In regions inhabited by minority tribes we have attacked tribal chiefs too strongly, thus injuring, instead of respecting, local customs and manners. . . . When reorganizing the party, we paid too much importance to the notion of social class instead of adhering firmly to political qualifications alone. Instead of recognizing education to be the first essential, we resorted exclusively to organizational measures such as disciplinary punishments, expulsion from the party, executions, dissolution of party branches and cells. Worse still, torture came to be regarded as a normal practice during party reorganization.57

Despite these statements and changes in top leadership, violence broke out in Nghe An Province the next month. On 9 November 1956, several hundred peasants gathered near Vinh to petition the International Control Commission to sanction migration to the South and to bring about a return of land that had been confiscated. A Communist propaganda team and armed forces were sent to the scene of the disturbance. Efforts to make arrests produced a riot which grew to the proportions of an uprising. On 13 November, troops stormed the town, dispersing the rebels and causing heavy casualties. Two reinforced divisions of 20,000 men were committed to suppress the rebellion.

Early in 1957 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, again following the Maoist example, invited criticism by sponsoring a "Hundred Flowers" campaign. The party leaders expressed surprise over the strength of the response. Critics were identified, arrested, and tried and much blood was spilt. The exact number of persons killed is unknown, but estimates range up to 500,000. Whatever the precise count, it was a costly period in terms of human lives. In any case, the various steps taken after the Geneva agreement tightened Communist control over the North, strengthened the Communist leadership in the army, and accelerated the "advance to socialism."'58 With the blunting of opposition and the consolidation of power, North Vietnam would now be able to provide increased support to Communist efforts in the South.

67

Quoted in U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.5, p. 7, tab 3, pp. 11-12; Ho, On Revolution, pp. 304-06.

58

U.S.-V.N. Relations, bk 2, pt. IVA.5, p. 7, tab 3, p. 13; Human Cost of Communism, p. 7.

A Transitional Period

Since 1953 the Vietnam conflict had gone from war through a time of consolidation of Communist control in the North, the establishment of the Republic of Vietnam in the South, and the phasing out of the French to a period of increasing violence. The period had been transitional also in other respects. Initially Cold War tensions eased after Stalin's death but, as a new regime resolved its problems within the Soviet Union, a more aggressive policy was resumed on the international scene. The Far East continued to be a troubled area in which the United States Navy was frequently required to respond to crisis situations, many of which involved the People's Republic of China. Meanwhile, technological achievements altered the capabilities of the United States Navy and the roles of its Fleet. The period also witnessed changes in strategic policy, the chain of command of the operating forces, and the administration of the national defense.

The Employment of United States Naval Forces

Vietnam had been brought to the forefront of United States attention by events during the final phase of the French-Viet Minh War and by Communist gains at the Geneva bargaining table. In the long term, Vietnam— at least insofar as the United States Navy and its operations were concerned -was but one feature of a much larger picture. Many of the problems of stability, self-determination, and security for the emerging Republic of Vietnam were intertwined with the overall security problems of Southeast Asia. These in turn were related to those of the Far East as a whole and, with regard to both the international Communist movement and the employment of naval operating forces, the instabilities, threats, and crises of the Western Pacific were linked to similar events elsewhere, such as in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Moreover, the influence of a naval presence in one area was bolstered by evidence of the willingness to act and effectiveness demonstrated in other areas.

After the Geneva accords the United States continued to maintain a Navy presence in Southeast Asian waters. Vice Admiral Phillips remained in command of the "Fair Weather Training" force until 21 August 1954 when operational control of Task Group 70.2 was transferred to Vice Admiral Pride (Commander Seventh Fleet). Phillips then returned to his First Fleet command in the Eastern Pacific.

Signs soon appeared of a potential crisis resulting from a Chinese Communist threat against the Tachens, a group of Nationalist-held islands off the mainland about 200 miles from the northern tip of Taiwan. Seventh Fleet destroyers visited the Tachens on 19 August and other major units of the Fleet were assembled nearby. Further south, the People's Republic of China tested Quemoy Island on 26 August with a small raid. This was followed by a heavy bombardment from the mainland on 3 September. Seventh Fleet units, including Task Group 70.2, were sent to the Taiwan area, where they remained until the crisis eased. The shelling continued sporadically during the months that followed, as the Chinese Communists increased their military forces on the mainland opposite the Taiwan Strait. Seventh Fleet task forces were sent to the area at critical periods, in readiness for action if required and to help deter offensive actions by the Chinese Communists.1

Shortly after midnight on 14 November 1954 the Chinese Nationalist destroyer escort T'ai P'ing was patrolling north-east of the Tachen Islands when two suspicious contacts appeared on the radar. Minutes after general quarters sounded, a torpedo from either a motor torpedo boat or a submarine slammed into the port side of the ship. Meanwhile, the ship opened fire on the attackers with 3-inch and 40-millimeter guns. The engagement was over in five minutes. Crippled T'ai P'ing radioed for held and by 0530 destroyer escort T'ai Ho had T'ai P'ing under tow. Less than two hours later the forward bulkhead, severely damaged by the torpedo, collapsed and the ship rolled over and sank. Washington considered, but rejected, a show of force in response to this incident.2

