promise of future more permanent and more general engagements for the same object, but such engagements were never formed. How then can this temporary and partial convention be considered as altering, radically and generally, principles which have been universally adopted, and in the modification of which all have an interest? Would France herself admit that a combination, such as that which constituted the armed neutrality, may rightfully change the law of nations, and establish a new code of universal obligation? It is believed that no nation on earth would more perseveringly oppose such an invasion of its sovereignty.

There seems then to be no solid ground for maintaining, that the general law of nations has been at all varied by the armed neutrality.

It remains to inquire whether the treaties, between France and the United States, pledge either nation to assert and establish the principle, that free bottoms make free goods.

The treaty of amity and commerce, concluded the 6th February, 1778, stipulates reciprocally for the right of trading with and protecting the goods of the enemy of either party in the vessels of the other, and in turn surrenders its own goods found in the vessels of an enemy, but it contains no clause imposing on either party the duty of extending the principle, or of supporting its application to other nations. The stipulations of that treaty are negative as well as affirmative. They specify as well the disabilities intended to be created and the duties to be imposed, as the privileges designed to be granted. Had it been intended that either nation should have been bound to maintain this principle in its intercourse with others, or should have been in any degree incapacitated from prosecuting freely that intercourse, without the previous admission of the principle, a stipulation to that effect would have been made. No such stipulation having been made, the parties cannot be presumed to have intended it. In deed it would have been madness in the United States, under their actual circumstances, to have formed such an agreement. There being no express stipulation to this effect, it cannot be supposed to have been implied. Nations forming a solemn compact which ought to regulate their conduct towards each other which is to be resorted

to as the standard for adjusting their differences, do not leave to implication such delicate and important points. Indeed if a great principle not mentioned is permitted to be implied, the object of a written agreement, which is itself to evidence all the obligation it creates, is totally defeated. But who is to make the implication, and to what extent is implication to be allowed? It is very easy to perceive, that the doctrine of implying in contracts stipulations never formed, would destroy all certainty of construction, and open a boundless field of controversy to the contracting parties.

It results from the very nature of a contract which affects the rights of the parties, but not of others, and from the admission of a general rule of action, binding independent of compact, which may be changed by consent, but is only changed so far as that consent is actually given, that a treaty between any two nations must leave to all others those rights which the law of nations acknowledges; and must leave each of the contracting parties subject to the operation of such rights. For the truth of this position, believed to be so clear in itself, and which it is supposed the history of all Europe will illustrate, the ordonnance of 1744, already quoted, is considered as furnishing an unequivocal authority. By that ordonnance the law of nations is applied to all those neutrals with whom France had not stipulated, that the quality of their bottoms should be imparted to their cargoes, while those with whom such stipulations had been made are exempted from the application of the law.

The desire of establishing universally the principle that neutral bottoms shall make neutral goods, is prehaps felt by no nation on earth, more strongly than by the United States. Perhaps no nation is more deeply interested in its establishment. It is an object they keep in view, and which, if not forced by violence to abandon it, they will pursue in such manner as their own judgment may dictate as being best calculated to attain it; but the wish to establish a principle is essentially different from a determination that it is already established. The interests of the United States could not fail to produce the wish: their duty forbid them to indulge it, when deciding on a mere right. However solicitous America might be to pursue all proper means, tending to obtain for this principle the assent of all

or any of the maritime powers of Europe, she never conceived the idea of obtaining that consent by force.

The United States will only arm to defend their own rights: neither their policy nor their interests permit them to arm, in order to compel a surrender of the rights of others. These and other considerations, which have been submitted to the government of France, produced on the part of the United States a decision, that their bottoms could not of right protect the goods of a belligerent power from an enemy not bound to respect the principle. This decision was founded on the most perfect conviction, that it was enjoined by the law of nations; and that good faith, respect for truth, and for the duties of an upright and honest judgment, rendered it indispensable. This conviction remains unshaken. If those articles, which still appear conclusive to the American government, have not the same operation on the judgment of France, they must at least be sufficient to evince the sincerity with which that government has acted, and to prove that its conduct, in this respect, was produced by a sense of duty, and not by any partiality for a nation against which it was, at that time, considerably irritated by other causes.

The undersigned, citizen minister, rely too implicitly on your candour and discernment, to apprehend, that you will estimate improperly, the motives which on this essential point have influenced and guided the United States.

