present." In his report, O'Daniel added prophetically: "I believe that if I were charged with the defense of the area, I would have been tempted to have utilized the high ground surrounding the area. . . .

13

In addition to assessing the military situation, O'Daniel had been instructed to explore-in view of the ever growing United States involvement -the possibilities of his being stationed permanently in Vietnam for liaison with General Navarre, to expedite Mutual Defense Assistance Program deliveries, and to inject American thinking on strategy and training at the highest French command levels. General O'Daniel found Navarre flatly opposed to the liaison idea, since he viewed it as an attempt to undermine his control. However, he did agree to periodic visits by the American general.1

One of the major topics of discussion between O'Daniel and Navarre was the assistance program. General Navarre complained that he was not getting essential equipment fast enough. In addition to the inevitable time involved in providing items to a foreign government and delivering them to a remote area, added delays stemmed from the administrative processes of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and staffing in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the State Department. In commenting on a proposal that military assistance for Indochina be administered and financed separately from MDAP, Rear Admiral David M. Tyree, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Material), agreed that MDAP procedures were not well suited to support of combat operations. He stated:

The most significant reason for this is the usual delay of several months from the time funds are appropriated by Congress until supply action can be initiated, even though items may already be in Navy stocks. This delay is caused by the many echelons of approval required both for the items in a program and for the release of funds to the responsible department.

He contrasted the procedures with the streamlined ones of the Korean War, when immediate action could be taken to provide material from Navy stocks-"limited only by availability of materiel and status of naval appropriations." While Vice Admiral Roscoe E. Good, Deputy Chief of

13

Chief, U.S. Special Mission to Indochina, report, of 5 Feb. 1954 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. 246–52. His reservations contradict most accounts which assert that U.S._military observers found the Dien Bien Phu defenses satisfactory; Navarre, Agony of Indochina, pp. 316-17; Giap, People's War, People's Army, pp. 207-08; Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, pp. 108, 296.

"Navarre, Agony of Indochina. p. 229.

Naval Operations (Logistics), agreed that logistic support for Indochina should be separately administered and financed, he was concerned over budgetary implications and opposed a solution which would charge Indochina expenditures to the Navy budget. His opposition was understandable in view of the cuts then being applied to the funding of the military departments.15

While some success was being achieved along the coast in Atlante during the winter and spring of 1954, the French were hard-pressed on the mountain plateau near the Laotian border. Nevertheless, to provide troops for Dien Bien Phu and prepare for subsequent action expected in the region of the Red River Delta, Navarre redeployed the bulk of the mobile forces from the plateau. Only one Vietnamese mountain division, one Vietnamese mobile group of limited offensive value, and small commando units remained. As a consequence, the main burden of defending the area fell upon a regimental task force, the Groupement Mobile 100. Activated in November 1953, the hard corps of the task force consisted of the French battalion which had been transported from Korea by the United States Navy in October. In a series of actions and ambushes lasting from February to July 1954, the French 1st Korea Battalion fought valiantly but was almost completely annihilated.1o

16

Dien Bien Phu

Located in a valley of the T'ai highlands in the remote northwestern part of Tonkin, eight miles from the Laotian border, Dien Bien Phu was the site of a small airfield built in the late 1920s. For two months after the Japanese coup in the spring of 1945, it had been the headquarters for a remnant of French forces, before they withdrew to China. Dien Bien Phu was next occupied by the Chinese after World War II. The French moved back in during the spring of 1946. They pulled out when the Viet Minh attacked posts in the mountains in the fall of 1952.1

When French forces returned to Dien Bien Phu in November 1953, Giap lost no time in starting a buildup of Viet Minh troops in the area,

15

Memo, ACNO (Material) to DCNO (Logistics), ser 000231P41 of 12 Feb. 1954; memo, DCNO (Logistics) to DCNO (Operations), ser 000232P41 of 13 Feb. 1954.

10 Fall, Street Without Joy, pp. 185-250.

17 For a detailed account of the Dien Bien Phu campaign, see Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place.

reported to his unified commander, Commander in Chief, Pacific, he was sent in this instance as a representative of the JCS, "under the over-all supervision of the Commander in Chief, Pacific. . . ." One of O'Daniel's tasks was to "expedite revision and aggressive implementation of French military plans for successfully concluding the war in Indochina, including the early initiation of aggressive guerrilla warfare, aimed at knocking the enemy off balance, disrupting enemy supply lines, and gaining the initiative for anticommunist forces." Early aggressive military action against the Viet Minh was deemed essential.14

14

During General O'Daniel's visit to Indochina, he was briefed by Navarre on the new aggressive concept of operations for the conduct of the war. According to the plan, the French would take the initiative that summer in local offensives and commando and guerrilla actions. They would attack the flanks and rear of the enemy in the north during the fall and winter, progressively pacifying regions not directly involved in the battle. The plan promised a maximum of cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, and a continuance of "the effort of instructing and organizing the Army of the Associated States so as to give them more and more participation as well as more autonomy in the conduct of operations.'

