The Elgar Companion to Public ChoiceWilliam F. Shughart, Laura Razzolini Edward Elgar Publishing, 01/01/2003 - 776 من الصفحات '. . . this compendium offers a solid introduction into an economic field that is gaining in influence.' _ Detmar Doering, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 'The first essay in this volume, "Public Choice at the Millennium," by the two |
المحتوى
The old and new public choice Chicago versus Virginia | 3 |
Property rights private and political institutions | 33 |
The logic of collective action | 59 |
Social choice theory | 83 |
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK | 115 |
Constitutional choice | 117 |
Monarchies hereditary and nonhereditary | 140 |
The anatomy of political representation direct democracy parliamentary democracy and representative democracy | 157 |
The interestgroup theory of government | 357 |
Rent seeking and rent extraction | 379 |
Public choice and public finance | 396 |
Politics and the macro economy | 422 |
Monetary policy | 440 |
The politics of government growth | 457 |
Is trust in government compatible with trustworthy government? | 479 |
THE PUBLIC CHOICE REVOLUTION | 495 |
INSTITUTIONS AND MECHANISMS OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE | 181 |
Institutions durability and the value of political transactions | 183 |
Voting | 197 |
On legislatures and legislative efficiency wages | 240 |
Bureaucracy | 258 |
Rational choice theories of bureaucratic control and performance | 271 |
The judiciary | 293 |
Money | 310 |
Ideology | 328 |
Clubs and club goods | 337 |
PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY | 355 |
Public choice as an experimental science | 497 |
The public choice approach to economic history | 512 |
Law and economics | 547 |
Public choice and the environment | 590 |
Institutions policy and economic growth | 611 |
Public choice and economic growth Randall | 628 |
The international economy in public choice perspective | 645 |
References | 673 |
| 751 | |
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عبارات ومصطلحات مألوفة
agency agenda allocation alternative analysis argue behavior benefits Borda count Buchanan budget bureau bureaucratic choice theory collective action common law companion to public competition constitutional constraints contract contributions courts cycles decision democracy democratic direct democracy economic growth economists effect efficient election electoral Elgar companion empirical environmental equilibrium example expenditures factors function ideology important incentives income increase incumbent individual influence interest groups issue Journal judiciary Law Merchant legislative legislature literature marginal maximize ment monetary policy optimal organization outcomes output party percent politicians predictions preferences prisoner's dilemma problem produce property rights public choice public choice theory rational rational ignorance redistribution regulation rent seeking representative representative democracy self-interest social choice social choice theory social welfare function spending Stigler studies theorem tion Tollison trade transaction costs transfers Tullock variables voting wealth Weingast welfare welfare economics