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Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend farther than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States; but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law.

diction of courts. The Senate will almost necessarily better understand the nature of offences which require impeachment, and the rules that apply to them, than the judges can. And as these offences are sometimes such as violate no written statute or legal precedent, so, in judging of them, a wider range of discretion is allowed than in judging of infractions of either written or common law. This discretion the Senate will be better prepared to exercise than almost any other persons, from their greater experience, and more intimate acquaintance with the difficulties and embarrassments of persons in official stations, and their liabilities, with the best intentions, to fall into occasional errors. We will only notice farther, the guarded manner in which this power is given to the Senate, by the requirement of a prosecution from the House, and the concurrence of two thirds for a conviction.

By comparing the last clause of this Section with Art. 2, Sec. 4, it would seem to follow that the Senate, on conviction, were bound, in all cases, to enter a judgment of removal from office, though it has a discretion, as to inflicting the punishment of disqualification.

Among modern governments, having one legislative branch in any way analogous to the United States' Senate, the most remarkable are those of France and Great Britain. The French Chamber of Peers was formerly in the enjoyment of hereditary possession of their office; but hereditary rights of

What of the Senate's knowledge of offences?

Why is a wider range of discretion allowed in judging of them than of other offences?

Why will the Senate be better prepared than others to exercise this discretion?

What is to be noted farther on this matter?

Have you any remarks or questions of your own to propose?

How far only can judgment in cases of impeachment extend?
What liability will remain to the party convicted?

What appears by comparing this with Art. 2, Sec. 4? Can you tell

why such a discretion is proper?

What important modern governments are here noticed?
How did French Peers formerly hold their office?

Peers were abolished in 1831. They are now nominated for life by the king, only from among those who have held for a certain time high public offices,-ministers, generals, counsellors of State, prefects, mayors of cities of at least 30,000 inhabitants, presidents of royal courts, members of the National Institute, etc.

The British House of Lords has recently numbered 426. They are composed of Lords spiritual and temporal. The Lords spiritual are two English archbishops, and twentyeight bishops, of whom four are Irish. These ecclesiastics are admitted to a seat in the House of Lords, in view of the number, education, wealth, character, and influence of the clergy; and as an equitable compensation for their exclusion from the House of Commons. The Lords temporal consist of five orders of nobility, viz. dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts, and barons. These titles are remnants of the old feudal system, under which they were given to military leaders, and signified, perhaps among other things, the amount of territory which they claimed, and over which they exercised jurisdiction. The honor and importance of the offices designated by these titles, rank in the order in which we have named them, the first being the highest. Lords are raised to their place in the upper House by royal prerogative. Sixteen of them are from Scotland, and twenty eight from Ireland. Their requisite age is twenty-one years. The total number of Lords and Commons in Parliament has, within a few years past, been one thousand and eighty-four. On the subject of apportionment we may farther remark here, that in the House of Commons, five hundred representatives are from England and Wales, fifty-three from Scotland, and one hundred and five from Ireland.

What change in 1831? How, and for what term, are they now nominated? And from what classes?

How many were the British House of Lords in 1830? kinds of Lords?

What two

What are Lords spiritual, and how many? Why do they have a seat in the House of Lords?

Of what do Lords temporal consist?

What is said of these titles? What of the honor in the offices designated by them?

How do Lords obtain their seat in the upper House?

How many from Scotland and Ireland? What is their requisite age?

What was the number of Lords and Commons in 1830?

How are the Commons apportioned to the three kingdoms?

SEC. 4. The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a differ-, ent day.

The debate on the first clause of Sec. 4, arose from a wish at the same time to preserve the sovereignty of the States, and to secure a representation from the States, in case they should neglect to make provision for electing Representatives or Senators, or through party influence make such laws as to defeat the choice of them. Should such a practice arise and prevail in a State, through disaffection to the general Government, or otherwise, the Congress may interfere, and secure to those who may remain loyal the privilege of being represented in Congress. The State Legislatures having the sole power to choose Senators, they must be chosen at the place where the Legislature convenes.

"The Congress shall assemble," ect. Some division appeared in the Convention on the necessary frequency, as also on the policy of fixing the times, of the meetings of Congress. By some, also, May was supposed to be a better season for a session than December. To this it was argued, in reply, that the winter is the best season for business. Some of the plans proposed contemplated yearly meetings.

Most modern Legislatures meet at least once a year. Some diversity appears on this subject in the practice of the different States of the Union.

Repeat Sec. 4, first clause. From what did the debate on this clause arise?

State a case in which Congress may interfere as provided?

What makes the place for choosing Senators improper for Congress to decide?

What division in the Convention is noted?

What time besides December was proposed for meeting? argument in favor of December? Do you think of any other?


What is the practice of most modern Legislatures with regard to

yearly meetings? Where does some diversity prevail?

Can you name any State Legislature that meets twice a year? Any that meets once in two years?

SEC. 5. Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications, of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties as each House may provide.

The Assemblies of the people in ancient Athens were remarkable for their frequency. They convened four times every thirty-five days, besides extraordinary occasions. Amphictyonic Council met twice a year.


SEC. 5. "Each House shall be the judge," etc. The principal debate on this clause was on the question of a proper quorum. Some thought a majority too large. It would put too much power in the hands of a few, who by seceding at a critical juncture might frustrate an important measure, and even by constant absence vitally endanger the government. A small quorum was also the right one, because it would always hold out a powerful motive to all members to be present. By others it was said that a quorum less than a majority would give the power of legislation to a number dangerously small, especially to the interests of distant States, whose members would attend with more difficulty, and much oftener be necessarily absent, than those of States near the seat of government. The objections to a large quorum were finally removed by the power given to a smaller number, i. e. the smallest number who may be present at the right time and place, and constitutionally qualified to act, to adjourn from day to day, and compel the attendance of absent members.

How often did the popular assemblies of Athens meet? The Amphictyonic Council?

Of what is each House the judge?

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How much is a quorum? What do you understand by a quorum? What may a smaller number do?

What occasioned the principal debate on Sec. 5?

Why did some think a majority too large?

What advantage did they expect from a small quorum?

What objection had others to a quorum less than a majority?

How were the objections to a large quorum finally removed?

Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member.

Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secresy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either House on any question shall, at the desire of one fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.

Some debate arose

"Each House may determine," etc. with regard to the number that ought to be required for the expulsion of a member. It was finally fixed at two thirds, because it was two great a power to be given to a bare majority. Times of party violence might arrive, it was evident, when a majority might be united to expel an obnoxious individual, more on account of the party to which he belonged, than his disorderly behavior.

"Each House shall keep a journal," etc. Some attempts were made to introduce a distinction between the two Houses, in the rule respecting the publishing of their journals, and the entering on them of the yeas and nays. Some thought it unnecssary to require the publication of the journals. The matter of them would be called for by the people, and one way or other be divulged fast enough. The argument for publishing was that otherwise the people would be alarmed with a fear that the Legislature would be a secret conclave. This would be as true in the case of one House as of the other, so that they ought to be both required or exempted alike. The exception, with regard to cases requiring secresy, was also found equally necessary for both Houses. The object of entering the yeas and nays was to secure the responsibility of members to their constituents. It was ar

What may each House determine? For what may it punish members? What majority may expel a member?

What in this clause occasioned debate? Why was the number fixed at two thirds?

What journal must each House keep? What exception to pub lishing?

How many are necessary to call for the entering of yeas and nays? What attempts were made on this clause?

What arguments for and against publishing the journals?

Why ought there to be no distinction in what is required of the two Houses?

What was the object of entering the yeas and nays?

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