15

The outline of the plan, as reported by General O'Daniel in the summer of 1953, differed in one significant respect from the plan as recounted in General Navarre's memoirs-in the timing of the French offensive. In his book, Agony of Indochina, Navarre stated that the basis of his plan was similar to that of General Salan, namely:

1. During 1953-1954 campaign, maintain a strategically defensive attitude north of the 18th Parallel, and seek to avoid a general battle. On the other hand, take, whenever possible, the offensive south of the 18th Parallel, in order to clean up South and Central Indochina and recover our forces there. In particular, to seek to liquidate the L.K.5 [Vietnam from Tourane to just north of Saigon].

2. Having obtained the superiority in mobile forces, i.e., starting in autumn. 1954, take the offensive north of the Porte d'Annam, with the goal of creating a military situation permitting a political solution to the conflict.16

During O'Daniel's trip to Indochina, he and other members of the mission also discussed naval operations with Vice Admiral Auboyneau, who had

"Memo, JCS to SECDEF, of 10 June 1953 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. 59–67.

15

Memo, JCS to SECDEF, of 11 Aug. 1953 in Ibid.,

pp. 134-37.

10 See Navarre, Agony of Indochina, pp.135-36.

replaced Vice Admiral Ortoli in April 1952 as Commander of French Naval Forces, Far East." Admiral Auboyneau agreed to reorganize his forces to include a joint amphibious command, with the purpose of "attaining increased amphibious effectiveness," and to delegate "increased responsibility to Vietnamese leaders and units.'

❞ 18

As the Navarre plan was being assessed in Washington, American policymakers were concerned that the situation might worsen. A United States Central Intelligence Agency assessment of 4 June 1953 stated that, “if present trends in the Indochinese situation continue through mid-1954, the French Union political and military position may subsequently deteriorate very rapidly." Secretary of Defense Wilson summarized the situation as follows: "Communist aggression in Indochina presents, except for Korea, the most immediate threat to the free world. For more than 6 years communist forces, supplied with weapons and equipment from Communist China and Soviet Russia, have been waging open warfare."

19

Admiral Felix B. Stump, the new Commander in Chief, Pacific, endorsed, with some reservation, the Navarre concept forwarded by O'Daniel, as it was relayed by O'Daniel to the JCS. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the plan were set forth in a memorandum of 11 August 1953 signed by their chairman, General Bradley. The Joint Chiefs of Staff hesitated to predict actual results, but felt the plan offered "a promise of success sufficient to warrant . . . additional U.S. aid.

» 20

Admiral Radford succeeded General Bradley as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 August 1953. Having just completed his tour as Commander in Chief, Pacific and Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, a tour lasting from April 1949 until June 1953, Admiral Radford had a current understanding of the situation in Southeast Asia and the Far East. He had visited the friendly countries in the area and conferred with their military and civilian leaders. His tour had included all except the last month of the Korean War. Having been responsible for the performance

17

Naval officers on the mission were Captain Stephen Jurika, Jr., and Ensign Pence, USNR, of the Pacific Fleet staff.

18 Ltr, Chief, Joint Military Mission to Indochina to JCS, of 14 July 1953 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. 69–72.

19 U.S., Defense Department, Semianual Report of the Secretary of Defense, Jan.-June 1953 (Washington: GPO, 1953), p. 61; CIA, "Probable Developments in Indochina through Mid1954," 4 June 1953 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, p. 47.

20

Memo, JCS to SECDEF, of 11 Aug. 1953 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. 134–35; memo, OP-35 to CNO (no date, ca. Aug. 1953).

of units of the Fleet, under operational control of the Supreme Allied Commander when in the Korean area, he was familiar with the problems of that limited war. Impressed with Radford's capabilities, experiences, duties, and personality, key naval aviators recognized and respected him as their leader. A strong proponent of carrier air power, he had served three tours in the Bureau of Aeronautics and as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air. His combat experience included command of carrier divisions and carrier task groups in World War II and participation in the intense naval actions during the last ten months of the war. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal had brought him to Washington in 1945 to head the "Secretary's Committee of Research on Reorganization" in connection with the question of unification. He had served as Vice Chief of Naval Operations from January 1948 to April 1949.

On 28 August 1953, in one of his early actions as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford signed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense commenting on the Navarre plan. In it the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the previous wording to have been "overly optimistic with respect to the 'promise of success' offered by the Navarre concept." The JCS noted that the actual success would "be dependent upon the aggressiveness and skill with which the French and Vietnamese forces conduct their future operations." 21

Reorganization Plan No. 6

When Dwight D. Eisenhower became President of the United States in January 1953, he developed the "New Look" for his administration. One of the areas in which he sought changes concerned the responsibilities of those charged with providing for the common defense.

Some further steps toward functional centralization had already been taken. The Defense Supply Management Agency was established in July 1952 under the Office of the Secretary of Defense, although with limited responsibilities for the time being. In August, the office of Director of Installations was established whereby "direct surveillance over the planning and construction of all public works by the military departments was centralized in the Office of the Secretary of Defense." 22 The National Security

21 Memo, JCS to SECDEF, of 28 Aug. 1953 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. 138-39. "U.S., Defense Department, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July-Dec. 1952 (Washington: GPO, 1953), p. 5.