Legislatures. At the same time this course seemed to promise a body of more stability, gravity, experience, and wisdom, in proportion to its numbers, than the House could be expected to possess. Especially as these excellencies were farther sought by making the required age thirty years, and extending the term of service to six years. Another excellence of this plan is the difference of elements it introduces into the two branches of the Legislature. Without this, a single branch might be as good as two.

Some members of the Convention sought a property qualification for Senators. Having in view the British House of Lords, and the effectual manner in which antagonist influences are balanced between that and the House of Commons, they thought some approach toward English nobility desirable. Since some must be rich, and others poor, they thought the interests of these two classes should be separately embarked in the two Houses of Congress. Thus the pride and selfishness of the rich would be brought in direct collision with the envy and jealousy of the poor, which would make the two Houses an effectual check upon each other. Mr. G. Morris remarked that " if the second branch [the Senate] is to be dependent, we are better without it. To make independent, it should be for life. It will then do wrong, it will be said. He believed so; he hoped so. The rich will strive to establish their dominion, and enslave the rest. They always did. They always will. The proper security against them is to form them into a separate interest. The two forces will then control each other."

it

But perhaps as hard a question to decide as any other, was how the States should be represented in the Senate. The small States were determined on an equal representation, somewhere, with the large ones; and as that was given up in the House, it must be maintained, if at all, in the Senate. On the other hand, the large States could see no propriety in their being reduced to an equality with States of one twentieth of their size. At the same time, they saw that it was asking too much of the small States to say that they should

What did this course promise?

How were these excellencies farther sought?
What other excellence? What remark concerning it?
What qualification was sought by some, for Senators?
What body had they in view? Give some of their arguments.
How did Mr. G. Morris talk? How do you like his views?

What hard question had the Convention to decide?

What were the small States determined on? What had created

the necessity to maintain it in the Senate? How were the large States affected?

put themselves so entirely in the power of the large ones as they would be by a perfectly proportional representation in both Houses. In this view, the large States would perhaps have easily made some concessions, and yielded a part of the superiority to which their extent, population, and wealth, entitled them, if thus they could have been allowed to retain the rest. But the small States considered so much at stake that they could make no farther compromise; so that the large States, after much deliberation, rather than see a division of the Union, and a total failure of their most elaborate endeavors, consented to the present enormous disproportion in their representation in the Senate.

It is plain that the structure of the two Houses of Congress is the result of a compromise between the States. On the question of their perfect equality in the National Legislature, they were so nearly balanced that an agreement without a compromise was utterly hopeless. And experience has pretty well satisfied all parties of the wisdom of the plan finally adopted.

It was while deliberating on the manner of voting in Congress, whether it should be by States, as under the Confederation, or according to some equitable ratio of representation, that Dr. Franklin, after some appropriate remarks on their peculiar difficulties and anxieties; on the practice of daily prayers in that hall in the beginning of the contest with Great Britain; and on their dependence on divine illumination for success in their then present undertaking; stating also his own firm belief that God governs in the affairs of men; motioned that "prayers, imploring the assistance of Heaven, and its blessings on our deliberations, be held in this Assembly every morning before we proceed to business, and that one or more of the clergy of this city be requested to officiate in that service." It was seconded by Mr. Sherman;

What compromise might they have easily made?
How did the small States consider the matter?
What did the large States at length consent to?
What appears with regard to the structure of the two Houses?
On what question, and how, were the States balanced? What did

that fact make necessary? What has experience done?

What do you think of the course finally adopted? Are there any objections to it?

Could you propose a plan that would avoid all objections? Or have fewer objections against it than the one adopted? On what occasion did Dr. Franklin make a motion for prayers? What did he state as his own belief? you think of such a motion on that oc

What did he first remark on? State his motion. What do casion? Who seconded it?

