members who had now for the first time taken their feats, he anticipated the ableft affiftance, and the firmeft fupport; they had, in a feparate parliament, given fpecimens of brilliant powers of eloquence, and of extenfive knowledge of commerce; and it might reafonably be pronounced, that on fubjects of difficulty their aid would be of the higheft utility.

From his imperfect idea of the general relations of European states, he was unwilling to dwell long on other particulars in the speech, but briefly stated the neceffity of maintaining our naval fuperiority against every confederacy originating in hatred or jealousy.

Mr. Grey expreffed feelings of much anxiety on hearing what were the measures to be proposed to avert or meet the dangers with which the country was threatened: these feelings, he faid, were not feelings of unmanly difmay and defpondency; he was open to topics of confolation and arguments of hope; but nothing which he had heard had tended to remove his apprehenfions: he could not pafs from fear to confidénce on the grounds now laid before the house; he could not banish uneafinefs, when there was no change of that ruinous fyftem of politics which had reduced us to our present state of diftrefs; ftill lefs could he difcover any cheering probability of its termination, when we were only affured of the pacific difpofitions of minifters, and informed they would purfue the fame plan which had involved us in thefe calamities their profeffions had been reiterated in every emergency to reconcile the people to the prolongation of the war, and to obtain new means of fupport; and it was ow

ing to the infatuated reliance upon them, that the nation had been fo long and fo calamitoufly involved in the conteft.

It would be well to avoid every topic of debate unconnected with the immediate fubject; but, left filence fhould be mifconftrued inte approbation, and as he had ftrenuoufly difapproved of a legislative union before it took place, it ap peared a duty to deliver his fentiments respecting Ireland, now that measure was adopted.

The evils to which this union was propofed as a cure were evils not refulting from Irish independ ence, but the fatal effects of a mifchievous fyftem, enforced by those who hated independence and profcribed it, because incompatible with their fchemes of adminiftra. tion. Ireland, we were told, was now quiet; but might we be per mitted to inquire if this tranquil. lity fprang from affection? Had it been followed by a relaxation of that fevere policy to which the country had been fo long the victim? Were thofe vexatious laws to be repealed, of which fo many of the inhabitants ftill complain? Were the pri vileges of the conftitution to extend to thofe who had hitherto been excluded the enjoyment of them? If indeed those jealous reftrictions, to which the catholics were ftill subjected, were to be removed, it would be a pledge of real and permauent tranquillity; but this was not the cafe ; the rebellion had been extinguifhed before the union. Ireland had been quiet for a year after it had been rejected; but this circumftance had not been confidered as a proof the country was out of danger, or fecurity reitored. Why then should it be inferred that the union was the cause of the tran

quillity,

quinty, and fo many benefits affirmed to be now realifed? The experiment is but just begun; many difficulties to the completion of the measure were unmentioned, and must be provided for; practice would difcover many more, and a confiderable period muft elapfe before fuccefs could be fairly afcertained.

The next point to be confidered was, the melancholy profpect of a war against all Europe: Ruffia had been guilty of the grofleft violence and injuftice towards this country in the confifcation of the property of our merchants, and the treatment of our failors; these injuries demanded reparation: nevertheless, though the emperor had been the aggreffor, it did not follow that our minifters were free from blame; they might have given Paul ground of offence, though the offence could never juftify his conduct. He accufed them of violating a convention by which he was to receive the island of Malta as the reward of his co-operation against France. Did fuch a convention exift? Mr. Grey confeffed he was not inclined to believe that minifters would be guilty of breaking an exprefs ftipulation; yet fuch a charge furnished ground of inquiry-the affair ought to be inveftigated, in order to be cleared up-probably fome treaties of mutual benefit might have been made, and what thefe were it was the duty of the houfe to examine, before it determined that the rupture with Paul was occafioned by no misconduct on our part. In the laft fefion it had been affirmed that Malta had no connection with our ftipulations in the emperor's proclamation the contrary had been afferted if it had been poffible, by the ceffion of Malta, or of any port

in the Mediterranean, to have fatisfied the ambition or fecured the affiftance of Ruffia, it would have been the beft policy to have purfued this courfe, and to have brought a new power to oppose the aggrandisement of France. Such would Ruffia have been, and it would have been no lefs easy than advantageous to have gratified the withes of Paul.

The next confideration was, the nature of the difpute with England and the northern powers (Denmark and Sweden); and though Pruffia was unmentioned, it was equally engaged in thofe measures, fuppofed hoftile to this country: these powers, together with Ruffia, had fubfcribed a convention, the profeffed object of which was to fe cure their commerce against the vexations to which it had been subject. Without giving any opinion refpecting the confederacy, he felt it his duty to warn the house againft precipitately pronouncing it fo ef fentially hoftile to England as to justify an open war: it had been faid, that the claims now advanced had never been heard of till the American war: but this affertion was untrue; the king of Prufha, in the year 1740, difputed the pretenfions of this country on the fame ground as the armed neutrahity maintained, and contended as ftrenuously for the principle, that free veffels made free goods. In 1762, the Dutch refifted the claim of right to fearch fhips under convoy, and refifted it at a period when, from our naval and military ftrength, it was little to be expected that any injury would be paffed over with impunity. the year 1780, the affertion of the rights of neutrals (frequently the. fubject of controverly in different wars) affumed a greater degree of B 3

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confiftency and concert; the fubfcribers, that is, all the powers of Europe, entered into the armed confederacy, officially announced its principles, and claimed the rights enumerated in that famous document as agreeable to the law and practice of nations. Let then the queftion be examined with attention and impartiality; and if we can difcern a leading principle, whereby the claims may be tried and afcertained, fuch a principle will be found to be that of juftice.

