of ethnically non-Vietnamese people resisted domination by the Vietnamese Communists. These tribes created such difficulties that, in May 1955, the party would announce the establishment of the Thai-Meo Autonomous Zone, for the purpose of eliminating dissension and providing a mechanism for control. More serious were the difficulties arising from widespread opposition to the land collectivization program, particularly in Thanh Hoa and Nghe An Provinces in central North Vietnam between the Red River Delta and Vinh. This region would later become the scene of antiCommunist revolts. To carry out this Maoist-style land reform program, which was initiated before Geneva, Ho's apparatus resorted to punitive taxes, terror, arrests, and public condemnation, trials, and executions. Determined to eliminate landlord and rich peasant classes basically opposed to communism and to gain the mass support of the poor majority, the Viet Minh stepped up their campaign of land expropriation and redistribution in the months following Geneva. This was accomplished by public denunciations of landowners, public trials before special People's Courts, sentencing of the "guilty" to penalties ranging from forced labor to death, and the immediate redistribution of the land and goods of those convicted. One Hanoi magazine divulged that, "people were arrested, jailed, interrogated, and cruelly tortured; people were executed or shot out of hand and their property confiscated. Innocent children of parents wrongly classified as landlords were starved to death." 39 Once such sources of opposition were brought under control, the Communist Party and the government sought to establish a "stable and powerful revolutionary base" for the struggle to gain control over the rest of Indochina. They prepared for future combat by taking steps "to consolidate the national defense system of all the people" throughout Vietnam. The army in the North, increased by five divisions during the five months following Geneva, was employed as "the tool of the proletarian dictatorship. . . . South of the 17th parallel, they sought to build solid bases "in cities, and to associate the local rear base area ... with the common rear base of the entire country." 39 40 Quoted in J. Price Gittinger, "Communist Land Policy in North Viet Nam," Far Eastern Survey, XXVIII (Aug. 1959), p. 118. 40 Giap, Banner of People's War, pp. 32-45; Giap, People's War, People's Army, p. 37; Ho, On Revolution, pp. 276-78, 301-03; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.4, pp. 8–9. A "Small, Highly Efficient Navy" The naval objective of the combined French-American mission stemmed from recommendations made by United States advisors on 15 January 1955. These called for assistance in the development of a "small, highly efficient navy," capable of conducting operations which might involve any of the following tasks: a. Limited amphibious operations. b. River and coastal patrol. c. Minesweeping. d. Direct fire support. e. Logistic support for military forces."1 The American objective was ambitious, but the need for such a navy was real. In the vast region of the Mekong Delta most of the transportation was by water. In some parts, inland waterways were the only means of surface transportation. The success of the State of Vietnam depended on the waterborne movement of rice and goods, on naval actions against enemy riverine lines of communication, on amphibious-type operations, on gunfire support of troops ashore, and on logistical resupply by water. Along the lengthy, indented coast, inshore and offshore naval units also could play important roles by intercepting enemy movements along the coast and preventing infiltration of supplies by sea. Initially the French agreed to train deck, engineering, and supply officers and to carry out training exercises for all Vietnamese Navy units while under French operational control. The Americans would maintain a small detachment of officer and enlisted personnel at the Naval Training Center, Nha Trang. The detachment would assist with training aids, school equipment, and the material requirements of the center. United States personnel would conduct classroom instruction only in the event of a shortage of French or Vietnamese instructors. Additionally, the Americans were responsible for establishing and operating a small unit at Saigon to carry out afloat training of Vietnamese naval units (refresher training, lasting three weeks or less for each ship), and to provide short courses on the maintenance and operation of equipment in these units. The American element of the combined mission was also charged with arranging for certain out-of-country training "Navy Section, TRIM, Monthly Report, No. 1 of 21 Mar. 1955. of Vietnamese naval personnel. Vietnamese trainees would be required to have a working knowledge of English or be provided with qualified English-Vietnamese or English-French interpreters. 42 Separate from the French Training Mission, the combined mission was at best a compromise arrangement for the transitional period. For the time being, American influence on the Vietnamese Navy would be minimal, since de facto control of operations and training was centered in one individual-French Captain Jean Récher. He served in three positions: Commander in Chief of the Vietnamese Navy, Senior French Naval Representative on the French Training Mission Staff, and head of the Navy Division of the combined mission. The American naval personnel assigned were thus, in essence, advisors to the French personnel who commanded the Vietnamese Navy, trained its personnel, and through the Navy Yard at Saigon, repaired its ships and craft.* 43 Although obviously in its infancy, this Navy soon would be called upon to do its part to eliminate armed opposition to the government within South Vietnam. 42 Navy Section, MAAG, "Directive of Chief MAAG Indochina Establishing the Training Relations and Instruction Mission to the Armed Forces of Vietnam," of 27 Feb. 1955. Also, this directive made the Vietnamese Navy responsible (with advice and assistance from TRIM) for all training of personnel and units not specifically allocated to the French and U.S. elements of TRIM. 43 Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Naval Forces of Vietnam,” p. 6. The Republic Of Vietnam And During the next three years, the South Vietnamese would gain operational control over their riverine naval units, and replace French personnel in the Vietnamese Navy Headquarters with their own officers and men. The operation of the small river force would play crucial roles in the action to put down dissident military forces, thus helping pave the way for the establishment of the Republic of Vietnam. First jointly with the French, and then alone, United States training, advisory, and maintenance assistance would help the Vietnamese in this period to build their navy and establish a Sea Force and a Marine Force to complement the River Force. The Sea Force would "show the flag" in visits to nearby countries and conduct limited coastal patrol and landings on strategically located islands. But, this would be a period of low-level activity in the conflict between the Communists and South Vietnam, as North Vietnam consolidated its control and prepared for a period of increased violence in its continuing efforts to gain control of the South. The foremost problem facing Diem's government in 1955 was that of overcoming the opposition of the three Sects. Both political and military actions would be required. The strongholds of these semi-autonomous states were in the area formerly known as Cochin China, peopled in earlier times by Malays and Khmers and later by Vietnamese who had migrated south from Annam. Waterways were the key to control of the regions where the Sects were located and riverine operations would be required. Each of the Sects had military forces, with arms, munitions, and equipment supplied to them by the French to aid in the war against the Viet Minh. Although this aid had been formally withdrawn, the Sects continued to receive French funds and advice. The Cao Dai religious Sect was centered at Tay Ninh, northwest of Saigon next to the "Parrot's Beak" section of the Cambodian border. Its armed followers totalled 15,000 to 20,000 men. |