The End Of

The French-Viet Minh War

The United States responded to the worsening situation in April 1954 by agreeing to send more military aid to the French and Associated States. Added evidence of American support was given when Lieutenant General O'Daniel replaced Major General Trapnell as head of the U.S. MAAG on 11 April. Because of American concern over a rank predating that of Lieutenant General Navarre, O'Daniel was assigned to Indochina as a major general.1

The French continued to call for more and more American equipment, particularly aircraft. Vice Admiral Auboyneau, Commander of French Naval Forces, Far East, had suggested to General Navarre the use of twenty-four idle pilots from the carrier La Fayette, now drydocked in France, to fly Corsair aircraft that might be provided by the United States Navy from stocks in the Western Pacific. Navarre requested the pilots because the French Navy was conducting the majority of the sorties in support of Dien Bien Phu. He felt that the higher instrument qualifications of naval aviators and the better instrument capabilities of their aircraft made them better suited for support missions in the poor weather which so often enveloped the valley at Dien Bien Phu in the spring.

The French request for naval aircraft was approved on 13 April 1954, and Saipan (CVL-48) set sail from Yokosuka, Japan, with twenty-five AU-1 Corsair aircraft (formerly designated F4Us), maintenance material, and spare parts. Also on board were one officer and five enlisted men with temporary duty orders to Indochina to help the French with maintenance problems. On 18 April at 0830 Saipan, in company with destroyer Colahan

1 Admiral Carney agreed with General Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff, that it was unfortunate the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not consulted on the appointment of General O'Daniel, and that the latter's rank was being reduced. Memo, OP-004 to CNO, of 26 Feb. 1954.

(DD-658), rendezvoused with the French patrol craft L'Inconstant off Tourane harbor. Two French liaison officers came on board and shortly thereafter the Corsairs were flown off by Marine Corps pilots attached to Saipan's air group. The original plan had been to fly the aircraft to Cat Bi airfield near Haiphong, but because that airfield was so overcrowded, the planes were order to Tourane. When the aircraft touched down on the steel Marston-matting of the airfield, the American aviators were greeted by French pilots, many of whom had trained with the Americans at the Pensacola Naval Air Station in Florida. Soon thereafter, Saipan sailed into the harbor and anchored near the French carrier Arromanches. The United States pilots returned to their carrier by helicopter while deck crews unloaded the spare parts for the aircraft into French LCUs and LCMs. The entire operation was completed without incident by 1600 that afternoon, when the carrier and its escort put to sea for the Philippines."

Within a week of their arrival, French naval pilots began flying the Corsairs in support of Dien Bien Phu. They went into battle just in time to bolster the badly depleted squadrons of Arromanches, which were down to two-thirds of their original strength. On 30 April, carrier Bois Belleau finally arrived on station to augment the air effort. In praise of the naval air arm. General Navarre later declared that it was the only military service which met and surpassed its obligations at Dien Bien Phu.3

Other aid also continued to flow to Indochina. In May, the French obtained a second squadron of ten Privateer patrol planes. Although their

3 Barjot, Histoire de la Guerre Aeronavale. pp. 402-05; Navarre, Agony of Indochina, p. 84. By July 1954, the United States had delivered aid to Indochina at a cost of $2.6 billion. The items included 2 light aircraft carriers, 438 other naval ships and craft, and approximately 500 aircraft. NA Saigon, report, 14-S-54 of 24 June 1954, JN-N-59-2184, box 44, FRC; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 1, pt. IVA.2, p. 15.

primary mission was to augment the coastal patrol against Viet Minh infiltration, most of the Privateers were diverted to flying bombing missions in support of the garrison of Dien Bien Phu.