As the conduct of flates to each other ought to be guided by it, it follows that whatever advantages might accrue to this country by contention ought to be given up if their claims were not juft: any temporary acknowledgment of them, dictated by fuperior force, could never compenfate the hatred of other ftates, the evil of rendering their animofity inveterate and fowing the feeds of future confederacies whenever the embaraffments of this country prefented the profpect of efta blishing a difputed claim. Our naval afcendancy indeed ought to be carefully preferved, as the fource of our glory, and the bulwark of our fafety; but he should be forry that the maintenance of this diftinétion depended on any claim inconfiftent with the intereft of other independent nations-or that, to preferve the interefts of the British nation, we fhould abandon the maxims of juftice, in which alone true greatnefs and permanent fecurity confited.

If it were neceffary to prove the claim was juft, it was no lefs neceflary to prove it valuable: here he reminded the houfe of a faying of one of its diftinguished members-"As you ought not to go to war for a profitable wrong, fo

neither ought you to go to war for an unprofitable right." The maritime fuperiority of Great Britain was of ineftimable value, but was this claim (fo odious to our neighbours) effential to its exiftence? This ought clearly to be demonftrated before we engaged in an univerfal war for its defence, and purchased it at the price of blood. But admitting the claim was juft and beneficial, circumftances might require a relaxation in the rigour of its exercise : a right in itself valuable might not be equally important at every period; there might be times when the infringement of it would be productive of no inconvenience, and the affertion be attended with imminent danger in being exercifed with moderation, in certain circumftances, the right was fecured and confirmed; in being pushed to extremity it might become fo grievous as to be thaken off for ever. Suppofe, even, that at the prefent moment our admiffion of the claims. of the northern powers had enabled them to fupply France with articles for her fleets, what evils could have refulted from it? France, deftitute of feamen, of fhips, of every thing conftituting a navy, what advantage could he have obtained from the fupply of a few naval

ftores ? What importance would

have been a numerical addition to her marine, without the nerves and finews of naval greatnefs? In 1780, by the principle of the armed neutrality, the right of entering places blockaded is diftinctly abandoned, and what is understood as a place blockaded clearly explained. At the prefent moment-thanks to the ability with which the blockade of the enemy's ports is conducted by the kill of our naval commanders-the enemy could derive little Lenefit from an extenfion

of

of the privileges of neutrals. But granting that all these facilities were permitted to France, could fhe, without feamen, without fkill, and without difcipline, establish formidable navies? But what might be the confequence of carrying the difpute with the northern powers to extremities? Should we not, in a moment, double her marine, and fupply her with experienced failors? Would not the hoftile navies of Europe (to use a military phrase) out-flank us on every fide, from Archangel to the Tagus? By our driving thofe powers to make one common caufe with France, fhe would acquire new means of annoying us, and not only increase her opportunities of attack by dividing our means of refiftance, but by purfuing thefe unconciliatory meafures, we fhould not be able to retain a fingle port in Europe. Naples even now could not be confidered as open to us; Turkey and Portugal, by the growing preponderance of our foes, could not be expected long to be in our favour; and if we talk of the vigilance neceffary to guard againft the fhat tered navy of France, how much muft our difficulties be increafed when we raise up fo many enemies against us!

It had been faid that our fuperior navy would deftroy, the trade of the enemy; but was not trade eifential alfo to England? Commerce was the bafis on which our own revenue, frength, and national greatness, were founded; and if this was impeded in every quarter, if every market was fhut against us, and, whilft fuccefsful in destroying the trade of our opponents, we destroyed that of our own country, our deftruction as a nation was inevitable: nor was it merely in the privation of a market for our com

modities that we should fuffer-not only the valuable fources of our fplendor and fecurity would be cut off, but the fupply of our naval ftores; nor could we depend on other countries to furnish them.

But admitting the truth of all this, our honour, we are told, was attacked, and must be vindicated, whatever it might coft. It then comes to be confidered whether the difpute might have been avoided by our minifters, or had it been provoked by their misconduct? The fufpicion was not without probability: in violation of the laws of nations, they had attempted to compel the neutrals to declare against France'; witness their behaviour to Genoa and the grand-duke of Tufcany: the northern powers had been provoked by our vexatious proceedings against them: inftead of countenancing any undue violence or grievous irregularity, the greatest care fhould have been taken to prevent any abufe, without conceding the right. Inftructions to our cruifers on the fubject of neutrals would have obviated many complaints. It is evident our naval. officers did not conceive themfelves entitled to feize and detain neutral veffels under convoy, as appeared from commodore Langford requir ing new inftruétions before he brought in the Swedish convoy. This moderating policy, which fecured by tempering the exercise of thofe rights, was that which the earl of Chatham adopted in that glorious war which he conducted againft France: a teftimony of high authority in favour of that adminiftration is left on record; it is that of lord Camden, who ftates, that the policy of the earl of Chatham in regard to neutrals was to act with caution and good temper, 'to prevent the enemy from obtaining

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