By the end of the month, the Vietnamese had opened a second front against the Hoa Hao in the Plain of Reeds region, a stronghold of the Soai faction along the Cambodian border. Four dinassauts operated on the Mekong and waterways southwest of Saigon. When the Soai faction rallied to the government on 12 February, the dinassauts redeployed and then proceeded to the Rach Gia area to press the illusive Ba Cut in operation Nguyen Hue. Ba Cut was finally trapped and captured in April 1956 and the Hoa Hao resistance collapsed.25

At the height of the campaign against the Hoa Hao, General Ty praised the role of the Vietnamese Navy, saying:

The most remarkable feats... are no doubt those realized during the operations against the rebels. South Vietnam is a country watered by numerous rivers and streams, thus forming isolated regions. This is why during operations Dinh Tien Hoang [against the Hoa Hao], Hoang Dieu [against the Binh Xuyen], and Nguyen Hue, the... [Vietnamese Navy units] have played a preponderant and decisive role for the success of the Army. The daring assaults of the marines have increased the value of the Vietnamese Navy.26

Successes in the Sect Civil War released an increasing percentage of the republic's armed forces for participation in the efforts to reduce Communist strength and influence. Evidence of Diem's resoluteness, progress in the Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign, and the extension of governmental controls produced highly favorable results in the State of Vietnam. That spring a government official claimed that "94,041 former communist cadres had rallied to the... [South Vietnamese government], 5,613 other cadres had surrendered . . . 119,954 weapons had been captured . . . and 707 underground arms caches had been discovered." The claim may have been exaggerated and the declaration that the campaign had "entirely destroyed the predominant communist influence of the previous nine years” was certainly an overstatement, but there could be no doubt that substantial progress had been realized. By 1956, according to the authors of the Department of Defense study, United States-Vietnam Relations, "Diem's success in the South had been far greater than anyone could have fore

25 NA Section, Joint Weekly Analyses, 49 of 11 Dec., 50 of 17 Dec. 1955, 4 of 27 Jan., 7 of 17 Feb., and 9 of 3 Mar. 1956; Buttinger, Vietnam: A Political History, p. 413; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.4, p. JJ.

"NA Saigon, report, 14-56 of 7 Feb. 1956, JN 62-A-2199, box 80, FRC.

." The North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duan confirmed Diem's progress when, after visiting the South in 1955 and 1956, he concluded that, unless the Democratic Republic of Vietnam reinforced the supporters in the South, the Communist movement there would be stamped Out.27

Military Assistance Problems

Training was but one of many obstacles to be overcome in the development of a navy adequate to South Vietnam's needs for self-defense against the Communist threat. Strong French feelings against My made it difficult for TRIM to assist the Vietnamese Navy in overcoming its general lack of experience and leadership-no officers over thirty years of age were in the Navy. Although Captain Rechér no longer headed the Vietnamese Navy, he remained Chief of the Navy Division of TRIM. Another factor reducing the effectiveness of TRIM's assistance efforts was the virtually constant commitment of the bulk of Vietnamese Navy and Marine forces to pacification operations.

Further development of the Vietnamese Navy was impeded also by its subordinate status within the Vietnamese Armed Forces General Staff. Although the Navy commander was a Deputy Chief of Staff, his rank was only that of lieutenant commander, junior even to the lieutenant colonel who headed the Marines, a part of the naval establishment. Other members of the general staff were, except for the Air Force deputy, from the Army. Under the Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, the Navy and Air Force were at the level of the Army Quartermaster and Chief of Engineers. The Navy had no control over its funds. With the Army managing common-type supplies, the Navy encountered difficulties in competing with the extensive demands of the far larger ground forces.28

A continuing problem during this transitional period was that of providing urgently needed aid in a timely fashion. As in the French-Viet Minh War, administrative delays were encountered. In the assessment of the American Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Burke, "of course one

"U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.4, pp. EE, pt. IVA.5, pp. 6, 28, tab 2, pp. 27-28, 50. "NA Saigon, report, 5-56 of 16 Jan. 1956, JN 62A-2199, box 80, FRC; Navy Section, MAAG Vietnam, "Naval Forces of Vietnam," p. 11.

difficulty in the MDAP field is that there are many interested parties with consequent diffusion of responsibility and complexity of administration." His views were shared by other Americans, and the troubles were not confined to Vietnam. Subsequently, an official of the Office of the Secretary of Defense would announce to Congress that the administrative lead-time for the aid program had been reduced from six to three months between 1956 and 1957. But a three-month administrative lag in addition to the time required to obtain the items and deliver them to Southeast Asia was still undesirably long for actions in response to rapidly changing situations.2

29

Two years later, in the light of growing criticism concerning administration of the Military Assistance Program, President Eisenhower would appoint a committee to study this effort and help in its justification to the Congress. The committee, chaired by William H. Draper, Jr., submitted its preliminary conclusions on 17 March 1959. While strongly supporting the program, the committee acknowledged that many criticisms had been made by the public, by the Congress, and by persons within the Executive Branch. It reported evidence of "long delays from the initiation of proposals to the development of a firm program and of an excessive number of reviews and over-coordination during the programming process." Among various other shortcomings, the committee cited "faulty or uneconomic programming" and criticized deficiencies in the promptness and effectiveness of policy coordination.30 Actions were then taken to improve the situation. Having been largely dependent on the French for logistic support, the Vietnamese Armed Forces needed additional training and assistance before they could be self-sufficient. United States help to them would be limited by the number of American military personnel permitted in-country. Although not a party to the Geneva accord, Washington continued the self-imposed 342-man ceiling which was consistent with the cease-fire agreement's prohibition of "the introduction into Viet Nam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel...