The early decision of the American government on this subject was immediately avowed, openly and amply supported by Mr. Jefferson, the then Secretary of State, in his letter to Mr. Genet, dated the 24th July, 1793; and in his letter to Mr. Morris, dated 16th August in the same year. The arguments, which those letters contain, were supposed to have satisfied the government of France, since its ministers in the United States no longer controverted the principle they supported. Indeed those arguments appeared too conclusive to permit a doubt concerning the success which would attend them.

In August 1794, when Mr. Monroe, the then minister of the United States to this Republick, was received into the bosom of the convention, France obviously did not consider the acknowledgment of this established principle of the law of nations, as indicating a partiality towards her enemy. The language used on the occasion could

only have been used to the minister of a nation, whose friendship was valued, and whose conduct had evinced the sincerity of its professions. It was then declared "that the sweetest, the frankest fraternity united in effect the two Republicks," and that "their union would be for ever indissoluble." These declarations, made long after America had avowed its neutrality, and had avowed its acquiescence under the principle, that a belligerent power, unrestrained by particular treaty, may of right take out of the bottoms of a neutral, the goods of its enemy, demonstrate that neither that neutrality nor that acquiescence induced the want of a proper regard for France. The government of the United States still cherishes the hope, that this true and fair estimate, then made of its conduct, may be soon resumed by a nation whose friendship it has assiduously and unremittingly cultivated, by all those means which good faith and justice could permit

it to use.

After the discussion of this interesting question was supposed to have been closed, and France was believed to have been entirely content with that system in which the United States found themselves bound to persevere, some complaints were made, not against the principles adopted by the government, but against the application of those principles to particular cases supposed not to come within them. The neutrality of the United States could not permit prize to be made of vessels belonging to nations with whom they were at peace, within their jurisdiction; or by privateers fitted out in their own ports. Regulations to this effect were necessarily made; and to enforce the observance of those regulations, was a duty not to be dispensed with. The right of one of the belligerent powers, to obtain the release of a vessel captured under such circumstances, was as sacred as the right of the captor to a vessel taken on the high seas and which according to the usages of war was lawful prize. The United States were bound to respect the rights of both. To do so, it was necessary to examine the facts; for which purpose, a tribunal, in which both parties might be fairly heard, was unavoidable. Some complaints were made of particular vexations, and each complaint has heretofore been particularly attended to. It is believed to be unnecessary to review these several cases, because

the undersigned are entirely persuaded that explanations, already given, must have been completely satisfactory. Should any one of them be still considered as furnishing subject for complaint, the undersigned will proceed to its investigation, with the most sincere desire to attain truth, and to redress the wrong, if any has been committed.

During this period, the causes of complaint against France, on the part of the United States, were by no means inconsiderable. Their commerce was not exempt from depredations, believed to be entirely unwarrantable, made upon it by the cruisers of this Republick.

On the 9th of May, 1793, the national convention passed a decree relative to the commerce of neutrals, the first article of which is in these words: "The French ships of war and privateers may stop and bring into the ports of the Republick, such neutral vessels are are loaded, in whole or in part, either with provisions belonging to neutrals, and destined for enemy ports, or with merchandise belonging to enemies." In consequence of the remonstrances to the American minister, the convention, on the 23d May, declared, "that the vessels of the United States are not comprised in the regulations of the decree of the 9th May." On the 28th of the same month, the convention repealed the decree of the 23d-On the 1st July, they re-established it. On the 27th July, it was again repealed. Under the decree of the 9th May, the vessels of the United States were captured, brought into the ports of France, and their cargoes disposed of. Could this decree, citizen minister, be regarded otherwise than as infringing the laws of nations, the rights of neutrals, and the particular engagements, subsisting between France and the United States?

When on the 8th of June, in the same year, the British government issued a similar order, its injustice produced a ferment throughout America, indicating strong dispositions immediately to oppose its execution by force. The letter of Mr. Jefferson, the then Secretary of State, to the minister plenipotentiary of the United States at London, dated the 7th Sept. 1793, and remonstrating against the order of the 5th June, contains so much justness of sentiment, and strength of argument, as to have been quoted by your predecessor, in his letter to Mr. Monroe of the 9th March, 1796.