navy, and to the public, they ought to fupport it. When a council of war was called to confider the propriety of giving up the enterprife, this officer of engineers, who had undertaken to put the general into poffeffion of the town with the lofs of 200 men, was not fummoned to attend it. Why was he not called, and his advice followed? The place was worth 200 men, however hocking the expreffion. There were in the harbour 34 fail of the line, befide feveral frigates, and many merchant veffels richly laden. The enemy were quite unprepared, and this rich prize was within our reach. A regiment marched near Fort St. Philip gave three cheers when they came in fight of it but inftead of being allowed to follow up their advantages, they were ordered to take fhelter under a ftone wall. The naval officers offered to take a fort which much retarded the operations of the army, but their offer was rejected. When the men were ordered to re-embark, their indignation almoft broke out into mutiny. Thefe ftatements were generally credited; and if falfe, they ought to be proved fo. When the troops were re-embarked, they failed for Vigo, and there the tars cut out a privateer, as they faid, "to fhow their commander how to take a thing." One of them being afked what he thought of the expedition "Why," faid he, "I don't think as how a French general with 500 men would have left Ferrol without taking it.". Before the destination of the expedition was known, the general is reported to have faid, they were going to gather laurels! What then must have been their difappointment! Mr. Sturt then read many letters from officers employed in the ex

pedition, confirming his statements; and concluded by moving, "that the house refolve itself into a committee of the whole houfe, to inquire into the caufes of the failure of the expedition to Ferrol."

1

Sir James Pulteney said, he trufted that, after the fpeech the house had just heard, it was unneceffary to apologife for taking the earlieft opportunity of prefenting himfelf to their notice. After all that had been faid upon the prefent motion, the clamour which had been received, and the unfounded infinuations fpread abroad, parliament could not be aftonished at his anxiety to ftate the grounds on which he had acted. He apprehended meeting no contradiction when he affirmed that all expeditions fimilar to that againft Ferrol were undertaken with more hazard and difficulty than any other military operations. He was ftill convinced they were frequently connected with the views of this country, and neceffary to be undertaken on some occafions, however hazardous. But while he felt the neceffity of fuch attempts, he muft acknowledge that man would il difcharge his duty, who did not thoroughly weigh the danger of the fervice, and the risk of the enterprife he was about to undertake. He meant not the danger of lofing a number of men, for this, however lamentable, was the inevitable fortune of war; but he alluded to that extenfive view of the fubject which belonged to the commander in chief, who muft regard the danger as connected with the general prefervation of his corps, confidering whether the object warranted the extent of the risk. Had he conceived the chance of taking Ferrol fairly to have been calculated, and refrained from the attack merely on account of lofing

200 men, or even a much larger number; he should have felt himfelf deficient in his duty to his country, and deferving much of the imputation which had been fpread abroad: but when, after mature deliberation, he found that an attack had no chance of fuccefs, and that a failure involved the lofs of moft, if not the whole, of the corps under his orders, he clearly perceived it to be his duty not to hazard an enterprize, when the profpect of fuccefs was defperate, and the event of a failure would not have comprehended the general fafety. It never could be the intent of a government to expofe to imminent hazard a body of troops whose lofs would not only have defeated every other object of the campaign, but have been a fevere blow on the country. To ftate to the house the fuccefs with which our landing had been effected was needlefs; or that all oppofition in our progrefs to the heights above Ferrol was defeated by the gallantry of our troops. The poffethion of these heights afforded him a full opportunity of obferving the whole fituation, and the refult was decidedly not to hazard the attack, as the nature of the works prevented the poffibility of a coupde-main, and the troops defending them were more numerous than he had expected. The number of them, from his own obfervation and the reports of other officers and of prifoners, was afcertained to be 6000 men ; a number much greater than was neceffary completely to defend the works round Ferrol; and this number he had ftated in a letter to Mr. Dundas the day after he re-embarked. The town he faw was covered on three fides by the fea; the fourth fide, an extent of about 2000 yards, was regularly fortified in mafonry, having seven baltions, befide other flank defence: 1801.

the whole was in the best order, having been lately conftructed.