The battle at Dien Bien Phu was now raging on the valley floor. Outposts to the west of the field had been evacuated. Major Viet Minh assaults on defensive positions just north of the airstrip on 3 to 5 April were repulsed, but the situation was ominous. By now, Soviet 75-millimeter antiaircraft guns were interfering with the dropping of supplies and reinforcements, and with air strikes.5

In the light of America's refusal to fly combat missions, Navarre suggested sorties by unmarked aircraft. Admiral Radford rejected the proposal on 11 April. Then the French Secretary of State for Air, Louis Christianens, on a visit to the United States, discussed the loan of American B-29 bombers, only to discover that there were no French pilots trained to fly the planes. General Navarre proposed that the United States carry out night raids on Viet Minh supply lines leading to Dien Bien Phu, but this suggestion also was rejected.

The United States continued to explore the possibility of united action with its allies in Southeast Asia. However, not even Dulles's personal trip to Europe, during 11-15 April, could persuade the British to agree to such a course. On 20 April, upon the secretary's return, he informed congressional leaders that, under these circumstances, American action in Indochina was neither imminent nor under consideration.

On the night of the 13th, a Communist commando force infiltrated the airfield at Dien Bien Phu and blasted a trench across it. With the help of such trenches and underground passageways, the Viet Minh steadily closed their lines. Defensive positions to the west and north were almost cut off from the rest of Dien Bien Phu. Fortification Huguette 6 just north of the airfield was evacuated on the 18th.

At that point, the military situation at Dien Bien Phu took another turn for the worse. The loss on 23 April of the key outpost of Huguette 1, located on the western side of the strip, made parachuting of reinforcements virtually impossible. Compounding the disaster was the loss of an elite parachute battalion in a desperate attempt to retake the position. It was

"Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place. pp. 210-24.

'Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War, pp. 89, 91–92; Ély, Indo-China in Turmoil, p. 42; Gurtov, The First Vietnam Crisis, pp. 101-102.

the garrison's last operational reserve. The Viet Minh trench system grew tighter around the fortress, which had shrunk to only one and a half kilometers in diameter. French leaders estimated, even before the battle for Huguette 1, that Dien Bien Phu would fall by asphyxiation within ten days and after that the Viet Minh would break through to the Tonkin delta.

That same day in Washington, Admiral Donald B. Duncan-the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, who was acting for Admiral Carney during the latter's temporary absence—studied an alarming dispatch from Secretary of State Dulles, who had returned to Europe, reporting conversations with French Foreign Minister Bidault. Bidault had taken Dulles aside during a North Atlantic Treaty Organization meeting in Paris to show him a message in which General Navarre again declared that only massive air support could save Dien Bien Phu. Bidault asked Dulles point-blank if the United States would reconsider the 5 April rejection of air support. Only American military intervention could save the fortress. Its loss, said Bidault, would result in public revulsion against the war and an irresistable demand for the French to withdraw. Bidault was not interested in Dulles's proposal of a Far Eastern collective security treaty to defend Indochina, which he felt would do nothing to save Dien Bien Phu. When Dulles stated that he would like to get Britain into the picture, Bidault countered that the British contribution would be small at best.

Admiral Duncan immediately ordered that Phillips's attack carrier striking force be placed on "twelve hours notice for possible resumption of operations previously conducted in western South China Sea." 8

In anticipation of a scheduled meeting with the President on the morning of the 23rd, Radford consulted with Duncan about the deployment of Seventh Fleet carriers. Duncan informed Radford that Boxer and Philippine Sea (CV-47) were in Subic on a twelve-hour steaming notice. Radford urged that Essex (CV-9) be returned to the force. Essex was then midway in a passage from the Philippines to Japan, but Duncan withheld action, pending the White House meeting. The consensus at the conference on 23 April, at which the Navy was represented by Secretary of the Navy

7 Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, pp. 243, 258, 271, 276; Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War, p. 90; Navarre, Ag^ny of Indochina. pp. 378–79.

Memo, VCNO to CNO, of 23 Apr. 1954; Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War, p. 93; msg. CNO 222323Z Apr. 1954.