As

CHAPTER IX

PEACE PROPOSALS

the war progressed during the period of

the negotiations on the submarine question two things had become clearer with every month. In the first place, the issues of the war, which had at first been deliberately obscured by German diplomacy, were being gradually disclosed by her unmistakable conduct. In the second place, as our own experience proved, and as the President with his usual clear-sightedness had discerned, neutrality in so serious a conflict, involving such momentous interests, must become increasingly difficult, if not impossible. For very different reasons, then, by a curious coincidence, von BethmannHollweg and President Wilson put forth at the same time proposals for peace. Perhaps nothing has been so difficult to understand as this seemingly similar action, for to the world at large and, indeed, to many of our people the very divergent motives which governed

the Chancellor and our President were not clearly set apart. Let us, therefore, begin by saying that the President's action had been planned long before he knew of the German intention, and if we would understand the two proposals we must consider them separately.

Let us examine therefore in some detail the German situation. With the publication of the statements by Doctor Mühlon and Prince Lichnowsky, the belief that Germany was responsible for the war had naturally become a conviction. It is plain also that the German Government began it as a war of aggression, and though many of its subjects were and are still deluded, the progress of the war made its purposes clear, even though with characteristic duplicity it attempted to maintain to the end the fiction that it was fighting in self-defense.

A large party, indeed, the most influential party in Germany, which included the militarists and Pan-Germanists, had, as we have seen, intended that the new war prophesied by Bernhardi, and looked forward to as "The Day," should at last give Germany a considerable start toward the realization of Gross Deutsch

land (greater Germany). The programme, as we saw in Chapter I, included annexation east and west. The adjoining peoples especially toward the east in Russia, the Balkans, and Asia Minor, were to be forced into the Empire, and the Hohenzollerns, who had made themselves masters of all Germany, were in turn to make themselves masters of Europe and the world. It is in the following language that Naumann, a deputy of the Reichstag and one of the best-known political publicists of Germany expresses it:

"And over all these; over the Germans, French, Danes, and Poles in the German Empire; over the Magyars, Germans, Roumanians, Slovaks, Croats, and Serbs in Hungary; over the Germans, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, and southern Slavs in Austria, let us imagine once again the controlling concept of Mid-Europe."

That Germany planned to carry out this programme in the World War became clearer when six of the great industrial and agricultural associations of Germany, on May 20, 1915, presented their petition to the Chancellor.

They urged that Belgium should be subject

to Germany in "military and tariff matters, as well as in currency, banking, and post.' Northern France as far as the river Somme should also be annexed for "our future position at sea," and the industrial establishments in the annexed territories should be transferred to German hands. From Russia part of the Baltic Provinces and the territories to the south should be taken. Germany's need of new agricultural territory, of new mining and industrial districts, especially of the coal and iron of Belgium and northern France, was emphasized.* This was to be followed just a month later by a petition signed by 1,341 of the most important members of the university, church, official, legal, literary, and artistic circles.

It advocated the annexation of the whole eastern part of France, from Belfort to the coast, and the transfer of the business undertakings and estates to German ownership. Belgium was to be held and the inhabitants allowed no political influence in the empire. The occupied part of Russia was to be retained and the land turned over to Germany. Egypt was *See War Cyclopædia article, “No Annexations, No Indemnities."

to be taken from England. As to indemnities, "we ought not to hesitate to impose upon France as much as possible."

Subsequent statements to the same purport could be added, but we can be in no doubt where Germany stood after Ambassador Gerard's report of his interview with Von Bethmann-Hollweg, while the German peace terms were still before the world. From the time when the question of peace was first broached Mr. Gerard asked the Chancellor and other officials what Germany's peace terms were. He could never succeed in drawing from them any definite terms, and on several occasions when he asked the Chancellor if Germany was willing to withdraw from Belgium, the Chancellor replied: "Yes, but with guarantees." He seemed unwilling to explain, but when pressed and asked directly what these guarantees were he replied:

"We must possibly have the forts of Liége and Namur; we must have other forts and garrisons throughout Belgium. We must have possession of the railroad lines. We must have possession of the ports and other means of com

*War Cyclopædia, ibid.