Starting on 10 January 1955, the Chinese Communists started a heavy aerial bombing of the Tachens. Not only did the Chinese Nationalist Air Force lack the capabilities of providing continuous air cover at that distance

1

1A discussion of this crisis from the deterrence point of view is in Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, pp. 266–94. 'NA Taipei, report, 158–54 of 1 Dec. 1954, JN 59A-2184, box 16, FRC.

from its fields, but the defensive needs of Taiwan prohibited the diversion of a significant portion of their fighter planes. The situation became critical when, on 20 January, the mainland Chinese seized Ichiang Island, which was within artillery range of the Tachens. Admiral Carney alerted the Pacific command and Commander Seventh Fleet to the possibility that carrier aircraft might be directed to cover an evacuation of the Nationalists, and that the American ships might be called upon to assist in the withdrawal. Rear Admiral Hopwood, Acting CINCPACFLT during the temporary absence of Admiral Stump, issued a tentative operational plan on 23 January. Vice Admiral Pride deployed his striking force to the area. On the 28th, a joint congressional resolution authorized the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deemed necessary for the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, "this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores." Admiral Stump delayed the return to the United States of Yorktown, which was completing a tour in the Western Pacific. As a result, five attack carriers (Kearsarge (CVA-33), Essex, Wasp, Midway, and Yorktown) were available when the planned operations were ordered.3

On 6 February the Republic of China formally requested United States help in evacuating armed forces and civilians from the threatened islands. That morning the Seventh Fleet's Surface Action Force (TF 75) started patrols off the Tachen area, while aircraft from the Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF 77) flew overhead. By afternoon, all the ships of Rear Admiral Sabin's Amphibious Evacuation Force (TF 76) were enroute from Taiwan and Okinawa. Minesweeping and beach reconnaissance started the next morning. Two days later, ships of the Chinese Nationalist Navy and the United States Navy began to embark the evacuees. A Hunter-Killer Group (TG 70.4) provided antisubmarine protection, the Formosa Patrol Force (TF 72) conducted patrols, the Chinese and United States Air Forces furnished air cover within 100 miles of Taiwan, and the Logistic Support Force (TF 73) provided underway replenishment. Within 85 hours, 15,627 civilians, 11,120 military personnel, 8,630 tons of military equipment and

"Congressional Authorization for the President to Employ the Armed Forces of the United States to Protect Formosa, the Pescadores, and Related Positions and Territories in that Area," in American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, Vol. II, pp. 2486-88; COM7THFLT, report, ser 0033 of 10 Apr. 1955.

supplies, 166 artillery pieces, and 128 vehicles had been brought out from the Tachens by Nationalist and American ships. On 9 February, the Nationalist Navy conducted similar evacuations from the Yu Shan and Pei Shan Islands again under the protection of the Seventh Fleet.*

The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union met in February 1956, with delegates from fifty-five foreign Communist parties in attendance. The discussions focused mainly on internal Soviet policies. Khrushchev and others promoted the concept that there were different roads to socialism, and advanced the theory of "co-existence." Several of the Communist leaders from other nations, including China, were not in full agreement. The Chinese Communists reportedly still adhered to their belief in the inevitability of war along the path to socialism. Two months later the Cominform was dissolved.5

Soon thereafter, the United States Navy became involved in a complex crisis of the Middle East, where the Israeli-Arab struggle, Egyptian receipt of arms from the Communist bloc, and other events led to increased Sixth Fleet operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. In June 1956, Britain completed the withdrawal of troops who had been stationed in the Suez area. In response to threats against American oil interests in Saudi Arabia, two Sixth Fleet destroyers were ordered to the area. However, Egypt delayed their passage through the canal. Because of rising tensions in the Middle East, Admiral Burke alerted the Sixth Fleet on 7 July. The alert lasted four days.

On 26 July, one week after the United States had withdrawn its offer to assist in building the Aswan Dam, the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser announced nationalization of the Suez Canal. Events were now in motion that would culminate three months later in what became known as the Suez War. The main employment of the Sixth Fleet during that crisis was what is often loosely labelled as "naval presence." The American position, as highlighted by Vice Admiral Charles R. Brown's query to the Chief of Naval Operations on 8 November, "whose side am I on?," was ambiguous. Nevertheless, some measure of the Fleet's influence would be

4 Ibid.

5 Wolfgang Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962), pp. 120-66.

6

* Quoted in Hugh Thomas, Suez (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 141–42; see also "Proceedings, Naval History Symposium," Annapolis, Md. United States Naval Academy, 1973,