tional command vested in their unified and specified combatant commanders." 29 Other provisions of the Reorganization Act would influence or force the Navy Department to alter radically its principles of operation. Some of these were in continuation of gradual changes taking place since 1949, such as the creation of centers of authority within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. After the 1953 executive actions, the Secretary had added still more areas of functional authority across departmental and military service lines. In 1956, the secretary designated military departments as "single managers." One of the areas of single management was land transportation within the United States, and to that end the Military Traffic Management Agency was established under the Army. A single manager system was set up for supply management of certain categories of "common use items." Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy expanded the single manager system in fiscal year 1957, establishing the Medical, Clothing and Textile, and Military Petroleum Supply Agencies. The Navy and the other military services were becoming ever more dependent on others for some of the essentials upon which the readiness, effectiveness, and endurance of the operating forces depended. The system of designating military departments as single managers would last only a short time. An Armed Forces Supply Support Center was established directly under the Office of the Secretary of Defense to "integrate supply channels" and to coordinate procurement efforts more closely. The center administered certain supply programs common to more than one service.30 The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency was organized in February 1958. By creating new agencies directly under the Office of the Secretary of Defense, rather than fixing responsibilities on one of the three military departments, the number of "components" under the secretary was increasing and authority within the Department of Defense becoming more fragmented. In addition to their staffing and 29 Defense Department, "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," DOD Directive 5100.1 of 16 Mar. 1958; Navy Department, "Assignment and Distribution of Authority and Responsibility for the Administration of the Department of the Navy," General Order No. 5 of 14 May 1959. 30 U.S., Defense Department, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, Jan.-June 1956 (Washington: GPO, 1957), pp. 32–35; U.S., Defense Department, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, Jan.-June 1957 (Washington: GPO, 1958), pp. 35-36; U.S., Defense Department, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, Jan.-June 1958 (Washington: GPO, 1959), PP. 49-50. coordinating functions, subordinates in the Office of the Secretary of Defense would now, in effect, exercise line authority in certain areas. All in all the act was the culmination of a process leading away from result-oriented management principles. Increasingly the way in which responsibilities would be carried out focused on such objectives as "unified controls," "consolidation," "amalgamation," "common services," "single agencies," "common policies" to the extent that these tended to be treated as primary goals. Impact on the Navy Department The cummulative effects of the step-by-step process, that had been taking place since the passage of the 1947 National Defense bill, and of the changes that were in the offing as a result of the new Reorganization Act raised serious questions as to whether or not the Navy Department organization, division of responsibilities, and principles of management would be adequate to ensure full effectiveness of the naval operating forces. An increasing number of the defense-wide actions, in line with recommendations by individuals during the 1944 hearings, had an impact on a number of functional areas on which Fleet effectiveness, efficiency, and endurance depended. Now that the Navy Department was no longer "separately organized," others would be making decisions, issuing directives, directing procedures, conducting reviews, and exercising controls over areas crucial to Fleet readiness. Delegation of authority within the Navy Department would be more difficult. Increasingly it was found necessary for the Navy Secretariat and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to become involved in the areas for which the bureaus had been responsible. In the view of one analyst of defense management, provisions of the act resulted in the sharing of authority "not by those responsible for the operational performance of the armed services, but by an undetermined (if not unidentified) number of functional assistant secretaries and directors." 31 In August 1958, Secretary of the Navy Gates appointed the Committee on Organization of the Department of the Navy, chaired by Under Secretary of the Navy William B. Franke. While making an overall review of the department's organization, the committee explored comparative forms of organization. One form specifically examined was "the vertical-type organization, as exemplified by the general staff system in particular.” This system was characterized as concentrating both military and non-military responsibilities in the person of a single military officer acting under a civilian political superior. After examining the pros and cons, the committee concluded that "a continuation of the present bilinear system, with its definite division of military and nonmilitary duties and responsibilities among uniformed and civilian officials, offers a greater prospect for the successful prosecution of future naval warfare. . . ." Some organizational changes were recommended in light of the Reorganization Act, and to carry out the Navy's current and future functions in the most effective, efficient, and economical manner. 32 One example of the impact on the Navy Department of changes in the Office of the Secretary of Defense was the assignment of cognizance over research and development within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to a Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Development). Another was the designation of an Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and Development), although the assistant secretaries had been reduced from four to three by the recent act. Changes in organizational responsibilities beyond those recommended by the Franke committee would follow in later years. Many of these would be in response to Department of Defense actions authorized by the act. Others would be deemed necessary to meet the expanding demands of the growing staffs under the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs and to provide effective interfaces with defense agencies.33 By June 1959, personnel attached to Office of Secretary of Defense activities had grown to 2,773 (1,704 civilians and 1,069 military). Strategy Organizational changes were accompanied by gradual adjustments in the strategic policy of the United States. These adjustments were reflected in 32 Report of the Committee on Organization of the Department of the Navy: 1959 (Washington: GPO, 1959), pp. 16-18. 33 U.S., Defense Department, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1958-June 1959 (Washington: GPO, 1959), pp. 38, 41, 45; SECNAV, "Annual Report," FY 1959 in Ibia!., p. 279. programs and budgets after time-lags which had become longer as a result of the echelons added to the review processes. As the Soviet Union built up its nuclear stockpile and delivery capabilities, continental defense increasingly became a claimant for limited peacetime funds. The Soviets tested an intercontinental ballistic missile and launched satellites into orbit around the earth. By 1956, a condition was reached which some described as a "balance of terror." Hints of continuance of a policy of "massive retaliation" continued, as evidenced by the President's statement in January 1958 that "the most powerful deterrent to war in the world today lies in the retaliatory power of our Strategic Air Command and the aircraft of our Navy." In the same address, he stressed the threat of Communist imperialism, observing that "the Soviets are, in short, waging total cold war." Such statements were, however, accompanied by evidence of increased recognition of the need for conventional forces to cope with limited warfare situations. One sign of a shifting policy toward a more balanced strategy was the President's highlighting of the need to maintain freedom of the seas. In January 1960 Eisenhower would identify conventional forces required to meet "situations of less than general nuclear war." Among these forces were Navy carriers and the Marine Corps. An eventful period lay ahead for these conventional forces. 34 The Struggles for Power Continue The year of 1959 started with Fidel Castro's overthrow of Fulgencio Batista; Cuba soon would be under the rule of the Communists. During the Twenty-First Party Congress of the Soviet Union, which convened in Moscow on 27 January 1959 with seventy foreign Communist parties represented, Khrushchev highlighted the "national liberation" struggles in Asia, Africa, and South America, with lesser attention focused on Europe. In March, the Chinese employed military force to crush Tibet. Thomas Gates, now Secretary of Defense, assessed the overall situation in the Far East later that year, when he observed: "During Fiscal Year 1959, Communist China stepped up the pace of its offensive against the independent "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” 9 Jan. 1958 in Dwight D. Eisenhower, pp. 3-4. |