Immediately after they shall be assembled, in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes. The seats of the Senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, and of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that one third may be chosen every second year; and if vacancies happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the Legislature of any State, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies.

but strange as it may seem, neither the venerable age, and important services, of the mover, nor any of the great considerations by which the motion was commended to the attention of every deliberative Christian assembly, could keep the Convention from adjourning without even taking a vote upon it.

The classification of the Senators, and their going biennially out of office, was for the obvious purpose of having a majority of the Senate present, at every session, who had been in office long enough to enjoy the advantages of experience and an acquaintance with the duties of their station. It is also a guard against any improper combination among the Senators, by the biennial appeal made to a portion of the people through the State Legislatures.

When vacancies happen, the Executive authority, i. e the Governor of the State whose Senator has left his seat empty, appoints one to take his place until the next meeting of the State Legislature. When the Legislature meets, this temporary appointment ends, and they elect a Senator to the vacant seat. But he is not elected for six years, but merely for the unexpired part of the six years for which the Senator was elected who has vacated his seat.

What did the Convention do with it? What do you think of their course?

How are the Senate classified? What objects are aimed at in this arrangement?

What if the seat of a Senator becomes vacant by resignation or otherwise?

How long does the Executive, in such case, appoint a Senator for? How long the Legislature at their next meeting?

No person shall be a Senator who shall not have at tained the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of the State for which he shall be chosen.

The Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided.

The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice-President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside; and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present.

The necessity of providing for the death or removal of the President was the occasion of the creation of the office of Vice-President; and he is made president of the Senate, because such an officer is, as a matter of course, necessary; because it is a station of some importance and responsibility; and because that otherwise he would have no duty at all corresponding with the importance of his office. These reasons also make it proper that he should have a casting vote when the Senate are equally divided.

What is the required age for Senators? What citizenship is required?

To what office is the Vice-President appointed? When only can he vote?

Why was such an office created as that of Vice President? What were the reasons for making him president of the Senate? And for giving him a casting vote?

What sole power is given to the Senate?

What difference do you see between oath and affirmation? Who shall preside when the President of the United States is tried? Define preside.

Do you think of any reason why the Vice President should not preside in such a trial?

What is the meaning of convicted? of concurrence?

The power of trying impeachments is given to the Senate, rather than the Judiciary, because the latter would be too small a body; because some had fears that the Judiciary might be influenced by Congress, as in that case it was contemplated that Congress should appoint the Judges; because they might be also influenced by the President, who should nominate them; and because the Supreme Court will be the body to try the President according to law, after his impeach

ment.

The formation of a tribunal proper for trying impeachments was rightly considered by the Convention as a very important and difficult part of their trust. It was accordingly, after many different proposals, much anxious debate, and many careful siftings of the whole subject, that they fixed on the Senate as this tribunal. So far as they could refer to examples, they had before them some of the best State constitutions, and, in some measure, the example of Great Britain.

The plan, however, met with strong objections. An objection, as plausible as any, was that it confounds the legislative and judiciary authorities in the same body, contrary to the approved rule which requires them to be kept separate. This objection is one of that kind, however, which becomes the less, the more closely it is examined. For it is to be noted, that though the same body acts in different capacities, the capacities themselves, and the functions exercised in them, are kept separate. When the Senate sits as a court of impeachment, it lays aside entirely its legislative character. The utmost that can be said, is that the same body of men is constituted, in one capacity, a legislative body, and in another, a court for the trial of impeachments. If it be admitted that this is an intermixture, in some degree, of two branches of the government, the plea still remains that the provision is salutary and useful. If this be proved, the plan is justified. That it is so, appears from several considerations. The offences, which impeachment is designed to reach, are quite different from those usually within the juris

What reasons for giving this power to the Senate, rather than the Judiciary? Do you think these reasons are good?

How was the formation of a tribunal to try impeachments considered by the Convention? Did they decide it hastily? What examples had they to guide them?

What objection was made to this plan? What remark concerning it?

What is to be noted? How does this appear?

What is the utmost that can be said? What if we admit that there is an intermixture? How does it appear that this plea is a valid one? What of offences?