point on the River Oise near Compiègne, and then ran eastward, passing Soissons, Rheims, and Verdun, to a point almost opposite Metz, and about forty miles west of that famous German fortified city; at that point it ran due south again to St. Mihiel, and then due west, crossing the Moselle near the German border. The blow struck on April 17 was on an eleven-mile stretch east of Rheims, and on the front between Rheims and Soissons. The French troops proved irresistible, advancing from one to two miles

1,500,000 Germans. It was reported that in the battles of April 14, 15, 16, and 17 over 35,000 German prisoners had been taken by British and French together, and that the German casualties exceeded 150,000; more than 200 guns were captured and an immense amount of booty; fully 800 square miles of French territory were released.

These events seemed on the 20th to be only preliminary to even greater conflicts, perhaps the most critical of the

war.

S

INCE the outbreak of hostilities the submarine has been a conspicuous naval weapon, and German science has developed it with characteristic energy, system, and thoroughness. Early in the war the more powerful allied navies practically swept the seas of all enemy merchant ships and contained the battle fleets of the Central Powers within comparatively narrow limits. Beyond these limits, except for a few raids on commerce by surface cruisers, the naval activities of both Germany and Austria have been restricted to the use of submarines.

Considering the disadvantages inherent in underwater navigation, the results attained have been truly astonishing. In the first days of the war one small German submarine sank three British armored cruisers in less than one hour; since then German and Austrian submarines are estimated to have sunk 230,000 tons of naval vessels and 3,600,000 tons* of merchant shipping. On Oct. 7, 1916, the U-53 appeared in Newport Harbor, exchanged official calls, read the daily papers, sent dispatches, and departed a few hours after her arrival. The next day a submarine destroyed off Nantucket four British traders and one Dutch trader. A few months ago peaceful Funchal was suddenly bombarded by a German submarine.

The underwater mine layer has become an accomplished fact-it is disturbing to think of this huge mechanical fish secretly threading the ocean high

*Even the approximate accuracy of these figures is questionable, because of conflicting reports and the difficulty in determining whether a ship was sunk by a mine or by a torpedo in the instances where neither was

seen.

ways, laying its engines of destruction. In addition to all these, Captain König has smilingly introduced to us the Deutschland, a successful underwater blockade runner.

With this evidence of accomplishments it is not surprising that the submarine Nor has seized upon the imagination. has Germany, in furthering her ends, failed to take full advantage of the mystery surrounding underwater attack. It has been part of the German war plan to prepare and circulate submarine propaganda designed to strengthen hopes at home, and at the same time break down morale in enemy countries. This has resulted in a somewhat confused perspective; but it is important that the United States should search out the facts, reason to logical conclusions, and take the true measure of the U-boat.

Arm of the Weaker Combatant

The outstanding characteristic of the submarine, as the name indicates, is its ability to navigate below the surface of the water. This enables it to evade the enemy, to make a surprise attack, and to escape by hiding. These faculties are manifestly suitable for the weaker belligerent to use against the stronger enemy. Navies that dominate, that have power to seek and destroy in the open, are not dependent upon abilities to evade and to hide. It is for this reason that allied submarines have found their chief opportunity to strike in sea areas controlled by the fleets of the Central Powers, the Baltic, Dardanelles, and other waters close to Teutonic bases, while German submarines have been active in all other ocean areas within the cruising radius of their U-boats. Since the Allies control practically all the high seas, the

field of the U-boat has been large, while the activities of allied submarines have been confined to the relatively narrow coastal waters controlled by Germany, Austria, and Turkey.

Without depreciating the utility of the . submarine, it may be truly said that if the Allies had not possessed a single one they would still, in all probability, have been able to enjoy the incalculable advantages that surface control of the seas has given them. The German submarines, moreover, have not proved effective against enemy battle fleets; and in order to facilitate their commerce-destroying operations they have found it necessary, because of inherent weaknesses, to adopt methods in violation of the laws of civilized warfare. Before going deeper into the uses and limitations of the submarine it might be well to touch briefly upon some of the rules governing its legitimate employment.

Rules of International Law

The purpose of rules regulating oceanborne intercourse in times of peace and governing both belligerent and neutral conduct in time of war is to carry out practically the principles of the freedom. of the seas, and it need hardly be added that these principles are identical with those grounding all rules of right conduct at sea and on shore; namely, principles of liberty, justice, and humanity.

