validity of this recommendation would later be confirmed, when these facilities had to be expanded on an urgent basis in the 1960s to meet the needs of the Fleet and to support the programs of military assistance.

Navarre's Offensive

On 12 December 1953 General Navarre had notified his subordinate commanders of his decision to launch the promised offensive. His target was one of the six inter-zones into which the Communists had subdivided Vietnam for the administration and organization of their infrastructure. The Fifth Inter-Zone (Lien Khu V) in south-central Vietnam stretched along the coast from south of Tourane to north of Nha Trang and westward to the mountains along the Laotian and Cambodian borders. In addi

'COMISTFLT, OP-ORDER 10-54, ser 01A of 28 Feb. 1954.

COM1STFLT, report, ser 010A of 29 Apr. 1954; CAG 12, report, ser 031 of 4 Oct. 1954. 'COM1STFLT, report, ser 010A of 29 Apr. 1954.

tion to their political apparatus extending down the pyramid of zones, provinces, districts, inter-villages, and villages, the Viet Minh now had an estimated 30,000 troops in the Fifth Inter-Zone.

Prior French operations in this area had been of the hit and run variety and had not established continuous control. In Atlante, as his campaign was called, Navarre planned to move up the coast, establishing bases in three or four successive operations. Tasks would involve finding and destroying the enemy, detecting and eliminating traps and mines, installing a military police and administrative system, repairing roads and bridges, and carrying out general public reconstruction. By this means he intended to establish firm control over the populated narrow lowland region along the coast from Cape Varella to Fai Fo. In addition to the political value of the region, this was the main channel for supplies and personnel, either along Route 1 and the railroad, or waterborne off the coast.

Despite signs of an imminent major action in the T'ai highlands of Tonkin and his 5 December 1953 decision to accept battle there, Navarre assigned top priority to Atlante, stating to his subordinates:

In view of the considerable strategic and political results which one is entitled to expect from the complete execution of that operation, I have decided to subordinate to it the conduct of the whole Indochina campaign. during the first semester of 1954.10

Called Arethuse, the first phase of this offensive consisted of the seizure of Tuy Hoa by an amphibious assault and subsequent operations from a base area to be established there. The amphibious force, including LSTS and merchant ships from Tourane, was asssembled at Nha Trang under the command of the captain of landing ship dock Foudre. The transport group consisted of LSD Foudre, LSTS Rance and Chéliff, and the merchant ships. A landing force of two parachute battalions, two Navy commando units (Jaubert and Montfort), an Army commando unit, a 75-millimeter recoilless rifle battalion, a 105-millimeter artillery battery, an airfield engineer company, artillerymen, and pioneers was embarked. Dumont D'Urville, two patrol craft, Commandant Duboc and L'Inconstant, a seaplane tender, Commandant Robert Giraud, and a naval air detachment of Grumman Goose aircraft formed a naval support group.'

11

"NA Saigon, report, 40-54 of 25 Mar. 1954, JN-N-59–2184, box 44, FRC.