§ 271. As the prohibition in relation to ex post facto laws is confined to retrospective criminal laws, and as there is a class of retrospective laws which are not criminal, this last class is restricted only by the prohibition against the impairing the obligation of contracts, and there is therefore a large class of retrospective laws which it is constitutional for the states to pass. Thus, a law abolishing imprisonment for debt, as well as to past as to future contracts, may be constitutionally passed by the state legislatures.1 All retrospective laws are, however, unjust and impolitic; for they destroy the relation of circumstances under which the parties upon whom the law acts stood at the time they made the contract, or performed the act in question.

The last prohibition of this clause is, that the state shall grant no title of nobility. The reason of this is the same as that in regard to the national government: it was an exclusion of every thing like nobility and aristocracy.

§ 272. Clause 2d. No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the nett produce of all duties and imposts laid by any state on imports and exports, shall be for the use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.

§ 273. The Constitution had already restricted Congress in the power to lay taxes, by requiring that direct taxes should be in proportion to the census, and indirect

taxes uniform; that no duties should be laid on exports, and no preference given to the commerce of one state over another. If such restrictions were found necessary for the general government, much more were they for the several states, who, by local regulations, were at all times liable to collision, and might destroy the commerce of each other. In fact, the revenue from commerce is another attribute of national sovereignty, and could safely be trusted only to that body in whom the national sovereignty resided, and to whom was intrusted the national defence and the general welfare. Sufficient power over internal commerce is left to the states, with the consent of Congress, to execute their inspection laws, all the rest is taken away.

§ 274. Inspection laws are not strictly regulations of commerce, though they may have an influence upon it.1 The object of inspection laws is to improve the quality of articles produced in the country, and fit them for use and exportation.

§ 275. In the year 1821, thestate of Maryland enacted, that all importers of foreign articles, commodities, &c., by bale, package, &c., and those persons selling the same at wholesale by bale, package, &c., shall, before they are authorized to sell, &c., take out a license, for which they shall pay fifty dollars, &c. This act was resisted as a violation of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court decided that it was unconstitutional. The ground of the decision was, that although an import duty is generally secured before the goods are landed, yet a tax is not the less an impost, though levied on them after they were landed; that a duty on imports is not merely a duty on the act of importation, but is a duty on the thing imported.2 Nor does it make any difference whether the duty was imposed by way of license upon the occupation, or as a direct duty on the article.

§ 276. It has already been seen that a state has no power to tax the Bank of the United States, because they have no power to restrain the constitutional means given to the government to execute constitutional ends.

§ 277. In the same manner it has been decided that a state has no power to tax stocks issued for loans to the United States.1

§ 278. Tonnage duties are taxes laid on vessels at so much per ton. After what has been said upon the propriety of imposts on imports and exports by the states, the reason for prohibiting a duty on tonnage will be evident. If the states could have laid duties on tonnage, they could have effected, indirectly, all the mischiefs flowing from a power in the states to tax imports and exports.

§ 279. The states shall not keep troops or ships of war in time of peace: this again is founded on the same principles as the other prohibitions relative to the exercise of national sovereignty; to keep troops, make war, &c. are attributes of national sovereignty, which could not exist at once in both the general and state governments, without constituting them separate nations, -a result which it was the very object of the Constitution to prevent. Under the recent ordinances and laws of South Carolina, a body of 12,000 volunteers were called out, a part of whom were armed, disciplined, and maintained at the expense of the state. In consequence of the compromise in respect to the Tariff, the question of the legality of this array has not arisen; but there can be no reasonable doubt that it was in every respect troops, and as such unconstitutional. The prohibition does not extend to a municipal guard, such as those kept to guard penitentiaries and arsenals; for these are not troops, but merely ministers of the civil law.

§ 280. The power to make treaties, alliances, and

Warton vs. The City Council of Charleston, 2 Peters' R. 449.

confederations had, in another place, been taken from the states; to this prohibition is here superadded that of making compacts and agreements with another state or with a foreign power, without the consent of Congress. It may be asked what compacts and agreements are here meant ? As alliances, treaties, &c. had before been mentioned, this clause refers to "private rights of sovereignty; such as questions of boundary, interests in land situated in the territory of each other, and other internal regulations for the mutual comfort and convenience of states bordering on each other." The compact between Virginia and Kentucky is of this class.

§ 281. No state can control the exercise of any authority under the general government.2

§282. The state courts cannot annul the judgments, or determine the extent of the jurisdiction, of the courts of the Union.3

§ 283. No state tribunal can interfere with seizures of property made by revenue officers under the laws of the United States.4

§284. No state can issue a mandamus to an officer of the United States. The official conduct of an officer of the government of the United States can only be controlled by the power that created him.5

§ 285. State laws, as, for example, statutes of limitation, insolvent laws, &c., have no operation upon the rights or contracts of the United States.

ARTICLE II.

OF THE EXECUTIVE.

SECTION I.

§ 286. Clause 1st. The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during a term of four years, and, together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same time, be elected as follows :

§ 287. The chief points laid down in this clause are, 1st, The unity of the executive; 2d, That he shall be elected; 3d, He shall hold his office for a limited time; and, 4th, That he be styled President.

1st. As to the unity of the executive, common sense, as well as the agreement of the best writers,1 unite in the opinion, that the office which is entirely ministerial, and in our government the executive is so, is better filled by one head than by several. History has in all instances condemned the vesting executive power in the hands of a council, and whenever the experiment has been tried among the states, it has proved disastrous.

2d. The next principle laid down is, that the executive shall be elective; and this is the distinguishing characteristic of our government from that of England, France, and other governments of Europe, where some portion of constitutional liberty is enjoyed. It is not the power possessed by the executive so much as it is the authority whence, and the mode in which, it is derived, that constitutes the difference between these governments and ours.

1 Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws, book II. chap. 6; De Lolme on Constitution of England; 1 Kent's Comm. 253, 255; 3 Story's Comm. 282.