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days were allowed for final withdrawal of troops, they were to be moved into provisional assembly areas within 15 days after the cease-fire date. Departure from the "Hanoi perimeter" was to be completed in 80 days and from the "Haiduong perimeter" in 100 days. Fear that once they gained control over an area the Communists would interfere with Vietnamese departures later proved justified.

On 23 July 1954, two days after the Geneva Conference ended, France offered to assist South Vietnam in evacuating civilian as well as military personnel from North Vietnam. The French agreed to build refugee camps in both the North and the South and to help resettle the refugees once they reached their destination. Doubting that the French could handle the task alone, Diem advised the United States Ambassador, Donald Heath, in Saigon that South Vietnam would need help in transporting Catholics and other anti-Communists from the North to the free zone of Vietnam.1

The cease-fire went into effect in northern Vietnam on 27 July, and by the end of the month, French troops had withdrawn into the HanoiHaiduong-Haiphong area. Along with the French military personnel, numbering some 80,000, thousands of refugees from the cities of Bui Chu and Phat Diem had already poured into the reduced area of French control.2

To help evacuate their equipment, much of which had been funded by the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the French requested the services of twenty American LSTS and one LSD. Concerned over the scarcity of such units in the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Carney proposed the use of ships of the Navy's Military Sea Transportation Service. However, the French request soon was overtaken by a much larger commitment.

On 5 August 1954 the French started a major effort by sea and air to transport troops, military equipment, and refugees from the Hanoi-Haiphong area to the South. They commandeered all available civilian and military passenger aircraft and began an intensive airlift, first from Hanoi, and then after 20 September, from Haiphong. Efficient as their efforts were, they could not handle all of those who wished to leave.

Also on the fifth, President Diem dispatched a personal message to President Eisenhower asking for American help in moving a million refugees from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. When France made an urgent plea

1

Richard W. Lindholm, ed., Viet-Nam: The First Five Years (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1959), pp. 48–60.

2 Ibid., p. 55; O'Ballance. Indo-China War, p. 245.

'Memo, OP-63 to CNO, ser 00033 P63C of 11 Aug. 1954.

for the United States to transport 100,000 refugees a month to the South, Ambassador Heath urged acceptance of the request. Anticipating a favorable response, Admiral Carney alerted Admiral Stump to the probability of American participation in the large-scale evacuation from Haiphong and informed him of a Secretary of Defense authorization to employ elements of the Amphibious Force, Western Pacific together with such Military Sea Transportation Service units as were required to do the job.*

The possibility of assisting with an airlift as well as sealift was explored. However, it soon became clear that the French were making maximum use of the air terminals available in North Vietnam in transporting 3,000 refugees a day to the South."

On 7 August 1954, Admiral Carney directed Admiral Stump to imple ment the evacuation plan, in an operation which became known as the "Passage to Freedom." The Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet was responsible for the sea evacuation and for providing overall support. Under CINCPACFLT, Rear Admiral Lorenzo S. Sabin, Commander Amphibious Force, Western Pacific (Task Force 90) and also Commander Amphibious Group 1, was assigned command of the sea operation. He was authorized to "use elements of PHIBFORWESTPAC [Amphibious Force, Western Pacific] and MSTS WESTPAC in proportions at your discretion as required to accomplish the task expeditiously." Stump directed Sabin to confer with Commander Naval Forces, Philippines (Rear Admiral Hugh Goodwin) concerning logistic support. The Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina (Major General O'Daniel) was designated the "over-all military co-ordinator ashore," responsible for refugee affairs. General O'Daniel designated Captain James Collett, head of the Navy Section of the MAAG, as his deputy.

The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry was advised on 8 August that:

The United States Government desires to extend to the Government of Viet-Nam all reasonable assistance to evacuate from areas defined in the cease-fire agreement its nationals who understandably are unwilling to face

*Msg, CNO 062207Z Aug. 1954; Lancaster, Emancipation of French Indochina, pp. 341-45; CTF 90, report, ser 0252 of 8 Nov. 1954.

"Exodus: Report on a Voluntary Mass Flight to Freedom: Viet-Nam, 1954," The Department of State Bulletin, XXXII (7 Feb. 1955), pp. 223–26.

