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tions are necessary to keep up popular interest in current politics.

V. The numbers of the two American houses seem small to a European when compared on the one hand with the population of the country, on the other with the practice of European States. The Americans, however, doubt whether both their Houses have not already become too large. They began with twenty-six in the Senate, sixty-five in the House, numbers then censured as too small, but which worked well, and gave less encouragement to idle talk and vain display than the crowded halls of to-day. The inclination of wise men is to stop further increase when the number of four hundred has been reached, for they perceive that the House already suffers from disorganization, and fear that a much larger one would prove unmanageable.

VI. American congressmen are more assiduous in their attendance than the members of most European legislatures. The great majority not only remain steadily at Washington through the session, but are usually to be found in the Capitol, often in the Chamber itself, while a sitting lasts. There is therefore comparatively little trouble in making a quorum. The requirement of a high quorum, which is prescribed in the Constitution, has doubtless helped to secure a good attendance.

A division in Congress has not the importance it has in the House of Commons. There it may throw out the ministry. In Congress it never does more than affirm or negative some particular bill or resolution. Even a division in the Senate which involves the rejection of a treaty or of an appointment to some great office, does not disturb the tenure of the Executive. Hence it is not essential to the majority that its full strength should be always at hand, nor

has a minority party any great prize set before it as the result of a successful vote.

Questions, however, arise in which some large party interest is involved. There may be a bill by which the party means to carry out its main views of policy, or perhaps to curry favor with the people, or a resolution whereby it hopes to damage a hostile Executive. In such cases it is important to bring up every vote. The process of "going into caucus" is the regular American substitute for recognized leadership, and has the advantage of seeming more consistent with democratic equality, because every member of the party has in theory equal weight in the party meeting. It is used whenever a line of policy has to be settled, or the whole party to be rallied for a particular party division. But of course it cannot be employed every day or for every bill. Hence, when no party meeting has issued its orders, a member is free to vote as he pleases, or rather as he thinks his constituents please. The House caucus is more or less called into action according to the number and gravity of the party issues that come before Congress. In troublous times it has to be supplemented by something like obedience to regular lead

The Senate is rather more jealous of the equality of all its members. No senator can be said to have any authority beyond that of exceptional talent and experience; and of course a senatorial caucus, since it rarely consists of more than fifty persons, is a better working body than a House caucus, which may reach two hundred.

The House of Representatives is for the purpose of serious party issues fully as much a party body as the House of Commons. A member voting against his party on such an issue is more certain to forfeit his party reputation and his seat than is an English member. This is true of both the Senate and the

House. But for the purpose of ordinary questions, of issues not involving party fortunes, a representative is less bound by party ties than an English member, because he has neither leaders to guide him by their speeches nor whips by their private instructions. The apparent gain is that a wider field is left for independent judgment on non-partisan questions. The real loss is that legislation becomes weak and inconsistent.

The spirit of party may seem to be weaker in Congress than in the people at large. But this is only because the questions which the people decide at the polls are always questions of choice between candidates for office. These are definite questions, questions eminently of a party character, because candidates represent in the America of to-day not principles but parties. Whenever a vote upon persons occurs in Congress, Congress gives a strict party vote. Were the people to vote at the polls on matters not explicitly comprised within a party platform, there would be the same uncertainty as Congress displays. The habit of joint action which makes the life of a party is equally intense in every part of the American system. But in England the existence of a Ministry and Opposition in Parliament sweeps within the circle of party action many topics which in America are left outside, and therefore Congress seems, but is not, less permeated than Parliament by party spirit.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE RELATIONS OF CONGRESS TO THE PRESIDENT

So far as they are legislative bodies, the House and the Senate have similar powers and stand in the same relation to the Executive. Although the Constitution forbids any Federal official to be chosen a member of either the House or the Senate, there is noth

ing in it to prevent officials from speaking there; as indeed there is nothing to prevent either House from assigning places and the right to speak to any one whom it chooses. Now, however, no Federal officer appears on the floor. A committee may request the attendance of a minister and examine him, but he appears before it only as a witness to answer questions, not to state and argue his own case. There is therefore little direct intercourse between Congress and the administration, and no sense of interdependence and community of action such as exists in other parliamentary countries.

The President himself, although he has been voted into office by his party, is not necessarily its leader, nor even one among its most prominent leaders. The expression of his wishes conveyed in a message has not necessarily any more effect on Congress than an article in a prominent party newspaper. No duty lies on Congress to take up a subject to which he has called attention as needing legislation. The President and his Cabinet have no recognized spokesman in either House. A particular senator or representative may be in confidential communication with them, and be the instrument through whom they seek to act; but he would probably disavow rather than claim the position of an exponent of ministerial wishes. When the President or a minister is attacked in Congress, it is not the duty of any one there to justify his conduct. The accused official may send a written defense or may induce a member to state his case; but this method lacks the advantages of the European parliamentary system, under which the person assailed repels in debate the various charges, showing himself not afraid to answer fresh questions and grapple with new points. Thus by its exclusion from Congress the executive is deprived of the power of leading and guiding the legis

lature and of justifying in debate its administrative acts.

Either House of Congress, or both Houses jointly, can pass resolutions calling on the President or his ministers to take certain steps, or censuring steps they have already taken. The President need not obey such resolutions, need not even notice them. They do not shorten his term or limit his discretion. If the resolution be one censuring a minister, or demanding his dismissal, there is another ground on which the President may disregard it. The act is in law not the minister's act, but that of the President himself, and he does not therefore escape responsibility by throwing over his adviser.

Either House of Congress can direct a committee to summon and examine a minister, who, though he might legally refuse to attend, never does refuse. The committee, when it has got him, can do nothing more than question him. He may evade their questions, may put them off the scent by dexterous concealments. He may with impunity tell them that he means to take his own course. To his own master, the President, he standeth or falleth.

Congress may refuse to the President the legislation he requests, and thus, by mortifying and embarrassing him, may seek to compel his compliance with its wishes. It is only a timid President, or a President greatly bent on accomplishing some end for which legislation is needed, who will be moved by such tactics.

Congress can pass bills requiring the President or any minister to do or abstain from doing certain acts of a kind hitherto left to his free will and judgment, -may, in fact, endeavor to tie down the officials by prescribing certain conduct for them in great detail. The President will presumably veto such bills, as contrary to sound administrative policy. If, however,

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