ments in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons [sic.] and armoured vehicles," although "war materials, arms and munitions which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cessation of hostilities" could be replaced. The establishment of new military bases was prohibited and none was to be established under the control of a foreign state. No additional military personnel could be introduced into Vietnam.

The Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities was primarily a military settlement of the war. A political settlement was only alluded to in Article 14, which stated that, "pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Viet Nam" each party to the agreement would administer its own regroupment zone."

19

Such a settlement was spelled out more clearly in a Final Declaration. The declaration emphasized "that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." It further called for elections in July 1956 on establishing "democratic institutions" in Vietnam.20 The declaration also specifically noted that the French-Democratic Republic of Vietnam agreement forbade the introduction of foreign military personnel, the establishment of military bases under foreign control, and the use of the zones as part of any military alliance or "for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy." It was also stipulated that the military demarcation line was provisional and not in any way to be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary.

At the Geneva Conference the United States had been "an interested nation which, however, is neither a belligerent nor a principal in the negotiations." At the conclusion of the conference on 21 July, Under Secretary of State Smith issued a unilateral declaration setting forth the United States' position. He stated that the United States was not prepared to concur in the conference's "Final Declaration," but took note of the agreements concluded on the 20th and 21st of July. Referring to the United Nations' Charter, Smith declared that the United States would refrain "from the threat or use of force" to disturb the agreements, and "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the . . . agreements with grave

19.

"Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam (1954)” in Nutt, "Troika on Trial," Vol. III, App. II, pp. 27–43.

20

"Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954" in Ibid., App. V, pp. 48–50.

concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." He then restated a Washington declaration of 29 June 1954 as follows: "In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly." On the other hand, Smith reiterated the traditional American position that "peoples are entitled to determine their own future" and declared that the United States would not "join in any arrangement which would hinder this" policy."1

The South Vietnamese had presented their own plan "designed to obtain an armistice, without even the temporary partitioning of Vietnam. . In a statement issued on 21 July, they protested the fact that their proposal was rejected without even having been considered. Furthermore, the South Vietnamese "solemnly" protested the fact that the French "arrogated [to themselves] the right to set the date for future elections. . . ."22

Because the United States and South Vietnam refused to sign the Final Declaration, the other nations at Geneva did not sign either. The FrenchViet Minh War was over, but a complete political settlement had not been achieved.

Shortly after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, increased Chinese Communist activity was noted in the coastal areas near Taiwan, particularly by air and naval units close to Chinese Nationalist offshore islands. In particular, the Tachen Islands appeared to be threatened. Under the operational control of Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, Commander Seventh Fleet deployed forces, including carriers Tarawa (CV-40) and Boxer, to the area and increased the reconnaissance efforts of Task Force 72. On 7 July 1954, a P2V patrol plane on a reconnaissance flight in the Formosa Strait was attacked by Chinese Communist aircraft, but was not damaged."

23

On 22 July, Chinese fighters twenty miles southeast of Hainan Island shot down a British Air Cathay Skymaster enroute from Bangkok to Hong Kong with eighteen passengers on board. Vice Admiral Phillips, embarked in Hornet (CVA-12) on training exercises in the South China Sea, in company with Philippine Sea and a screen group of twelve destroyers, reacted immediately upon hearing the British distress call. He ordered Rear Admiral

21 Msg, SECSTATE, of 12 Mav 1954 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 9, pp. 457-59; Statement, Under Secretary of State at the concluding plenary session of the Geneva Conference of 21 July 1954 in The Department of State Bulletin. XXXI (2 Aug. 1954), pp. 162–63.

Statement by the Government of Vietnam, July 21, 1954 in Nutt, "Troika on Trial," Vol. III, App. VI. pp. 51–52.

* COM7THFLT, report, FY 1955. p. 11; msg, CINCPACFLT 260006Z May 1954.