Lindholm, Viet-Nam: The First Five Years, p. 63; msgs, CNO 071633Z and CINCPACFLT 080259Z Aug. 1954.

the grim certainties of life under the Communists. . . . The United States is also prepared to provide as far as possible material help needed to enable refugees from Viet Minh domination to resume existence under their chosen government with maximum opportunity to add to the strength of that government through their own efforts."

Before ships of the amphibious group could be deployed to Southeast Asian waters and begin the evacuation, operational control had to be transferred from Commander in Chief, Far East to Commander in Chief, Pacific. Despite the termination of the occupation of Japan in 1951 and the signing of the Korean Armistice in 1953, command over operations of units of the Pacific Fleet was still divided between two unified commands, which in turn came under two executive agents. Under the Department of the Army, Commander in Chief, Far East, was responsible for an ocean area encompassing Japan, Korea, North China, and the Ryukyus. Under the Department of the Navy CINCPAC was responsible for the rest of the Pacific area and the Indian Ocean. In this instance the decision had already been made in Washington, and the transfer of operational control took place on 8 August. Commander Naval Forces, Far East (Vice Admiral William M. Callaghan) was advised that the last amphibious units would leave for Indochina on or about 19 August. The first ships were on their way by the 10th.8

On 10 August 1954 Rear Admiral Sabin flew to Haiphong to confer with General O'Daniel; Vice Admiral Auboyneau, the senior French naval officer in Indochina; Rear Admiral Jean Querville, Commander of the naval facilities at Haiphong; Jerry Strauss, head of the United States Special Technical Economic Mission in Hanoi; and the Vietnamese Mayor of Haiphong. Admiral Sabin promised to provide 4 LSTS and 4 AKAs immediately, to be augmented by as many as 4 LSDs, 8 APAs, 18 LSTs, and 4 AKAS, if necessary. Except for screening the refugees for diseases or the presence of Communist agents, the French Army would handle the details of the embarkation. The French Navy agreed to supply all the port services, including pilots for the LSTs entering Haiphong and the landing craft making the four and a half hour trip to the Along Bay anchorage. French

U.S., State Department, American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, Vol. II, p. 2398.

* CTF 90, reports, ser 0252 of 8 Nov. 1954 and ser 04 of 3 Jan. 1955, encl. 1; ltr, Sabin to Settle, of 14 Mar. 1955.

and Vietnamese liaison teams would be embarked in each ship to control

the refugees.

Admiral Sabin organized his forces as follow:

TF 90-Amphibious Task Force, Western Pacific, RADM L. S. Sabin
TG 90.8—Embarkation Group, CAPT W. C. Winn, Commander Transport
Division 13

TU90.8.1-Transport Unit, CAPT W. C. Winn (2 APDs, 8 APAs, 4
AKAS, 4 LSDs)

TU90.8.2-MSTS Transport Unit, CAPT P. W. Mothersill, Commander
LSD Squadron 1

TU90.8.3-Landing Ship Unit, CDR F. W. Logsdon, Commander LST
Squadron 3

TU 90.8.4-Embarkation Control Unit

TU90.8.5-Control Unit, CDR A. E. Teal, Commander Amphibious
Control Division 12 (1 APD, 1 Underwater Demolition
Team)

TG 90.9-Debarkation Group, CAPT B. N. Rittenhouse, Commander
Transport Division 14 (1 APD).

A MSTS advisor was assigned to Admiral Sabin's staff and the MSTS office in Saigon was expanded.10

Over the years, one of the lessons of amphibious and emergency sealift operations has been that the bottlenecks are invariably at loading and unloading sites. Anticipating problems in embarkation, Admiral Sabin, in his operation order of 11 August, provided for the use of Navy shore parties to build the camps, process the refugees, control the over-the-beach operation, and direct the loading of landing craft and lighters. Captain Clarence Coffin and the 200 men of Naval Beach Group 1 were enroute to Southeast Asia at the time, embarked in the flagship Estes (AGC-12). However, the planned United States Navy operations at embarkation sites were prevented by French concern about giving any appearance of violating the Geneva agreement provision concerning foreign troops. The French would allow no more than fifteen to twenty Americans on the beach to handle communications, liaison, beach supervision, and medical problems. This resulted in delays in processing the refugees and, at times, less than

"Memo on Haiphong Conference," 10 Aug. 1954.

10 "MSTS Historical Diary: 1 January-31 December 1954," Sept.; CTF 90, report, ser 04 of 3 Jan. 1955, encl. 2.

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