❞ 31

Admiral Stump had recommended, with the concurrence of Admiral Burke, that additional manpower be authorized to fill TRIM spaces vacated

"Ltr, CNO to OP-63, ser 0101P60 of 6 Apr. 1956; U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on Security Appropriations for 1958 (85th Cong., 1st sess.) (Washington: GPO, 1957), p. 357.

30

'The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, "Composite Report" of 17 Aug. 1959, Vols. I, VII, pp. 3–15.

Article 16 of "Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam" in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents (Washington: GPO, 1957), Vol. I, p. 757.

by the French. Two and one-half months of protracted discussion between the State and Defense Departments followed a request to this effect from the Joint Chiefs on 9 December 1955 to the Secretary of Defense. Once the State Department agreed to a manpower increase in principle in February 1956, discussions shifted to determining the exact number of personnel to be authorized.32

A team headed by Major General William Lawton, sent to Vietnam to study military finances and the logistic situation, found that:

Since the recent heavy phasedown in French forces, an adequate logistic capability in Free Viet-Nam no longer exists. . . . From the standpoint of preservation of U.S. assets, the situation is also most unsatisfactory. Adequate control of MOAP [sic.] spares and supplies has, in large part, been lost.

Although this was largely a problem concerning ground forces, the small Vietnamese Navy experienced similar deficiencies, as highlighted by an assessment made later in the year by Navy members of the MAAG, who reported: "The Vietnamese Navy did not know what equipment was on hand or what was required; and they lacked the experience and training to know how to find out.'

33

On 6 January 1956, the Vietnamese urgently requested American assistance, taking the position that replacing Frenchmen with Americans "would not violate either the spirit nor the letter of the Geneva Accords." The JCS and the Secretary of Defense agreed with the Vietnamese and concluded that at least $100 million worth of Mutual Defense Assistance Program material could be saved if 150 to 200 Americans skilled in supply management and logistics were sent to Vietnam. Both Admiral Stump and General O'Daniel requested that more U.S. personnel be assigned to Vietnam. The JCS concurred, stressing the gravity of the situation and recommending an increase in the manpower ceiling.

34

The situation was becoming even more critical as French armed forces in Vietnam were being steadily reduced. Then, on 26 February 1956, the

32

Memo, OP-62 to CNO, ser 00103P62 of 29 Nov. 1955; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.4, p. 19, bk 10, pp. 1057-59.

3 Ltr, SECDEF to SECSTATE, of 31 Jan. 1956 in Ibid., bk 10, pp. 1046-47; Navy Division, MAAG Vietnam, "Summary of MAAG-TERM Activities," of 21 Nov. 1956.

"Ltr, SECDEF to SECSTATE, of 31 Jan. 1956 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 10, pp. 1046-47, bk 2, pt. IVA.4, pp. II, 19; Navy Division, MAAG Vietnam, "Summary of MAAG-TERM Activities," of 21 Nov. 1956; Memo, OP-61 to SECNAV, ser 0050P61 of 2 Mar. 1956.

Republic of Vietnam asked France to withdraw its military forces completely. That same day the United States Departments of State and Defense announced a plan to send 350 additional military logistic experts to Vietnam. They would advise and assist the Vietnamese with the huge amounts of American-supplied material left by the French. Augmented by experienced Japanese or Filipino technicians, these experts "would provide for the continued maintenance of an estimated 100 million of U.S. military equip ment . . . threatened with . . . abandonment." This group, known as the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM), would be separate from the MAAG because of the Geneva Agreement restrictions.35 Negotiations began immediately to obtain the approval of France, Britain, and the nations of the International Control Commission (ICC)—India, Canada, and Poland-for the introduction of these men.

...

The ICC's reaction to the American proposal to introduce equipment recovery personnel had been cool initially, but finally the member governments acquiesced to the TERM program after receiving United States assurances that this would reduce the military equipment in South Vietnam. In view of this understanding, the State Department emphasized that, while the "TERM personnel will perform functions of training which are inseparable from their tasks of recovering and maintaining . . . [American] equipment in Viet-Nam, such functions should in no case . . . become the primary duty of TERM." The Chief of the MAAG was authorized to transfer men between the MAAG and the TERM as needed.3

36

Then, at the last minute, India, which had previously expressed no objections to TERM, raised the question of the International Control Commission's authority to approve or disapprove such a mission. At this point Admiral Burke, who was charged with implementing the TERM program as executive agent for the JCS, declared that "the TERM project has, since its inception, been plagued by time-consuming delays." He recommended that TERM be dispatched with or without ICC approval. Finally, on 1 June, the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission was activated. It would complete its initial mission in 1957 when it merged with the MAAG.37

35

38

Ibid.; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.5, tab 1, P. 4.

'Ltr, Deputy Under SECSTATE to SECDEF, of 1 May 1956 in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 10, pp. 1057-59.

37

Navy Division, MAAG Vietnam, "Summary of MAAG-TERM Activities," of 21 Nov. 1956; U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.4, p. LL; memo, OP-61 to SECNAV, ser 00186P61 of 8 May 1956; memo, CNO to ASD(ISA), ser 0085P62 of 9 May 1956.