Although on thofe fides covered by arms of the fea the fhore was formed by a ridge of fteep rock, yet the rock had been scarped away, and every opening built up with great labor: this might ferve to give an idea of the other works, and he formed his judgment upon it. Such being the actual fituation of Ferrol,

and the force to defend it such as had been mentioned, independent of other corps which could have been thrown in before night, there appeared no probability of fuccefs in any attempt against it.

But he had fince had his opinion confirmed in every point by authorities who could not be fuppofed interested in fupporting either the character of his majefty's arms, or in fuftaining his individual reputa tion-he meant his majefty's enemies.

In an official report published in France, figned by the officer who gave it, and counterfigned by the maritime præfect of Breft, the following was the state of the place at the moment of debarkation:

The garrifon confifted of part of a battalion of the regiment of Africa, and of another of Zamora, 200 foldiers of the marine, and a battalion of the militia of Orenfé. If we join to this small number of troops thofe compofing the flying camps of Siria, amounting to 1000 men, and that of Ayres, compofed of a battalion of the immemorial del Rey, and another of Guadalaxara (these two camps were fituated a league and a half from Ferrol) we fhould fee that the total number of troops which could be collected amounted to 4000 or 4,500 men. If we take away what were neceffary to guard the forts and the town, there would remain about 1800 difpofable men." E

That

That is, the enemy had 1800 men more than were neceffary, and more than they wanted for the defence of the place. This was the ftate of the troops at the time when

he landed.

The account proceeded to inform ùs, that another regiment from the Spanish fleet, that of Afturias, was landed, and alfo the reft of the marines, of which only 200 were reckoned before.

The account alfo mentions a third camp, that of Juia, which might have been drawn into the town, if wanted. It probably confifted of 1000 or 1500 men. Befides this, we learn from another account published at Madrid, that a battalion of the regiment of Africa, and the volunteers of Arragon, came from Corunna. Thefe battalions were quite diftinct from all the other troops. It appeared then from the lowest calculation, that the enemy muft have had in or near the town at least 7000 men.

The general account, published at Madrid, entered into no detail of numbers. The letter of the French ambaffador talked of 4000 difpofable men, which muft mean the number of men beyond that neceffary to guard the town and forts; and the account itfelf fays that the garrifon amounted to 3000 men.

the

He hoped that, after this, it would not be faid that the town of Ferrol was defencelefs, or deficient in point of garrifon. That it would not be argued a place was affailable by a coup-de-main, which even with all their natural enemy, folicitude to diminish their numbers and means of defence, acknowledged to have been over-garrifoned. And the conduct of the enemy was the ftrongeft confirmation poffible of the moft material part of this account. For thefe 1800 men, who came to oppofe or attack us,

were not formed between us and the town, but were fent round by water, thus putting us between the town and them; which proved that the enemy thought themselves ftrong enough to defend the town without the affiftance of that corps.

Was Ferrol deficient in point of works? This queftion was decided with the former by the enemy themcould be felves. If 1800 men fpared out of 4500 or even 5500, it followed that the place was strong in itself.

It therefore appeared that the enemy themfelves confirmed moft ftrongly the idea he had given of the works, and of the force to defend them; and confequently it could not be faid that he either proceeded on grounds lightly eftablifhed, or which had proved ultimately fallacious.

Though he took the whole refponfibility of the retreat on himfelf, yet he fhould have been much to blame had he not attempted to profit by the knowledge and advice of the general officers who accompanied him. He therefore spoke with them individually and collectively on the fubject. They attentively viewed the place, and were all of opinion that an attack was likely to prove unfuccessful, except one general officer, who had not at that time fufficiently made. up his mind on the fubject, but who had fince informed him that he was confident the attack would have failed.

The honourable gentleman had fpoken, much of an officer of engineers; him he had alfo confulted, and he gave it as his best judgment that the place might be taken by efcalade in the night; that there would however be confiderable risk of failure, though it was poflible the attempt might fucceed.