Harry D. Felt, then Commander Carrier Group (TG 70.2) and embarked in Philippine Sea, to aid British and United States Air Force units searching for survivors. Nine survivors, one of whom subsequently died, were rescued without incident.

Then on the 26th, three search planes from Philippine Sea, led by Commmander G. C. Duncan, Commander Carrier Air Group 5, were attacked by two LA-7 Chinese Communist fighters. The "bogies" made a low-side run on Lieutenant R. M. Tatham in an AD Skyraider and opened fire at about 3,000 feet. After failing to score hits, the Chinese pilots broke off and made a head-on firing run against Commander Duncan's Skyraider. Commander Duncan alerted the rest of the flight to join the action. In the meantime, Lieutenant Tatham made firing runs on the lead LA–7. Hits were observed. Another AD made a firing run on the LA-7 as it slowly rolled on its back and spun into the water. Taken under fire by eight Skyraiders the second LA-7 crashed into the water near a fishing junk. As the pilots regrouped, a small gunboat, escorting two Polish merchantmen in the vicinity of the air action, began firing on the Navy pilots. On orders from Admiral Felt the aircraft withheld their fire and returned to the carrier."

Although a reduction of the overall force levels of the United States Navy had been underway since the Korean armistice, extensive demands for deployed naval forces had continued. The withdrawal of two carriers from the Western Pacific, planned for January 1954, had been continually deferred. Forces were no longer sufficient to maintain the required level of peacetime deployments without adverse effects on readiness in other areas and on morale. This situation led the Navy to seek a reduction of the requirement for carriers in the Western Pacific from four to three, as of 1 July. In the words of Admiral Duncan, acting Chief of Naval Operations:

The deployment of 4 CVA to the Far Eastern Command is the most difficult commitment to maintain. It has now been extended for over two years. To continue it: ships have been switched from ocean to ocean, sometimes temporarily, at other times permanently; carrier Air Groups from one Fleet have been married to carriers of the other Fleet and the entire unit pressed through an abbreviated training period which has proved unsuitable to prepare the ship for its intended duty 25

The request was denied.

24 Memo, OP-33 to OP-03, ser 0072 of 29 July 1954; CARDIV 3, reports, ser 0059 of 7 Aug.

and ser 0193 of 23 Aug. 1954; CAG 5, report, of 26 July 1954.

Meanwhile, the United States was groping for means of ensuring the security of South Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries. As the Seventh Fleet continued operations to protect American interests throughout the Far East, it was ordered to assist in the transportation of refugees from North Vietnam.

Passage To Freedom, 1954-1955

One of the immediate results of the French-Viet Minh Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam was the involvement of the United States Navy in the humanitarian task of helping provide passage south for those who desired and were able to flee Communist rule in the North. Throughout its history and in many scattered areas of the globe, the Navy had often been called upon to rescue people from areas of natural disasters, political turmoil, warfare, or oppression. The task was thus a familiar one, but each case had its own set of problems. Difficulties encountered in the Vietnam operations were in many respects unique.

In addition to requiring that each party regroup military forces, equipment, and supplies to its own zone (the Viet Minh forces to the north of the demarcation line and French Union Forces to the south), the agreement also stipulated that "until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district." The United States had urged such a provision during the negotiations. Experience in Eastern Europe and Korea had emphasized the importance of timely provisions to assist those who wished to escape a Communist dictatorship. Wherever the Communists had gained control, they had taken extraordinary steps to restrict communications across the borders and to prevent the inhabitants from leaving; in each case, the "iron curtain" had descended. Those remaining behind who actively sought freedom had often been subjected to coercion, imprisonment, torture, or even death. France sought the provision concerning movement of civilians so that it could withdraw not only military dependents and French citizens but also Vietnamese who would be in danger because of close affiliations with the French.

United States assistance would be requested because of the large number of people who desired to leave North Vietnam and the importance of civilian movements in the initial phases of regroupment. Although 300