As weapons and other conditions change, new situations arise which may require modifications in these rules; but both in time of peace and in time of war reason calls for a general concurrence of Governments before a modified or new rule can become operative; and any belligerent instituting methods in violation of previously established regulations assumes the burden of proof to show that new conditions compel new rules in order to carry out the never-changing principles of the freedom of the seas.

There is little room for confusion of thought on this point. Unfortunately, however, it is the experience of wartime practice that military necessity and the doctrine of "might makes right" twist these rules into a bewildering tangle. One belligerent breaks a rule and

attempts to justify his conduct. The enemy, as a matter of policy, turns a deaf ear to the arguments in justification, and, seeing only the broken rule, proceeds to retaliate by breaking another rule on the ground that military necessity forces him to resort to this act of reprisal. And so one act of reprisal leads to another until unconscionable degrees of lawlessness are reached.

It has been suggested as a possible solution obviating the difficulties of drawing up a set of good working rules to govern naval operations against commerce that one sweeping sanction of immunity might suffice by which all trade ships would be allowed to carry on their peaceful pursuits unmolested in time of war as in time of peace. The objection, however, to such a rule is, that when the world is divided between nations at peace and nations at war, this rule would satisfy peoples at peace and one side of the belligerents, but the other belligerents would find it discriminatory and would oppose it as an infringement upon their rights to use the seas in accordance with principles of equity and freedom.

To deny belligerents, moreover, their right to use the seas for suppressing enemy commerce and imposing economic pressure in order to hasten the settlement of their differences, would deprive the world of what is generally looked upon, when conducted according to the rules of civilized warfare, as a humane method of re-establishing conditions of peace. It may be added that those who aim at a world peace secured by a concert of power may reasonably assert that, while the freedom of the seas is a foundation principle on which to make a world peace secure, naval power, by instituting blockades, may at times prove a humane and effective means of compelling recalcitrant Governments to observe the provisions of this peace.

Certain Established Rules

During a war, the maritime interests of belligerents and neutrals are bound to conflict; and it is impossible to give either of them unlicensed use of the seas without restricting the freedom of the other. Hence a compromise is necessary,

and so long as nations recognize a state of war as involving conditions subject to law in which both belligerents and neutrals have rights, it is manifest that rules are required to define and guarantee these rights. It will not be attempted here to examine closely the many rules drawn to govern naval warfare, some of which were still subjects of controversy when the present war began; but, as an aid to the memory, a few of the recognized and established regulations affecting the use of the submarine will be briefly outlined:

1. A blockade to be binding must be effective; that is, it must be maintained by a force sufficient to render ingress to or egress from the enemy coast line dangerous.

2. A blockade must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts.

3. During the continuance of a state of blockade no vessels are allowed to enter or leave the blockaded place without consent of the blockading authority.

4. The prohibition of contraband trade with the attendant adjudging of penalties is a belligerent right. This right can only be exercised upon the high seas and the territorial waters of the belligerents and in accordance with the rules and usages of international law. (Contraband of war may be defined as articles destined for the enemy and capable of use as an assistance to the enemy in carrying on war either ashore or afloat.)

5. Lawfully commissioned public vessels of a belligerent nation may exercise the right of visiting and searching merchant ships upon the high seas. whatever be the ship, the cargo, or the destination. If the examination of ship's papers and search show fraud, contraband, an offense in respect of blockade, or enemy service, the vessel may be seized. Force may be used to overcome either resistance or flight, but condemnation follows forcible resistance alone. In exercising these rights belligerents must conform to the rules and usages of international law.

6. When a vessel in action surrenders, (usually indicated by hauling down the national flag or showing the white flag of truce,) firing must cease on the part of the victor. To continue an attack after knowledge of surrender, or to sink a vessel after submission, is a violation of the rules of civilized warfare only permissible in cases of treachery or renewal of the action.

7. Absolute contraband, including guns, ammunition, and the like, is liable to capture on the high seas or in the territorial waters of the belligerents if it is shown to be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to the armed forces of the

At the beginning of the war Great Britain might have taken advantage of the well-established case of our legal blockade of the Confederate States. A summary of the steps by which this civil war blockade was made legally effective will be found in the article, "American Tactics in the Present War," in CURRENT HISTORY MAGAZINE for November, 1916.