His opinion was that Ferrol, although

He muft obferve on this occafion, that if any engineer of rank had propofed a plan for a fiege, and offered a calculation of the time which fuch an operation would take, or the means moft neceffary to be employed, his opian engineer would certainly have had greater weight: but an escalade is an operation of a very different nature, and of which any other officer of experience must be as good a judge as an engineer.

nion as

Having no profpect of fuccefs in an immediate aflault, what remained to be confidered was, whether the place could be taken by a fege. He judged fuch an attempt impracticable, becaufe, firft, he muft have gotten poffeffion of the feveral forts commanding the entrance of the harbour on both fides, which could not be done without bringing heavy cannon, and opening batteries against it. And here the opinion of the principal engineer agreed with that of every other officer of rank. From the nature of the coaft, which was formed of steep mountains, the conveyance of cannon must have been a tedious work and until we had poffeffion of the forts, the fleet muft have lain on the coaft, fo hazardously fituated, that it could never have remained there a moment whenever the wind should change to the weftward.

But had he gained the forts, and brought the fleet to a fafer place, he must have occupied both fides of the harbour to protect it. He did not over-rate the detachment neceffary for that purpose, in fay ing that only feven or 8000 men could have remained as a befieging army, after covering the fleet, and keeping up the necellary commu

nications.

This was nearly the number which the enemy had the day after he landed. The whole force of the province was in movement. The troops from Vigo (the moft remote garrifon in Galicia from Ferrol) were actually upon the march; and they could have affembled ten or 12,000, added to the garrifon, before, he could well have opened the trenches. To at tempt a fiege against equal numbers is a very unusual operation in war. It is common to have three times the number of the garrifon; but to attempt it in any cafe against fuch a fuperiority as this, was entirely out of the queftion.

It had been faid by the honourable gentleman, that an univerfal panic prevailed among the ene

my. As far as they fhowed themfelves in the field, there were no fymptoms of panic or confufion, In the town they feemed bufy in making arrangements for their de fence; and the march of troops, dragging of guns, and univerfal movement in every quarter, was the natural confequence of an ap prehended attack; but how it is to be conftrued into the effect of panic and confufion he did not fee. That the merchants were afraid was likely; and he knew not where the inhabitants of any town, apprehending attack, would not be alarmed; but certainly E 2

thofe

thofe fymptoms of terror were not obfervable in the garrifon.

It had been afferted that the admiral had remonftrated against the retreat, and that the navy offered to do the reft with fhips, if he would only take the forts. The admiral never made the flightest objection to the retreat, nor ever made any propofal of making the attack with the fleet.

It had been reported that he retreated in confequence of private orders from the commander in chief. Why any one could infinuate fo abfurd and wicked a faltity, he fhould not prefume to fay. If with a view to apologife for his conduct, no fuch apology was needed-if with a view to throw odium on the illuftrious perfon alluded to, the uniform tenor of his life offered a moft unanfwerable teftimony, that he never could give any order to any officer which did not tend to the intereft of his country, and to fupport the character of his majesty's arms.

The names of officers had been often mentioned, who he was confident had never delivered the fentiments imputed to them. But the letters read by the honourable gentleman having been written by officers, these muft have been either of the navy or army. As to the navy, fir James faid he was not called to examine whether officers in that fervice were judges of military operations; and, excepting one officer of rank, who could not be quoted on the occafion, not one of them ever faw the place or approached it.

The naval officers were occupied in their own bufinefs, which they executed, as he had fated in his public letter, extremely well; but he meant not to infer from thence that they were competent judges

of the military defence of any place, far lefs of the strength of a place they never faw.

Officers of inferior rank in the army were not much better enabled to judge of this operation: they undoubtedly faw, or might have feen, the place, but most of them at a confiderable distance, without any plan or information on the fubject; and, fully employed in the duties of their stations, their views and accounts must have been very imperfect. Did the queftion then reft on the testimony of experienced officers accurately informed, or on thofe of another profethion, who never faw the place at all, or only had a distant cafual view of it? But it would naturally be afked, how came these reports to be generally believed? and this he could anfwer in a few words. The expedition against Ferrol was not the only service in which the troops were to be employed. This confideration weighed much throughout the bufinels, and might have induced him to adopt the plan he had followed, even had the nature of the works' and the force of the place been different from what he found them. His determination was to attack the town if it was advifeable, and otherwife to re-embark immediately. It had been affirmed that a difference had arifen between the two fervices; but till the re-embarkment there had arifen none. The principal charge appeared to be, that fort St. Philip was not taken, as it contained only fifty men. The troops who difputed the heights with us came from and retreated to that fort; which proves how far it was garrifoned. It is very probable there were boats ready to convey fuch men as were not wanted immediately for the

defence