Instead of proclaiming a legal blockade of Germany, Great Britain in an Admiralty order, Nov. 2, 1914, announced military areas in the North Sea, trusting to British command of the sea, which at that time seemed undisputed. This was an unfortunate move, for the possibilities of the submarine were not considered; and Germany was able to retaliate by declaring all waters about Great Britain and Ireland a 66 war zone," beginning Feb. 18, 1915.

Great Britain at once realized her mistake, and by an Order in Council proclaimed a blockade of Germany, March 1, 1915. But the harm had been done, and the pernicious war area had been evolved. On Jan. 27, 1917, the British Admiralty announced that the area in the North Sea had been enlarged. This was modified Feb. 13, 1917. On Jan. 31, 1917, Germany sent to the neutral nations the "barred zone" note announcing unrestricted submarine warfare beginning on Feb. 1, 1917.

Armed Merchantmen

Merchantmen have the right to arm for defense. A merchantman may repel an attack by any enemy ship, but only a man-of-war can attack men-of-war.

According to international law the character of a ship is determined by her employment; and it is an established right of merchant vessels that they may carry arms-for defense only-without necessarily altering their status before the law as traders engaged in legitimate

peaceful pursuits. This right is well established by precedent, and although prolific of complications, it has on the whole operated to sustain the principles of freedom of the seas. Its usefulness was conspicuous in the days of piracy; and the "long toms" on board our clipper ships proved strong arguments in suppressing lawlessness.

In the heat of war, moreover, belligerents are inclined to infringe the privileges of noncombatants, and experience has shown that the right of merchant vessels to arm for defense has tended to prevent belligerents from unlawful interference with peaceful traffic. The belligerent right to stop, visit, search, and capture merchantmen is a high sovereign power, and it seems reasonable to require that the vessels authorized to exercise it should possess potential strength. It would be a somewhat absurd condition, inviting abuse and irregularity, if rules were so framed as to permit a fast enemy motor boat, manned by three or four men armed with rifles, to stop, search, and capture an ocean liner, without allowing the liner to attempt lawfully either flight or resistance. On the other hand, a motor boat, submarine, or any other duly commissioned and authorized man-of-war has the right to employ force to overcome resistance or to prevent flight; and the merchantman has no redress for damage sustained during attempted flight or resistance. In the majority of cases, it is obvious that prudence will influence merchantmen to surrender promptly in the face of a respectably powerful man-of-war rather than forfeit immunity by attempting flight or resistance.

If an armed merchantman of a neutral country on friendly terms with the warring nations should resist by force a belligerent man-of-war, the neutral Government would properly discountenance the act as incompatible with the relations of amity existing between the two countries. If, however, neutral rights are violated to an intolerable degree a state of armed neutrality may supplant the relations of amity, and under these unusual conditions a Government has the right and may be in duty bound to pre

serve its neutrality by using such force as the circumstances may require; but in this delicate situation care must be exercised that force is used only in defense of neutral rights.

Blockades and Submarines

From the beginning of the war submarines have helped to prevent a close blockade of the coasts of the Central Powers, and the inability on the part of the allied navies to institute a coast line blockade strictly in accordance with the established rules of international law has led to what is generally known as a distant blockade. The so-called Orders in Council regulating this distant blockade have lengthened the contraband lists and extended the doctrine of ultimate destination until Germany's commerce with noncontiguous countries has been practically cut off.

As the effectiveness of the blockade increased, military necessity demanded that Germany do something to counteract it. The only weapon her navy could use was the submarine. Underwater attack against the blockading battle fleets met with little success; but the unscrupulous use of the submarine as a commerce destroyer brought better results. The vigorous protest of neutrals against the violation of their rights caused Germany, for a time, to make an effort to comply with the rules and usages of international law; but this effort proved ineffectual. The vulnerability of the submarine, with the increasing efficacy of the ways and means developed to safeguard merchantmen from its attack, presented to the German Government the alternative either of suffering a curtailment of submarine effectiveness or of abandoning lawful methods. Germany's decision to take the latter course was announced to the world by official notification that within a war zone embracing large areas of the high seas her submarines would sink all ships, neutral or belligerent, without warning. It was further announced that a weekly neutral steamer here and there would be spared, provided Germany's orders respecting cargo and behavior were carefully observed.

In tracing the developments leading to